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Introduction: Military Maintenance  
in Early Modern Europe
The Northern Exposure
Petri Talvitie and Juha-Matti Granqvist
University of Helsinki
Military and civil spheres are more or less isolated enclaves in 
our present-day Western world. Soldiers live and operate separate 
from the rest of the society, and, besides the annual parades and 
the possible compulsory military service, these two worlds have 
little contact. Wars are even more remote incidents, as they are 
mostly fought in far-away countries.
In early modern Europe, the situation was different. Not only 
was the continent war-torn, but the civil and military spheres 
were also closely interwoven during peacetime. The period from 
the 16th century onwards has been characterised as the age of 
military revolution: warfare was modernised, the size of armies 
grew rapidly, and more and more state revenues were needed to 
construct fortresses and navies, as well as to fund and provision 
the troops. Scholars like Geoffrey Parker have even attributed the 
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birth of the modern bureaucratic state to the military revolution, 
as nations had to collect their taxes and manage their resources 
more efficiently than before to sustain their growing armies.1
Pre-19th-century armies were not public institutions to the 
same extent that they are today – or at least were during the 19th 
and 20th centuries. European rulers delegated the construction of 
warships and fortresses to private contractors, and their services 
were also used for arms and munitions manufacturing, clothing, 
army transportation and the provisioning of armies and navies. 
Furthermore, intermittent warfare was often funded by wealthy 
merchants and other private individuals, who became important 
financiers and subcontractors for the crown.
In the past few decades, there has been a marked global trend 
towards privatisation in national services and an increased use of 
contractors in military supply and operations. Arguably, all West-
ern armies have become more or less dependent on private sup-
pliers and security services. To understand this development, it 
is worth looking back at how armies were sustained before the 
French Revolution. Early modern states could not have managed 
without resorting to civilians – national or foreign – specialised in 
bridging the gap between supply and demand.
***
The prevalence of private contracting and the army’s dependence 
on civilian maintenance has been highlighted by several historians 
discussing the nature of early modern warfare. One of the early 
major examples is Fritz Redlich’s 1960s study The German Military 
Enterpriser and His Work Force, which traces the evolution of 
mercenary troops in Germany between 1450 and 1650.2 Also, 
the importance of the billeting system has been recognised in the 
earlier research.3 It is justified to argue, however, that, during 
 1 Parker 1988.
 2 Redlich 1966; also, Géza Perjés refers to contractors in his compara-
tive article on army provisioning in Europe: Perjés 1970, pp. 49–51.
 3 See, e.g. van Creveld 1977, p. 7.
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the past 20 years or so, the theme has received much more sys-
tematic attention in historical research than before, and, as a result 
of this renewed interest in non-state actors’ involvement, some of 
the established conceptions of civil–military relations have 
been challenged.
Most recent studies concentrate on the outsourcing of military 
activities, which was a common practice throughout Europe in 
the early modern period and particularly in France, Spain, Britain 
and the Netherlands, as well as in several German principalities. 
According to David Parrott, 17th-century military commanders 
were basically proprietors of their regiments, acting relatively 
independently through their own networks of arms producers, 
merchants, transport operatives and creditors.
The level of outsourcing was probably highest in Britain, where 
responsibility for most war supplies and manufacturing was 
assumed by private entrepreneurs rather than by government 
establishments during the 18th century. Uniforms, equipment, pro-
visions, and horse fodder were purchased on contract, and large 
fortifications in England were built by contractors. Also, the vast 
majority of British warships were provided by merchant shipyards. 
Traditionally, merchants operating in the military business have 
been accused of rent-seeking at the expense of the crown, but recent 
studies have found that the level of corruption was actually quite 
low. In reality, the British military supply system worked in a highly 
efficient manner, which partly explains Britain’s naval and military 
success in the Seven Years War and in the Napoleonic Wars.4
What is common to all the studies mentioned above is their 
desire to re-examine established conceptions about the impact of 
war and military organisation in state formation. According to the 
older standard narrative, put forward especially by Charles Tilly, 
the nearly constant and resource-demanding nature of warfare 
between the late 15th and early 19th centuries forced European 
rulers to centralise their administration and to develop efficient 
and meritocratic administrative machineries to collect resources 
– land, labour and capital – from the territories they ruled. As 
 4 Lynn 1997; Bannerman 2008; Knight & Wilcox 2010; Parrott 2012; 
Goossens 2014; Torres-Sánchez 2016; Torres-Sánchez et al. 2018. 
4 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
regards the armed forces, they had also been absorbed directly 
into the state’s administrative structure by the 18th century, dras-
tically curtailing the involvement of independent contractors.
Historical literature on the topic has termed this new type of 
state the national state, the power state, the military state, or the 
fiscal-military state. According to Jan Glete, the lattermost term is 
the most useful one, because it puts equal emphasis on the income 
and expenditure parts of resource flows: European state budgets 
became enormously inflated during the early modern period, and 
most of the revenues were spent on war.5
David Parrott criticises these basic conceptions of state-capacity 
theorists by suggesting that ‘the scale, competence and resources 
of early modern governments have been greatly overestimated, 
and their capacity to achieve objectives correspondingly exag-
gerated’. In France, offices were sold to the wealthy elite to raise 
funds for the state, not to increase the efficacy of the administra-
tion. Elsewhere, the number of employees of the crown remained 
small and their freedom of action was curtailed by individual, 
territorial and institutional prerogatives.
The extensive outsourcing of public authority to private con-
tractors offered a solution to these restrictions; it was the most 
efficient means of mobilising military resources considering the 
limited political and administrative capabilities of early modern 
rulers. According to Parrott, the evolution of military enterprise 
created mechanisms by which rulers managed to achieve ‘a more 
extensive and effective mobilisation of private resources than 
would otherwise have been possible from their own fiscal and 
administrative capacities’. In that sense, there is no incompatibility 
between the growth of the power of the state and the development 
of a substantial sphere of private military activity.6
Why, then, were the contractors willing to offer credit and other 
services to the state despite the fact that wars were unpredictable 
events and the risk of losing everything was high? According 
 5 Tilly 1990; Glete 2010, p. 9.
 6 Parrott 2012, p. 316. See also Fynn-Paul et al. 2014, p. 10; Torres- 
Sánchez 2016. 
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to David Parrott, the principal motivation was profit: ‘Financial 
reward was a driving force in explaining the attraction of mili-
tary enterprise, and must be explored as a primary motive for 
the involvement of many commanders and colonels, as well as 
for those bankers and financiers who were willing to underwrite 
their activities, and those who provided the war goods, munitions 
and foodstuffs on credit against anticipated returns from military 
success.’ Likewise, social ambitions – noble titles, enhanced social 
status, and reinforced political standing in relation to the ruler – 
were important background factors, although Parrott admits that 
military enterprise was not ‘an easy and much-frequented route 
from obscure origins to high noble status’.7
A third model has been offered by Jan Glete, who emphasises 
the state’s role in the market with respect to protection and the 
control of violence. According to him, different social groups were 
willing to cooperate with the state in exchange for protection for 
their own activities. For instance, merchants involved in foreign 
trade benefited from rulers’ capability to control the seas. Glete’s 
explanation accepts that, in some European states, private con-
tracting was used because rulers did not have enough administra-
tive skills and power to run armed forces on their own. He insists, 
however, that ambitious rulers had ‘strong incentives to develop 
superior administrative capabilities of their own, and such capa-
bilities made it easier for them to cooperate with private groups 
who also had competence and access to resources’. In his view, 
private actors preferred to cooperate with strong rulers capable of 
actually ruling their territories.8
However, the phenomenon also had a reverse – and much less 
researched – side. Not all civilians involved in military mainte-
nance were wealthy merchants and ‘entrepreneurial commanders’ 
in search of profit and status. Common townspeople and rural 
communities were also massively involved in such maintenance 
operations in early modern Europe.
 7 Parrott 2012, pp. 241–250.
 8 Glete 2002; Glete 2010, p. 663.
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Giulio Ongaro’s recent work Peasants and Soldiers explores this 
side of the equation by concentrating on the Republic of Venice, 
where rural families provided hay, wood and housing for mer-
cenary troops, which the republic recruited almost constantly. 
Moreover, Venetian communities had to provide men and weap-
ons for rural militia – a numerically substantial subject army that 
was used for garrison duties and defensive warfare – and to ensure 
that the soldiers received adequate training and compensation. 
The agrarian population was also needed for the construction of 
fortresses, saltpetre production, and other military-related work.
Ongaro’s premises differ from studies devoted to military con-
tracting in that he includes all the non-state actors in his analy-
sis, including the rural elite, manual labourers, and peasants. 
Some of these groups, such as estate owners, managed to ben-
efit financially from the militarisation of the countryside, but in 
many Venetian regions the increased needs for provisioning and 
providing lodging for troops, together with the conscription of 
militiamen, oarsmen and sappers, caused severe economic diffi-
culties for rural dwellers.9 The same kind of argument has also 
been made for other European regions. According to Myron 
Gutmann, the lodgement of troops was the real scourge for the 
people in the Low Countries, rather than battles and sieges.10
***
The early modern Swedish Realm was, administration-wise, one of the 
most advanced countries in Europe. After emerging from the Middle 
Ages by cutting ties with the Danish-led Kalmar Union in the 1520s, 
it evolved quickly into an effective bureaucratic state under the 
forceful rule of the House of Vasa. A well-functioning government, 
efficient tax-collecting system and powerful military machine ena-
bled the northern kingdom to become a European superpower.
 9 Ongaro 2017.
 10 Gutmann 1980.
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During the so-called Swedish Age of Greatness, which more or 
less overlapped with the 17th century, the Swedes were in a near-
constant state of war with neighbouring nations – the Russian 
Empire, Poland, the German states and Denmark. Exploiting the 
military weakness and national disunity of their neighbours, they 
created a multinational realm that ruled most of the coasts of 
the Baltic Sea (see Figure 1.1). This greatness, however, was not 
permanent – the large and disjointed new realm was difficult to 
rule and vulnerable to attacks.
Figure 1.1: The Swedish conquests in 1560–1660. 
Source: Toivo 2007, p. 87. Map drawn by Petri Talvitie.
8 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
In the devastating Great Northern War (1700–1721), the neigh-
bours, who had caught up with the Swedes through their own 
military revolutions, got their revenge. As the result of the war, 
the Swedish Realm was reduced to its pre-greatness borders and 
downgraded to a second-rate European power.
In the 18th century, the Swedes turned from front-runners to 
underdogs. Most of their military budget went to the defence 
of their new smaller realm, rather than to waging wars of con-
quest, and the few wars they partook in ended more or less 
catastrophically. The Finnish War (1808–1809) marked the 
final humiliation: the old Swedish Realm was split in half, with 
Finland being annexed by the Russian Empire and the remaining 
part of the realm continuing its existence as the new Kingdom 
of Sweden.
As the Swedish military evolved, so too did the ways to man and 
maintain the army. For most of the Age of Greatness, the Swedish 
army was conscripted separately for every war, with every village 
obliged to provide able-bodied men to the service of the crown. 
From the 1680s onwards, conscription was replaced by the allot-
ment system, which allowed the realm to have a low-cost and rea-
sonably effective standing army. The villages were now obliged to 
recruit soldiers and give them a cottage and a patch of land. When 
such soldiers were not at war or tending to military exercises, they 
lived the life of a smallholding farmer.
The allotment system was in effect for all of the 18th century, 
but enlisted troops increasingly gained in stature beside it. Rap-
idly developing military branches such as the navy, as well as artil-
lery and fortifications, could not be manned by allotted troops, as 
they required soldiers who were in permanent service. This 
increased the size and importance of enlisted troops within the 
Swedish military machine. Unlike the allotted soldiers, who 
resided at the countryside, enlisted troops were a distinctively 
urban phenomenon, as the garrisons, naval bases and fortresses 
were concentrated in towns.
The early modern Swedish Realm is a well-known and often-
cited case amongst international military historians. Michael 
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Roberts, who fathered the concept of military revolution in the 
1950s, was a specialist in Swedish history and based his theoretical 
approach on Swedish examples.11 Also, Swedish historians them-
selves have been active in reworking and refining the concept. The 
front-runner has been the aforementioned Jan Glete, whose works 
on the connections between naval history and state-building are 
considered international classics.12
The concept, however, has also been fiercely attacked. Critics of 
Michael Roberts, such as Jeremy Black, have accused him on rely-
ing too much on Swedish history and thus overplaying the role of 
military in state-building. According to these critics, the Swedish 
Realm, with its reasonably well-functioning and uncorrupted 
governmental machine, was a European anomaly rather than a 
representative case.13
In building and upkeeping their military machine, the Swedes 
were eager to adopt the European models of maintenance. How-
ever, those models were developed in Western and Central Europe, 
where the populations were dense, distances short, agriculture 
productive, and towns large and wealthy. The Swedish Realm was 
a large and scarcely populated country where distances were long 
and weather harsh, and most of its towns would barely have been 
considered villages in the wealthier parts of the continent.
Many of the problems encountered by armies throughout 
Europe – such as the difficulty of gathering resources and organ-
ising transportation during autumn and winter months – were 
much more severe in the Swedish Realm.14 Some problems, 
in addition, were unique to the north – the freezing sea cut off 
maritime connections and made boat transportations impossible 
during wintertime, a problem that entrepreneurial commanders 
in Britain or France rarely had to consider.
 11 Roberts 1988.
 12 See, e.g. Glete 2002; Glete 2010.
 13 Black 1991.
 14 See, e.g. Black 1991, pp. 40–42.
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Although Sweden is a well-known and often-cited case, his-
torians like Michael Roberts and Jan Glete have researched the 
interaction between military and civil society mainly at the upper 
level, analysing the impact of military evolution on state forma-
tion and the development of modern bureaucracy. The grassroots 
level, namely the role played by ordinary towns and rural com-
munities in Sweden and Finland in terms of financing, feeding, 
accommodating and provisioning the army, has attracted 
less attention.
The role of civilians in army maintenance has been studied 
mainly during wartime. Most recently, Christer Kuvaja has stud-
ied how the Russian army utilised Finnish peasants for its main-
tenance operations during the occupation period of the Great 
Northern War (1713–1721), and Martin Hårdstedt has analysed 
the maintenance system of the Swedish army during the Finnish 
War (1808–1809).15 Peacetime civil–military interaction has so far 
been best analysed by the pan-Nordic research project Garnisons-
städer i norden (‘Garrison Towns in the North’) in the 1980s. The 
project analysed military towns in all the Nordic countries, with 
a special focus on the early modern period. However, it largely 
omitted themes like financing and maintenance, focusing on the 
military impact on the visual and demographic development of 
towns, and the rows and disputes between the army and civilian 
citizens regarding management of the local government and the 
right to conduct business in the military towns.16
***
The main objective of the present anthology is to analyse the 
role of civilians in the military supply systems in the early 
modern Swedish Realm, both in the towns and in the coun-
tryside. It aims to answer how the army sought to exploit 
 15 Kuvaja 1999; Hårdstedt 2002.
 16 See, e.g., Artéus 1997.
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civilians – burghers, peasants, entrepreneurs – in order to provi-
sion itself, and how the civil population managed to benefit from 
such cooperation.
David Parrott argues that typical early modern European gov-
ernments were ineffective, undermanned and corrupted, but 
managed to effectively mobilise military resources by cooperating 
with private under-contractors and financiers. At first glance, the 
situation seems to have been the reverse for the kings of Sweden: 
they had one of the most effective governments in Europe, but also 
a vast realm scarce of people and capital. The dichotomy between 
market-based and governmental allocation of resources lies at 
the core of this book. To what extent and in what ways were the 
Swedish decision makers able to utilise civil society in the build-
ing and upkeeping of its military machine, and how did the spe-
cial characteristics of the realm affect the said utilising?
The book does not concentrate on conscription, allotment or 
recruitment, which were arguably the most important ways that 
people in the towns and countryside subsidised the Swedish army. 
These themes have been actively studied by military historians 
both in Sweden and in Finland, and new openings have been pub-
lished even in recent years. Instead, it aims to give perspective to 
the much less researched theme of how the army used civil soci-
ety for its maintenance purposes: how did it purchase food, drink 
and accommodation for its soldiers and material for its needs, and 
how did it finance its military campaigns?
The outsourcing of military activities will be analysed in sev-
eral chapters focusing on such themes as the manufacturing 
of saltpetre, wartime credits and the provisioning of soldiers. 
These chapters offer an interesting point of comparison for stud-
ies devoted to more urbanised and densely populated regions. 
The different chapters are relatively independent of each other 
in terms of their approach to the overall themes of the book, 
as some of them are closely connected to the above-mentioned 
discussions on military enterprises and state formation, while 
others are more related to debates on civil–military relations in 
the Nordic countries.
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The concept of ‘civilians’ is understood broadly in the book. 
Several of its chapters discuss military officers who served as 
financers and providers of the Swedish army. As this financing 
and provisioning was not part of their official duties as officers, 
but a private business they ran on the side for various reasons – to 
gain financial profit, to look good in the eyes of the crown, or just 
to save their troops from starvation and slaughter – they are inter-
preted as civilian entrepreneurs.
The geographical focus of the book is the eastern part of the 
pre-1809 Swedish Realm. Referred during the Middle Ages simply 
as ‘Eastland’ (Österlandet), it was commonly known by the name 
of Finland during the early modern centuries. The eastern half of 
the realm was pivotal to the maintenance of the Swedish army, 
as it had strategic significance as a provider of raw materials, and 
it was Swedish Realm’s frontier against its perennial competitor, 
Russia. Most Russo-Swedish wars were fought on Finnish soil 
and required the efforts of Finnish country and town people – 
accommodating, feeding and provisioning the troops, sometimes 
for their own army, and sometimes for the occupying enemy.
Furthermore, Swedish crown’s peacetime plans and projects for 
the development of its eastern defences usually also required the 
efforts and services of Finnish peasants and townspeople, from 
the saltpetre production of the 17th century to the construction 
of the sea fortress of Sveaborg in the 18th century. Thus, the civil-
ian citizens of the eastern part of the realm were affected by the 
needs of military maintenance, both during wartime and in times 
of peace, more frequently than their western neighbours.
The chapters are thematically divided into three parts, the first 
of which deals with the financing of wars. It is opened by Jaakko 
Björklund, who in Chapter 2 illustrates how the officers of the 
Swedish army largely financed the Ingrian War (1609–1617), 
in which the Swedes conquered the provinces of Ingria and 
Kexholm from Russia. As half a century of almost uninterrupted 
warfare had emptied the treasuries of the Swedish Realm, and 
as it was simultaneously fighting another war against the Danes, 
the Ingrian War became almost a private enterprise of the high 
officers of the army. Björklund’s evidence shows that, without 
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the officers, their capital and connections, and their willingness 
to finance the warfare, the Ingrian War would have ended in 
catastrophe, instead of becoming one of the founding stones of 
Sweden’s Age of Greatness.
In Chapter 3, Kasper Kepsu continues the theme by discussing 
the burghers of Nyen, the Swedish settlement and largest trading 
town in Ingria, and their role as financers of the Great Northern 
War (1700–1721), which marked the end of Swedish Ingria and the 
ceding of the area back to Russia. As the battle over Ingria and 
Finland prolonged, the Nyen merchants – and particularly the 
wealthiest of them, Johan Henrik Frisius – became indispensable 
for the crown as suppliers and financiers. Even though Frisius and 
his colleagues were refugees from their destroyed hometown, they 
had better international connections and credit standing than 
the Swedish crown and managed to operate more efficiently at the 
markets than the royal officials.
In Chapter 4 that concludes the first part, Petri Talvitie analyses 
the sales of crown farms as a form of financing the war. The early 
modern Swedish crown was a major landowner, as, under Swedish 
law, all farms deserted or unable to pay their taxes three years in 
a row became crown property. Talvitie shows how the selling of 
these farms to private buyers became an important source of rev-
enue in the 18th century, first to finance the Great Northern War 
and later to cover the massive public debt created by the war. By 
purchasing crown farms, private Swedish and Finnish individuals 
became indirectly important financiers of war.
The second part deals with the role of countryside and rural 
population in military maintenance. It is opened by Mirkka 
Lappalainen, who in Chapter 5 analyses the manufacturing of 
potassium nitrate in late 16th- and early 17th-century Finland. In 
order to secure its self-sufficiency in gunpowder manufacturing at 
the eve of its Age of Greatness, the Swedish crown built a network 
of state-owned saltpetre works and obliged peasants to deliver the 
raw materials. The system did not function as hoped for several 
reasons, not least because of the burdensome ‘saltpetre tax’, which 
created conflicts between the local peasants and the crown’s men, 
and it was fairly quickly abandoned for other solutions.
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Next, in Chapter 6, Sampsa Hatakka discusses the mainte-
nance challenges of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, argu-
ably one of the biggest military catastrophes in Swedish history. 
Hatakka shows that maintenance problems were one of the root 
causes for the catastrophe. The war was declared without proper 
preparations, and the decision makers in Stockholm realised 
only too late that Finland lacked grain storages, mills and bak-
eries. The crown’s hastily attempts to improve the situation by 
building new infrastructure and outsourcing bread-making to 
civilians were of little avail, thanks to scarce population, lim-
ited resources, and transportation difficulties. Thus, the Swedish 
army had to use the critical first months of the war for solving 
maintenance problems instead of fighting, a fact that contrib-
uted heavily to its loss.
In Chapter 7, the final chapter of the third part, Anu Lahtinen 
offers a long-term microhistorical perspective of the effects of the 
military on the rural population by following the history of two 
southern Finnish villages, Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi, from the 16th 
to the 18th century. Although the villages were directly touched 
by war only a couple of times during the period, they were con-
tinuously shaped by the indirect presence of warfare and military 
readiness. They paid taxes to finance the military, lost a significant 
amount of their male workforce in wars, were obliged to provide 
upkeep for passing troops, and had to endure new manor lords 
who gained land grants in return for military service and dis-
turbed the local power balance.
The third part deals with the role of towns and urban population 
in military maintenance. The chapters by Juha-Matti Granqvist 
and Sofia Gustafsson discuss the town of Helsinki during 
the construction of Fortress Sveaborg. Founded in 1747 to be the 
keystone of the Swedish Realm’s eastern defence, Sveaborg was 
the biggest construction project in the history of the old realm and 
turned the small Finnish town of Helsinki into a massive building 
site. The fortress needed massive amounts of construction materi-
als, as well as food, drink and accommodation for its many thou-
sands of soldiers and workers.
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In Chapter 8, Juha-Matti Granqvist traces the evolution of 
the Helsinki burgher community during the fortress construc-
tion years, arguing that the close and long-lasting interaction 
between the town and the fortress gave birth to a special ‘military 
town bourgeoisie’. Guided by the forces of supply and demand, 
through the process of trial and error, the local burgher commu-
nity slowly evolved into a shape that was ideal in serving the mili-
tary. In Chapter 9, Sofia Gustafsson discusses the soldier billeting 
system, in which the townspeople were obliged to lodge soldiers in 
their homes. Gustafsson shows that, even though the billeting was 
a heavy burden to the local burghers, the co-existence of soldiers 
and civilians in same houses and rooms was in itself surprisingly 
peaceful. One of the reasons is that the garrison soldiers began, 
from an early stage, to interact closely with the local community, 
demonstrated for example by the numerous marriages between 
them and the local women.
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Officers as Creditors during  
the Ingrian War (1609–1617)
Jaakko Björklund
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Endless money forms the sinews of war.
— Marcus Tullius Cicero
From 1554 to 1660, the Swedish Realm was in a more or less 
permanent state of war against one or more of its neighbours. 
During this tumultuous period, organising, extracting and 
husbanding ‘national’ resources for warfare was the primary 
occupation and raison d’être of the developing fiscal-military state. 
Despite its minuscule population of only some 1.2 million and a 
small, underdeveloped economy, the Swedish Realm nonetheless 
managed to defeat its rivals and transform into a heavily milita-
rised Baltic empire.1
 1 Lindegren 2000, p. 133.
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This remarkable success, the heavy burden of war and their 
implications for the society have naturally attracted the attention 
of historians of diverse fields. However, from the point of view of 
military finances, the focus has mainly been on resource extrac-
tion by the central state: taxation, conscription, and state-run 
enterprises at home, as well as contributions and foreign subsi-
dies abroad.2 Much less attention has been paid to the role of per-
sonal agency and private enterprise in Swedish military finances.3 
Although the extensive use of mercenaries and military enter-
prisers willing to provide men, money and materials for war is a 
well-known fact, no deeper study of this business of war has 
been made. Furthermore, these entrepreneurs are still viewed as 
foreigners and other outsiders detached from the state, while in 
reality many were or became members of the Swedish elite and 
closely integrated with high administration and the royal court.4
In this chapter, I investigate the lending practices and credit net-
works of the officers, both domestic and foreign, of the Swedish 
army during the Ingrian War (1609–1617); a Russian civil war 
that the Swedes entered as ally to Czar Vasily IV, which soon 
turned into a war of conquest of the eastern Baltic sea region 
(see Figure 2.1). This was a war the Swedish Realm could not 
afford, and, as the army got little or no help from the central 
administration, it was left to fend for itself. It was largely thanks 
to the personal resources of private enterprisers and the army’s 
 2 See for example Lundkvist 1966, Lindegren 2000, Glete 2002, 
Hallenberg 2009 and Glete 2010. The most thorough study on 
17th-century Swedish war finances is Det kontinentala krigets 
ekonomi: Studier i krigsfinansiering under svensk stormaktstid by 
Hans Landberg, Lars Ekholm, Roland Nordlund and Sven A. Nilsson 
(1971). However, even the case studies of this collection assume a 
very macro-economic view of military finances.
 3 For an overview of the status of the debate regarding the role of per-
sonal agency, see Karonen & Hakanen 2017 and Fynn-Paul, ’t Hart, 
& Vermeesch 2014.
 4 For example in Linnarsson 2014.
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officers that Sweden managed to limp its way to victory eight 
years later.
I argue that, in the context of this particular war, the state use of 
credit advanced by its officers was a mutually beneficial solution. 
Officers were important intermediaries in a chain of borrowing, 
which tied social and mercantile groups behind the crown’s war 
effort. Thanks to the good credit and broad connections of the 
Figure 2.1: The eastern Baltic sea region at the turn of the 17th century.
Source: Map drawn by Kasper Kepsu and Petri Talvitie.
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officers, the state gained access to otherwise inaccessible resources 
at better terms than it could otherwise manage. Officers’ credit 
was also crucial to overcoming the recurring failures of the state’s 
supply apparatus and preventing military collapse. In turn, many 
officers were greatly enriched or otherwise benefited from lending 
to the crown.
The chapter is divided into three parts. I begin with a presenta-
tion of the various means and mechanisms through which officers 
advanced credit to the crown during recruitment and, subse-
quently, during the war. In the second part, I outline the sources of 
the funds advanced by officers, and their links to a broader credit 
network. Finally, in the third section I look at how officers were 
repaid for their services, and the kind of rewards they could hope 
to receive.
Credit and Military Supply
Officers played an important role in supplying the Swedish mili-
tary effort. Besides shouldering a large burden of the recruitment 
of troops and mobilising resources at the start of the war, officers 
continued to provide funds and credit throughout the war to make 
up for the inadequacy of state-organised military supply. These 
loans helped the army tide over the worst disasters and increased 
the duration that the army could be kept in the field.
Recruitment
Foreign troops formed the backbone of the Swedish army in 
the Ingrian War. A few years prior to the outbreak of the war, the 
Swedish conscript army had been virtually annihilated by a smaller 
Polish force at the battle of Kirkholm. Estimates for Swedish 
losses at Kirkholm range from 6,000 to 8,000 men, over 1% of the 
total male population, and a much higher percentage of those of 
fighting age. As a result, the Swedish army became increasingly 
dependent on foreigners to make up the numbers and improve 
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the quality of the army. German, British, French and Dutch 
soldiers, among others, answered the call. Although domestic 
troops still constituted half the numbers, the foreigners bore the 
brunt of the fighting.5
Recruitment of these foreign troops depended heavily on credit 
advanced by recruiting officers. Acting as military enterprisers, 
foreign officers would contract to recruit a unit of a specified 
composition and equipment, by a certain time, for a fixed fee. The 
crown would defray some of the costs, most notably by some-
times providing infantry with arms and armour and cavalry with 
mounts, as well as a small advance payment of laufgeld or anritt, 
but the bulk of costs were to be borne by the officers.6 These costs 
included recruitment money, equipment, and upkeep for the men 
between recruitment and the first muster.
Muster was to be held at an agreed port and in the presence of 
Swedish commissaries, who would inspect the troops. After mak-
ing deductions based on shortcomings and advance payments, the 
commissary would then pay the officer his commission, before 
boarding the men onto ships and sending them to Sweden. If an 
officer managed to schedule the various tasks properly and get 
 5 Domestic infantry was mostly used as garrison troops and as local 
militia near the border. Most were reluctant to serve abroad, and 
the Swedish king had a particularly difficult time forcing troops 
from mainland Sweden to serve in Finland, let alone in Russia. The 
total population of the Swedish Realm at the time of the battle of 
Kirkholm was in the region of 1.2 million. Mankell 1865, pp. 11, 
20–21 and Appendix 8; Lindgren 2000, p. 133.
 6 Laufgeld (for infantry) and anritt (for cavalry) were standardized 
payments in the international mercenary market, originally intended 
to cover living expenses for recruits traveling between the recruiting 
place and muster place and issued to recruits when they first signed 
up. However, the way the Swedes used these terms in documents and 
correspondence seem to refer to all funds advanced to assist recruit-
ing officers prior to the first muster. See Redlich 1964, pp. 41–42.
26 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
men and equipment at advantageous rates, then he could expect 
to recover the advanced sums, and perhaps even make a profit.7
Companies, headed by captains, formed the basic building blocks 
for recruitment.8 In the period 1606–1616, infantry was typically 
recruited in companies of 200 men at a commission of 1,600 Swedish 
dalers9 per full company, excluding arms and armour, which 
the Swedes would provide and deduct from pay. Cavalry was far 
more expensive and, to make it manageable for enterprisers, was 
recruited in companies of 100–150 troopers, with more allowance 
for deviating from the contracted number of troopers. More lightly 
armoured cavalry was to be supplied with an arquebus, pistol, 
sword and helmet, for which the recruiter would receive 26 dalers 
per trooper. Most expensive were the plate-armoured cuirassiers, 
armed with a sword and pair of pistols or lance, which were com-
missioned at a rate of 35 dalers per man.10
During the Ingrian War, the Swedes continued to follow the ear-
lier practice of contracting individual captains to recruit their own 
companies, which would then be loosely combined into regiments 
 7 RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Philip Scheding and Hans 
Nilsson 26.4.1606; Charles IX to Henrik Horn, Anders Haraldsson 
and Henrik Eriksson 5.9.1607.
 8 Cavalry companies were called cornets or fana, while infantry were 
either fänika or companies. For the sake of simplicity, I shall refer to 
all these company-level units, both infantry and cavalry, as compa-
nies and their leaders as captains.
 9 The Swedish daler (henceforth simply daler) was a unit of account, 
equal to 4 marks or 32 öre. As most accounts are conducted in dalers, 
I have used this throughout this chapter. Actual payments were made 
in a variety of Swedish, Russian and foreign coinage, as well as luxury 
furs and other materials. Inflation was considerable and exchange 
rates fluctuated. Unless an exchange rate has been specifically pro-
vided, I have calculated the riksdaler at 6 marks and 1 daler equal to 
28 denga (0.28 rubles), which were the norm in military accounts. 
Edvinsson (2010).
 10 RA, Diplomatica Hollandica vol 1, Hans Nilsson to Charles IX 
28.7.1607.
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or larger detachments. However, there was an increasing trend 
towards organising recruitment through higher-level enterprisers, 
capable of recruiting multiple companies or entire regiments of 
some five to six companies (1,000–1,200 infantry or 500–600 
cavalry), which they would then command with the rank of colonel 
or higher. Besides reducing the administrative burden of con-
tracting multiple enterprisers, this development was encouraged 
by the Swedish crown’s keenness to secure the services of foreign 
aristocrats with both fiscal and social capital.11
Officers were very dependent on their social standing and net-
works for recruitment. It was common for men to be recruited 
from among the enterprisers’ personal affinity, from his tenants 
and clients or, more broadly, from the populace of his area of 
origin or the area where he held government office.12 Success-
ful recruiters were also able to subcontract and delegate part of 
their task to subordinates, family and other contacts. These agents 
would each be allocated a certain region or place in which to 
recruit and would undertake part of the responsibility for man-
aging and financing the process. Thus, although a colonel held 
overall responsibility for recruiting a regiment and served as the 
frontman towards the Swedish crown, funding was actually shared 
by a larger group. This was beneficial both to the crown, which 
gained access to a broader credit network, and to the enterprisers, 
who could share the burden and risks.
Though information on how much funds various officers actu-
ally advanced remains sparse, the sums appear to have been 
considerable. Colonel Jacob Spens provided at least 9,214 dalers 
and 8 öre for the recruitment of a regiment of Scottish infantry, 
for which he was repaid in 1610. Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie, 
commander of the Swedish army, used 4,000 riksdalers (6,000 
 11 RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Hans Nilsson and Philip Scheding 
25.3.1606, and Charles IX to Evert Horn and Hans Nilsson 12.7.1607.
 12 Trim 2011, pp. 158, 185–186; RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, 
Casteguison to Charles IX 3.5.1608, De Corbeille to Charles IX 
23.5.1608, Francois des Essars to Charles IX 17.9.1608.
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dalers) of his own funds to recruit some 650 infantry, plus further 
funds to reform existing companies into his own lifeguard regi-
ment at a time when reinforcements from Sweden were not forth-
coming.13 Smaller sums were provided by captains, such as Daniel 
Hepburn, who brought 479.75 riksdalers (720 dalers) worth of 
clothes and cash for the troops recruited by De la Gardie.14
Particularly difficult and expensive was the recruitment of cav-
alry, which required the purchase of expensive equipment and spe-
cialised troopers. In 1607 and 1608, when Swedish recruitment was 
at its peak, competition on the recruiting market was severe, and it 
was difficult to obtain arms and armour quickly or inexpensively. 
Manufacturers also required half of the pay up front and in cash. 
As enterprisers operated largely on credit, obtaining cash posed 
its own difficulties, particularly since lending from professional 
moneylenders could be expensive. Furthermore, enterprisers 
were reluctant to provide funds early on, preferring to minimise 
risks and costs by deferring payments as late as possible.15
 13 RA, Kommissariats m.fl räkenskaper och handlingar, Account of 
Swedish crown's debts to Colonel Jacob Spens in 1610. It is possi-
ble that Spens had lent even more, for which he had already been 
repaid. Spens had been contacted as early as 1605 to recruit 1,600 
infantry and 600 cavalrymen. In 1608 these numbers were amended 
to 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalrymen, though it would seem that 
eventually only 1,200 infantrymen recruited by Spens arrived. 
However, Spens was also directly and indirectly involved with the 
recruitment of other Scottish forces, so it remains unclear what these 
costs actually entailed. See Fischer 1907, pp. 71–73; Grosjean 2003, 
pp. 26–30; Murdoch and Grosjean ‘James Spens’ (SSNE); AOSB I:2 
pp. 150–153, Axel Oxenstierna to Jacob De la Gardie 16.10.1613; 
TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 836–839, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxen-
stierna 18.12.1613; KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/14, 1615/12; Gener-
alstaben 1936, pp. 433–434.
 14 LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol, 6:1, Jacob De la Gardie’s prom-
issory note for Daniel Hepburn 25.11.1613.
 15 At this time, pistols and holsters cost 8.5 riksdaler (12.75 dalers) and 
cavalry armour 16 riksdaler (24 dalers) per set. RA, Skrivelser till 
Hertig Karl, Karl IX, Wilhelm von Danzig to Charles IX February 
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Swedish mismanagement of the process incurred additional 
difficulties and costs. Recruitment was primarily financed with 
the crown’s sale of copper, iron and other mining products to 
international merchants, who would provide bills of exchange 
to pay recruiters abroad. However, the Swedes tried to recruit too 
many troops at once, and had difficulties providing the resources 
on time. The crown’s lack of credit and complications caused by 
overseas travel and communications meant that payments were 
delayed, and ships and money arrived in the wrong places at the 
wrong time.
Enterprisers recruiting troops were confused by the uncertainty 
and, for fear of personal losses, held back on drawing up their 
troops until payment was certain. A lack of trust combined with 
the difficulty of travel to the Swedish Realm also caused problems, 
as officers refused to sail before receiving their pay in full, whereas 
the Swedish crown was reluctant to advance funds prior to the 
first muster, and wished to control shipping so that the recruits 
would not desert. Finally, diplomatic incidents with the United 
Provinces and the Stuart monarchy, as well as a war with Denmark 
in 1611–1613, made the import of already recruited troops from 
Western Europe difficult at times.
The net effect of these shortcomings was that during the most 
intense period of recruitment, from 1606 to 1610, the process was 
drawn-out and expensive. Many units had to wait more than a 
year abroad before finally arriving in the Swedish Realm. During 
this entire time, officers were forced to arrange additional funds to 
maintain their men, or risk dissolution and loss of all their assets. 
To the detriment of recruiters, what should have been short-term 
loans of a few months became costly medium-term loans of over 
a year.
What followed was a great deal of incrimination and haggling 
between the Swedish crown and the enterprisers over who was 
to blame and who should pay the extra cost. The crown agreed to 
1608, Regis de Vernet to Charles IX 28.11.1607, La Borde to Charles 
IX 6.6.1608; Terjanian 2005.
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pay for some of the upkeep and help with procuring equipment, 
yet the officers’ debts kept accumulating. For example, a year after 
his commission to recruit 500 French cuirassiers for a contract 
sum of 17,500 dalers, Henri de la Borde de Luxe complained that 
he had only received 2,500 florins (1,250 dalers), despite having 
spent more than 7,500 dalers of his own money.16 In another let-
ter, La Borde was growing concerned that his advances might 
soon exceed 10,000 dalers, and demanded additional security 
for repayment.17
Regis de Vernet, another colonel recruiting 580 arquebusiers for 
15,080 dalers, complained in June 1607 that he had already 
advanced 6,103 livres (2,560 dalers) for the upkeep of 60 men and 
the purchase of 150 suits of armour. On top of this, Vernet had 
provided 2,500 livres (1,050 dalers) to his subordinate captains 
for their recruitment. Six months later, the advanced sum had 
risen to 4,928.5 dalers, while at least one of the four subordinate 
captains had spent 500 crowns (625 dalers) to recruit ‘good men’ 
from Languedoc.18
Eventually, settlements were reached with many of the recruiters. 
The Swedes feared that failure to meet some of the enterprisers’ 
demands would cause them to lose the recruits they desperately 
needed, as well as cause irreparable damage to the reputation 
of the Swedish crown on the international mercenary market.19 
 16 RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, De la Borde to Charles IX 
6.6.1608.
 17 RA, Kommissariats m.fl. Räkenskaper och handlingar, Sieur de la 
Borde´s request to Charles IX 1608; RA, Diplomatica Hollandica 
vol 1, Charles IX to Hans Nilsson 28.7.1607; RA, Skrivelser till 
Hertig Karl, Karl IX, Regis de Vernet to Charles IX 13.8.1607.
 18 RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Hans Nilsson and Augustino 
Cassiodoro 28.2.1608; RA, Latinska riksregistraturet, Charles IX to 
Regis de Vernet 28.2.1608; RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, 
Costeguison to Charles IX 1.12.1607 and 3.5.1608, Regis de Vernet 
to Charles IX 4.6.1607.
 19 RA, Diplomatica Hollandica vol 1, Hans Nilsson to Söffring Jönsson 
27.7.1607.
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Enterprisers were allowed to bring fewer men than agreed and 
with incomplete equipment. The crown squeezed additional funds 
through mercantile credit, and the recruiters agreed to send over 
part of their units, while making new contracts for the recruit-
ment of the remainder and additional troops.
Despite these difficulties, the Swedish crown eventually man-
aged to recruit tens of thousands of foreign troops, of whom per-
haps 16,000–20,000 took part in the Ingrian War at one point or 
another.20 The expense was enormous. In 1609, La Borde claimed 
that French enterprisers alone had provided 500,000 dalers for the 
recruitment and salaries of their men, which remained unpaid.21 
Though this sum was certainly exaggerated, it is clear that this 
army could not have been mobilised without significant credit 
from enterprising officers.
Problems of military supply
Whereas recruitment relied on the private credit of contractors, 
the subsequent pay, upkeep and resupply of the recruited forces 
was the responsibility of the crown. Officers and soldiers were 
supposed to receive their pay on a monthly basis in cash (sold) or, 
more commonly, with a roughly 50–50 mixture of cash and kind 
(commis). As was typical for early modern warfare, the crown’s 
 20 This is a rough estimate based on calculations from figures in 
Generalstab (1936), muster rolls (KrA, Militieräkningar) and var-
ious commissary accounts (RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper 
och handlingar), as well as pay and supply accounts (RA, Proviant-
räkenskaper 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 12 and 13). This figure includes only 
troops who ended up serving in the Ingrian War. As the Swedish Realm 
was also fighting other wars at the time, the total number of recruited 
troops in this period is higher. I have also excluded thousands of 
Polish and Russian troops who fought for pay in the Swedish army 
but were not recruited by the Swedes.
 21 RA, Diplomatica Gallica vol. 548, Larmen Borgereich to Erik Jörensson 
3.8.1609.
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policy was that national resources would pay for recruitment and 
mobilisation, but that otherwise the war should pay for itself.22
For the first 15 months of the war, this worked well. The com-
pact, 5,000-man army that crossed the border in February 1609 
started the war as an allied detachment of Czar Vasily IV’s army. 
As agreed with the czar’s representatives, the army would be 
paid in full by the Russians. Though there were some tensions 
with regard to the payment of wages and military policy, the 
main army received most of what was agreed and fought a suc-
cessful campaign to drive back Vasily IV’s rebellious rivals and 
liberate Moscow.23
However, the military situation changed drastically in July 
1610, as the combined Russo-Swedish army suffered ignominious 
defeat against a far smaller Polish-Lithuanian host at the battle 
of Klushino. The czar’s position collapsed, and the much-reduced 
Swedish army transformed from Russian ally to an occupier. In 
the future, the war would have to be financed with resources from 
Sweden and of those Russian territories which the Swedes man-
aged to occupy.
Unfortunately, the Swedish crown was ill-equipped to pay for 
the war. Besides the difficulty and cost of transporting supplies 
to Russia, the crown lacked the resources. As Chancellor Axel 
Oxenstierna put it, the country was in a deplorable state after 
52 years of almost constant warfare. The best of the men had 
already been killed and those who remained could not be paid 
or fed and were close to mutiny. The crown was out of money, all 
its credit was used up, and future revenues for many years had 
already been allocated to service mounting debts.24 Moreover, in 
 22 Ekholm 1971, p. 145.
 23 According to surviving accounts, the Russians paid 498,167 dalers in 
cash, clothes, and precious furs. This was sufficient to pay full wages 
for at least 10 months out of 14, besides which the army received 
provisions and quarters at various times. See KrA, Militieräkningar 
1609/5, 1609/21; RA Provianträkenskaper 11.3.
 24 AOSB I:2 pp. 42–47, Axel Oxenstierna (on behalf of the Privy 
Council) to Queen Dowager Christina 25.3.1612.
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April 1611, long-simmering tensions with Denmark escalated 
into the Kalmar War (1611–1613). The war with the Danes threat-
ened the heartlands of the Swedish Realm and was therefore of 
higher priority to the central administration than the offensives in 
Russia. The exorbitant indemnities of the Kalmar War, a million 
riksdalers, consumed virtually all of the crown’s resources, which 
left the army in Russia to fight the remainder of the war on a 
shoestring budget.
Starting from the rebuilding of the army in Russia in 1610 and 
1611, it began to rely increasingly on private capital advanced by 
both officers and civilian merchants. The capture of the important 
trading city of Novgorod with its surrounding territories in 1611 
alleviated the supply situation somewhat. However, by the end of 
the year the army was still in a deplorable state. A large portion 
of the troops were again unarmed and without mounts, which was 
due to ordinary wastage, but also because soldiers were forced to 
sell or pawn their equipment in order to get food.25 The army was 
close to mutiny and, in April 1612, the commander complained 
that no more than two and a half months’ wages had been received 
since the battle of Klushino 21 months earlier!26
By the start of 1613, commerce in Novgorod and other Russian 
cities under Swedish occupation had all but ground to a halt, 
and there were no more funds.27 In order to make ends meet, the 
commissariat and high command increasingly resorted to dubi-
ous means to stretch the limited resources. Methods included 
debasing the coinage, selectively using more favourable exchange 
 25 TUL, F6 Cordt 3B pp. 147–163, 173–181, Jacob De la Gardie to 
Charles IX 14.2.1611, 12.3.1611, 1.4.1611, 23.4.1611, 26.8.1611, 
3.10.1611, and pp. 188–193, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus 
Adolphus 30.12.1611.
 26 TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 859–866b, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus 
Adolphus 22.4.1612; AOSB II:5 pp. 5–12, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel 
Oxenstierna 22.4.1612.
 27 TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 767b–771a, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus 
Adolphus 24.1.1613; AOSB II:5 pp. 44–47, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel 
Oxenstierna 1.8.1613.
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rates, attempting to re-calculate a month as 40 days (with limited 
success), skimping on payments to the sick and wounded, and 
alternating between paying wages in cash or kind depending on 
which was cheaper.28 Contrary to his orders, Jacob De la Gardie 
was forced to send units to Finland, where their supply would be 
somebody else’s problem, while officers who had advanced large 
sums were sent to demand pay from the king himself.29
In the spring and summer of 1614, a much larger crisis devel-
oped rapidly and threatened to overwhelm the entire army. A 
failed harvest in 1613 combined with longstanding over-taxation 
meant that the grain production of the Novgorod region plum-
meted, and the army and civilian population faced starvation. 
Rye, which had previously cost 1 daler per barrel, had by 1613 
gone up to over 3 dalers, reached 5 dalers around New Year 1614, 
and skyrocketed to 15 dalers by the summer of 1614.30 By this 
point, many of the soldiers were eating horse meat and dying 
of malnutrition.31
Plague struck in the spring. It killed at least 7,652 burghers 
in Novgorod alone and also laid low a large part of the army.32 
The remaining Russian peasants and burghers mostly fled across 
the border, and even the meagre harvest could not be collected 
 28 RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Order of 
länung for Nils Assersson’s cavalry 1615; Berglund & Zakharov 
1983; KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5; RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.3.; 
TUL F6 Cordt 4 pp. 602–603b, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
27.7.1612. 
 29 AOSB II:5 pp. 39–42, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 
6.7.1613.
 30 TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 556–560a, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus 
Adolphus 13.3.1614.
 31 AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 
5.5.1614.
 32 AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 
5.5.1614; RA, Handlingar rörander proviantering o.d. (M 1287) 
Fol 19, List of deceased in Novgorod 1614.
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without Finnish conscripts sent to help.33 To make matters worse, 
a resurgent Muscovy united under the recently elected Czar 
Michael Romanov started to press the Swedes hard, and threat-
ened to overwhelm Swedish positions with a major offensive 
launched in the summer.
Although the attack was repulsed, Jacob De la Gardie had no 
illusions that the Swedes could still profit from the war, and – 
having himself advanced vast sums to the army – urged the king 
to negotiate for peace.34 It took the king slightly longer to come to 
the same conclusion, and one last big offensive aimed at captur-
ing Pskov was planned for 1615. The king led the operation per-
sonally but, despite meticulous planning and all available crown 
resources being diverted to the task, the operation failed due to 
lack of cash and supplies.35
The last year and a half of the war was mostly a matter of ‘hanging 
through’, while the exhausted belligerents negotiated a settlement. 
The supply base of the army remained as deplorable as ever, and 
officers continued to advance funds not only for the benefit of the 
army but also to maintain stately appearances during diplomatic 
negotiations and provide for the English and Dutch delegations 
mediating the peace talks. However, the situation was helped by 
the discharge of parts of the army, and the knowledge that the war 
would soon come to a conclusion meant that the last resources 
of Novgorod, which had been spared for the rainy day, could be 
exploited. Peace was finally resolved on 27 February 1617, with 
the last troops vacating Novgorod a few months later.
The resources used to supply the army were more or less insuf-
ficient throughout the course of the war. The army, which ranged 
 33 TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 566–570, 577b 581, 587, Jacob De la Gardie to 
Gustavus Adolphus 20.4.1614, 8.7.1614, 4.8.1614.
 34 AOSB II:5 pp. 71–73, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 
13.3.1614.
 35 AOSB I:2 pp. 238–240, Axel Oxenstierna to Jakob van Dyck 
26.8.1615.
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in size from under 5,000 to little over 10,000 men, required on 
average around 50,000–60,000 dalers per month.36 In all calcu-
lations and reports, the amount actually provided came to little 
more than half of this. For example, during the eight months from 
8 July 1613 to 8 February 1614, the entire army of just under 9,766 
men received only 251,078 dalers’ worth of pay and provisions 
of the 455,386 dalers owed, or 55%.37 In total, 1,443,458 dalers’ 
worth of cash and wares, plus an undetermined amount of provi-
sions, passed through the army’s treasury or were brought from 
Sweden by special commissaries.38 This sum was comparable to 
the contemporary ‘Älvsborg Ransom’, the 1,000,000 riksdalers the 
Swedish crown had to pay to the Danes after losing the Kalmar 
War, and which almost bankrupted the realm. Though enormous, 
this fortune still only sufficed to pay for half or less of the cost 
of the war.
 36 For most of the war the army was 7,000–8,000 men strong. In 
October 1613 the army of 7,947 was owed 58,345 dalers per month. 
In February 1614, 9,766 men required 64,726 dalers per month and 
a projection for 1615 estimated that 7,978 men would require 
39,320 dalers per month plus victuals. See KrA, Militieräkningar 
1614/4; Generalstaben 1936, Appendix 12; RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. 
räkenskaper och handlingar, Projection for 1615.
 37 KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/4.
 38 This figure has been compiled from the surviving military accounts: 
KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5, 1609/21, 1613/4, 1614/7; RA, Provi-
anträkenskaper 11.3, Jören Thomasson’s account for cash and pro-
vision to the army 1609–1613, RA, Provianträkenskaper 12, Isack 
Månssons account for provisions in Novgorod 1613–1614 and 
Commissary Falentin Jöransson Frost’s account for Novgorod 1613; 
RA, Provianträkenskaper 13, Proviantmästare Erik Andersson’s 
account 1610, Anders Munck’s account for provisions in Novgorod 
1611–1617, Account for the war treasury and provisions in Livo-
nia 1616–1617; RA, Kommissariats m.fl. Räkenskaper och hand-
lingar, Account of supply to Evert Horn’s forces at Koporie 2.5.1613, 
Brief account of cash handed out by Boo Wernersson for matters of 
war 1614.
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Arrears
The main long-term supply problem was the accumulation of 
unpaid wages, called arrears. Because of the irregular and insuffi-
cient availability of resources, military units could seldom be paid 
more than the bare minimum needed for sustenance. This basic 
pay, called läning, was issued every 10 days with a mix of cash 
and provisions.39 In theory, läning was meant to be complemented 
with full wages (sold) paid on a regular basis.40 However, more 
often than not, these payments were neglected, which resulted in 
the continuous and untenable accumulation of arrears. This accu-
mulation is illustrated by pay received in both cash and kind by 
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Figure 2.2: Pay to De la Gardie’s regiment 1.1.1615–4.3.1616 (in Swedish 
dalers).41
Source: KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12, 1614/7, 1614/25. Figure by the author.
 39 The value of läning was approximately half the nominal wage of com-
mon soldiers, and a fraction of the normal salary of NCOs and officers.
 40 Later this was established as every four months, which was possibly 
also the goal during the Ingrian War. Roberts 1958, pp. 217–218.
 41 The unit was meant to receive pay every 10 days. What it was owed 
was calculated by company clerks based on personnel per company 
between musters. I have used the medium of what was owed per com-
pany per 10-day period. What the regiment actually received is calcu-
lated as a combination of payments with known dates and the mean of 
payments, per 10-day period, of payments with known timeframes. 
38 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
The regiment, which numbered 13 companies and 2,087 men 
in January 1615, received a minimum level of upkeep from the 
crown on a regular basis, supplemented by infrequent peaks when 
larger quantities of cash or clothes suddenly became available. The 
timing of these peaks was not haphazard but governed by how 
funds became available and how pressing the situation was. In 
particular, commanders sought to ensure that the men received 
proper equipment and pay prior to dangerous undertakings, such 
as sieges or battles. Looking at Figure 2.2, the first peak resulted 
from the payment of a half-month’s sold to the entire regiment on 
25 February 1615, just six days after 33,392 dalers arrived from 
Stockholm. The troops received another month’s sold in July as a 
perquisite for them to be willing to serve at the siege of Pskov, and 
again more substantial wages while the siege was underway.42
Only towards the end of 1615 did the amount of pay issued start 
to approach the required level, which was thanks to an improve-
ment of the supply situation combined with a decrease in the num-
ber of men serving in the regiment.43 In total, the pay received by 
De la Gardie’s regiment during 1615 and early 1616 was less than 
half of that owed. With some elements of the regiment having 
been in service since at least 1610, the regiment was already owed 
75,165 dalers by the start of 1615. By March 1616, the cumulative 
debt to both officers and men was already up to 189,411 dalers, as 
shown in Figure 2.3.
In the short term, as long as the soldiers received the minimum 
level of indispensable necessities, arrears were not a problem. 
Scarcity of resources, irregularity of supply, and delays in pay-
ment were common features of economic life and the norm for 
early modern soldiers, who could borrow or make do without 
 42 KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12, 1614/7, 1614/25.
 43 In March 1616, the regiment only numbered 1,355 men in eight 
companies. This decrease was due to attrition caused by disease, 
desertion and combat, as well as Jost Clodt’s company of around 200 
men being requisitioned by the king into his new lifeguard regiment. 
See Barkman 1963, p. 234.
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their full salary. However, in the long run, insufficient resources 
would begin to cause problems: lack of proper equipment, disease, 
indiscipline, disorders, desertions and eventually rampant loss of 
life or mutiny among the troops. Moreover, constantly operating 
on the margin of subsistence made the army brittle, which meant 
that any unexpected adversity could have potentially catastrophic 
consequences and lead to collapse.
To make up for this deficiency, the army had two options. It 
could resort to licentiousness and the forced requisitioning of 
what was needed from the local population, or it could rely on 
private credit. As the countless complaints of Russian peasants 
testify, the former option was frequently used. The resources of 
occupied Russian territories were exploited with co-ordinated 
collection of contributions, as well as unlicensed individual 
and collective looting.44 However, marauding alone was not suf-
ficient to maintain the army, and it was detrimental to military 
supply in the long run, since it would erode the supply base and 
drive away merchants.
 44 See the numerous petitions and complaints regarding the licentious-
ness of Swedish troops in Löfstrand & Nordquist 2005.
Figure 2.3: Accumulation of arrears to De la Gardie’s regiment 1.1.1615–
4.3.1616 (Swedish dalers).
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Increasingly, officers were required to advance their own funds to 
supply the army. They had a contractual and moral obligation 
to provide for the men under their command, and part of the 
rationale for their high wages was to recognise this responsibility 
and to provide the means to support their units.45 Furthermore, 
officers had a vested interest to lend money. Lending to the crown 
could be a profitable and socially beneficial activity in its own 
right, besides which officers could hope to make a profit with the 
management of a company or regiment. Officers could also enrich 
themselves with assorted side ventures of both legal and illegal 
variety, which entailed being in command of a unit. On the other 
hand, officers who allowed their units to collapse or disintegrate 
would lose these revenues and the social prestige of commanding 
a company or regiment, standing little chance of recovering the 
funds they had advanced.46
Crisis credit
Credit advanced by officers was particularly important during 
moments of acute crisis. These were unfortunately common 
occurrences, which could arise from the failure of regular supply, 
military defeat, unexpected collapse of morale, or some other 
unforeseen event. Owing to the slow speed of travel, uncertainty 
of information, and lack of stores, the personal wealth and credit of 
officers were frequently the only resources available on short 
notice. This ‘crisis credit’ formed an important buffer to cushion 
the army from the worst effects of these failures and saved parts 
of the army from collapse on multiple occasions.
Isolated detachments, operating away from the main army and 
the principal supply bases, were particularly susceptible to supply 
crises. Not only were such troops more difficult to maintain but 
the requirements for pay, provisions, clothes and armaments were 
 45 See for example the recruiting patent for Bertrand du Carrane of 
26.9.1606. RA, Riksregistraturet, Latinskt registratur 1606–1610.
 46 Parrott 2012, pp. 90–95, 208–209.
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also more stringent due to the rigours of campaigning and the 
presence of the enemy.
Field Marshal Evert Horn was repeatedly in command of such 
detachments, and his personal funds and credit helped stave off 
a number of disasters. The first instance was in early 1610, when 
Horn led a force of several thousand foreign troops from Finland 
to reinforce the main army. After crossing the frozen Gulf of 
Finland, the detachment ran into unexpected difficulties when 
supposedly friendly Russian magistrates refused to provide pro-
visions and encouraged peasants to flee into the forests with 
their foodstuffs.47
As the soldiers were dying in the snow, Evert Horn had little 
choice but to provide the men with 8,399 dalers’ worth of cash, 
food and clothes obtained from merchants.48 Other officers also 
pitched in, such as captain Pierre De la Ville, who provided an 
additional 1,200 dalers for upkeep.49 Although the force suffered 
severely from the 900-kilometre winter march through hostile 
territory, Horn nonetheless managed to complete his mission and 
link up with the main army on the eve of the battle of Klushino.
A slightly different form of crisis arose late in 1612, when Horn 
led a detachment to capture Ivangorod. Earlier attempts to besiege 
the fortress had failed, and the passage of troops and incessant 
raiding had picked the surrounding countryside bare and burned 
down much of the adjoining Swedish supply base of Narva. With 
the onset of winter and heavily engaged, the force was fully exposed 
to the elements and close to starvation. Disaster was once again 
staved off by the field marshal’s personal procurements, which 
included at least 1,100 barrels of grain (enough to feed 1,500 men 
 47 RA, Strödda handlingar M 1286, Ryska kriget, Evert Horn to Arvid 
Tönnesson and Erik Elfsson 12.2.1610.
 48 TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 854–859, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus 
Adolphus 10.4.1612; RA, Strödda handlingar M 1286, Ryska kriget, 
Jacob De la Gardie’s patent of what owed to Evert Horn 25.7.1610.
 49 RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.3, 10.6.1610 entry in Jören Thomasson’s 
account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613.
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for a month),50 as well as large quantities of clothes, cash, and other 
supplies from Livonian and Finnish merchants. Later, while peti-
tioning the crown to repay his subordinate, Jacob De la Gardie esti-
mated that Horn had spent over 18,000 dalers for this operation.51
Commanders of garrisons were frequently left to their own 
devices as well. In Porchov, a remote castle near the front line, 
Stadtholder Hemming Grass had to provide 486 dalers in cash and 
538 barrels of grain worth 1,806 dalers to a company of Scottish sol-
diers quartered there.52 Similarly, Understadtholder Claus Schlang 
was forced to pawn his silverware and jewellery in order to provide 
cash, clothes, food and supplies worth 1,336 dalers and 29 öre for 
the garrison at Narva at a time when it was close to starvation.53
Besides these local emergencies, there were two periods of gen-
eral crisis, which affected the entire army and forced many offic-
ers to dig deep into their pockets. The first was the defeat at the 
battle of Klushino in 1610, which caused the collapse of both 
the army and the Russo-Swedish alliance that had supplied it. As the 
army treasury was lost during the battle, paying and supplying 
the remaining loyal troops who limped their way back to the 
border fell on the shoulders of the officers. As commander of 
the army, Jacob De la Gardie showed the way, providing 5,474 
dalers and 8 öre to supply and refit the men. More or less willingly, 
Colonel Reinhold Taube provided 2,600 dalers, Field Marshal 
Evert Horn 2,500 dalers, Colonel Samuel Cockburn an unknown 
figure, and captains smaller amounts. These funds were indispen-
sable for purchasing weapons, ammunition, horses, clothes and 
 50 RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Ordinance 
for provisions to Nils Assersson’s cavalry 18.1.1615; Korhonen 1939, 
p. 75.
 51 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 618–619, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
7.10.1612; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 891b–896, Jacob De la Gardie to 
Gustavus Adolphus 17.1.1613.
 52 KrA, Militieräkningar 1617/3.
 53 RA, Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Account with 
underståthållare Claus Schlang on 22.3.1614.
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provisions, but also to pay the troops, who refused to recross the 
border until they had received money.54
An even greater ordeal was the supply crisis of 1613–1614, 
which arose from a combination of years of deficient supply com-
bined with the economic collapse of Novgorod. As the failure 
of the 1613 harvest became clear, requests for assistance sent to 
Sweden became increasingly urgent. These requests had been 
largely ignored in the previous years and, yet again, most of Jacob 
De la Gardie’s letters to Stockholm went unanswered. Even if the 
crown had been ready to step in, little help could be expected 
before the summer, when waterways and roads would be clear of 
ice and mud, and foreign supplies could again be imported.
To stave off disaster, the senior commanders took the initiative 
to arrange the necessary supply using their own resources. For 
starters, Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie provided 700 barrels of grain 
from his estates and ordered another 1,000 barrels on his own 
credit from merchants in Tallinn and Narva, worth 5,100 dalers in 
total.55 Later, the commander ordered his estate manager to send 
as much additional grain as could be got during the following har-
vest.56 Other officers were also asked to advance funds to pay their 
men and purchase supplies. Although the sums advanced remain 
 54 RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.1 pp. 246–247, Evert Horn’s and Samuel 
Cockburn’s receipts 6.7.1610; RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.3, Sum-
mary of upkeep for the army under the siege of Kexholm, in Jören 
Thomasson’s account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613; 
TUL, F6 Cordt 3B pp. 145–147, Jacob De la Gardie to Charles IX 
25.1.1611; LUL, De la Gardieska släktarkivet vol 5-1, Jacob De la 
Gardie to Lasse Abrahamsson 8.10.1610 and Reinhold Taube’s rever-
sal to Jacob De la Gardie 5.12.1610; Brännman 1950 p. 45.
 55 De la Gardie asked to receive 3 dalers per barrel, though he claimed 
that the actual price in Russia was 5 dalers per barrel. See AOSB II:5 
pp. 61–69, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 18.12.1613.
 56 TUL, F6 Cordt 3C pp. 10–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Erik Andersson 
10.6.1614.
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obscure, we know that Colonel Cockburn provided at least 3,429 
dalers for the purchase of clothes and weapons.57
Besides grain, the army was in serious need of clothing, which 
was a recurring problem each autumn and winter. By the end of 
1613, this need had become dire, since years of neglect and height-
ening enemy activity meant that ill-equipped troops were increas-
ingly exposed to the elements. With the resources of Novgorod 
tied to staving off the anticipated famine, the burden of clothing 
the troops in 1613 and 1614 was left to the officers.
Jacob De la Gardie and Evert Horn had already previously fur-
nished the soldiers with 12,000 dalers’ worth of clothes, and now 
ordered cloth and clothes to the value of 30,000 dalers from mer-
chants in Tallinn and Narva on their own credit. An additional 
6,000 dalers’ worth of clothes were purchased from a Dutch 
merchant, who had conveniently learned of the opportunity and 
arrived to offer his services to the generals.58
These collective efforts helped the army tide over the worst of 
the 1613–1614 crisis. By mid-July, the military situation had sta-
bilised, and at least 40,000 dalers in cash and several thousand 
barrels of grain had reached Narva.59 The defeat of a major offen-
sive from Muscovy gave the army some respite, and the victorious 
troops could be spread out into small garrisons, where they could 
be more easily supplied.
The final year of the war was also marked by crises, albeit on a 
smaller scale than the situation in 1613–1614. With the war wind-
ing down, collapse was averted by discharging a large part of the 
 57 TUL, Lossius A1 p. 213, Jacob De la Gardie to Johan De la Gardie 
3.5.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel 
Oxenstierna 5.5.1614; RA, Provianträkenskaper 12, Isack Månssons 
account for provisions in Novgorod 4.12.1613–30.9.1614.
 58 TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 556–560a, 572, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus 
Adolphus 13.3.1614 and 8.5.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, 5.5.1614 
Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna.
 59 TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 585–586, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus 
Adolphus 23.7.1614; RA, Kommissariats m.fl. Räkenskaper och han-
dlingar, Brief account of cash handed out by Boo Wernersson for 
matters of war 1614.
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army, squeezing the occupied territory of every last resource, and 
with the officers providing vast sums of money and provisions. 
De la Gardie himself provided at least 10,000 dalers more, and, 
together with Field Secretary Måns Mårtensson, the pair imported 
730 barrels of grains to Novgorod during the final year of the war.60
Sustenance credit
Resources lent in moments of crisis, though crucial, were only a frac-
tion of the total debt owed to the soldiers and officers of the army. 
The bulk of the crown’s debt accumulated over time. Soldiers and 
officers were constantly underpaid, which put pressure on the offic-
ers to lend more of their own resources to cover the shortfall and 
prevent this attrition from reaching catastrophic proportions. These 
regular loans significantly increased the resources at the crown’s 
disposal, helped maintain operational effectiveness, and kept the 
army going longer than would have been possible otherwise.
One common method for officers to maintain their men was 
by providing them with replacement weapons, armour, clothing, 
equipment and, most expensive of all, remounts.61 These would 
be purchased by captains and colonels from the merchants of 
Novgorod, Narva, Viipuri or further abroad and distributed to the 
men, becoming their property. Eventually, when the unit would 
receive pay, the officer would recover his loan by deducting the 
value of the items (including a mark-up price) from the individual 
 60 AOSB II:5 pp. 102–103, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 
22.3.1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 281–282, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustavus 
Adolphus 30.5.1616; AOSB II:1 pp. 93–95, Gustavus Adolphus to 
Axel Oxenstierna 10.6.1616; RA, Provianträkenskaper 13, Anders 
Muncks account for provisions in Novgorod 1611–1617.
 61 Commanders of domestic troops apparently had less of an obligation 
to equip their men, and we certainly find examples of small bands or 
entire units of troops, particularly Finnish cavalry, sent back to Finland 
to be re-equipped. Though we lack evidence, it seems likely that in the 
interim officers of domestic units provided replacements for their men 
in the same way as in mercenary units, but in a smaller scale.
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troopers’ wages. Horses killed in combat – rather than through 
disease or ‘ill keep’ – ammunition expended and ransoms would 
not be deducted from pay, but would rather be reimbursed to the 
officer by the crown.62
These purchases meant that officers could have significant 
amounts of their own capital invested in equipping their men, par-
ticularly since the crown failed to pay sold regularly and thus repay-
ment for these purchases would be delayed at the same time as the 
purchases continued to accumulate. In 1613, Evert Horn claimed 
that he had already provided some 20,000 dalers for the army, which 
included substantial sums of cash, clothes and horses for his own 
men. Some of the personal accounts of Jacob De la Gardie have also 
survived, and they list large quantities of clothes, armaments and 
other equipment imported to the warzone on a regular basis.63
Besides providing equipment for their men, officers admin-
istered the payment of wages, and could use this to manage 
the crown’s debt within their own units and to lend money. The 
arrears of each individual officer, NCO and soldier were carefully 
recorded in company accounts and, in theory, this was a personal 
debt between each man and the crown. However, the crown did 
not have the resources or interest to monitor this debt so closely, 
instead delegating the responsibility to colonels and captains. 
When units received pay, a commissary would muster the troops, 
count them and then pay their wages in a lump sum to the com-
manding officer, who could distribute the pay as he saw fit.64
Control of the distribution of wages of course provided great 
opportunity for corruption.65 Indeed, during the Ingrian War we 
 62 RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, La Borde to Charles IX 1608; 
Parrott 2012, pp. 208–209.
 63 See LUL, De la Gardieska Samlingen vol. 12:1, Jacob De la Gardie’s 
personal accounts for Nov 1610–25.2.1611, 8.5.1611–16.9.1611, 
3.1.1613–5.6.1613 and 12.2.1614–30.4.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 53–55, 
Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 17.9.1613; TUL, F6 Cordt 4 
pp. 649–652, Evert Horn to Måns Mårtensson 16.9.1613; Löfstrand 
& Nordquist 2009, vol. II:169 p. 224, Petition concerning payment.
 64 Redlich 1964, pp. 320–321, 503–514.
 65 Redlich 1964 pp. 320–321.
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find accusations of officers pocketing the pay of their men. For 
example, English soldier Nixon describes that, when his regi-
ment mustered for the first time, they received clothes, but all 
the money was kept by captains and sent back to their wives in 
England.66 Later in the war, it apparently became common prac-
tice for heavily indebted officers to sell some of the companies’ 
grain rations to pay off their debts.67
Table 2.1: Accounts of De la Gardie’s lifeguard cornet for the period 

















80 7 7 14,250 9,230 65%
Lieutenant 20 6 6 2,400 882 37%
Fendrik 
(ensign)
80 4 6 5,220 1,260 24%
2 NCOs 80 4 7 4,910 2,150 44%
2 NCOs 51–62 3 5 2,532 1,093 43%
4 NCOs 30 9 9 3,780 1,215 32%
2 NCOs 20–27 8 7 2,550 694 27%
16 Troopers 80 22 26 18,970 9,827 52%
17 Troopers 61–62 31 36 17,850 7,176 40%
7 Troopers 51–54 10 13 6,270 2,574 41%
17 Troopers 37–44 32 28 11,370 3,602 32%
9 Troopers 30–35 25 23 6,510 1,818 28%
10 Troopers 14–20 22 22 4,450 1,115 25%
89 Men 183 195 101,062 42,636 42%
Source: KrA, Militieräkningar 1610/1. Table by the author.
 66 Nixon 1610.
 67 AOSB II:1 pp. 74–75, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 
2.8.1614.
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However, it can be argued that both cases are examples of offic-
ers recovering what was owed to them and using this to manage 
the personal debt they had accrued on behalf of the company 
during recruitment and afterward. In contrast, we find numerous 
cases of officers actively using their own funds, or even borrowing 
money from third parties, to pay many months’ wages for their 
men, besides which they would pay special rewards and com-
pensations to individual out of their own pocket.68 Officers could 
also forfeit their own, substantial wages in favour of repaying the 
arrears of their men.69 This practice can be seen from De la 
Gardie’s lifeguard cornet of cavalry, whose accounts were drawn 
up on 22 May 1617, shortly before discharge (Table 2.1).
As this account demonstrates, the wage arrears of men of every 
rank could be quite considerable. Indeed, for captains and offic-
ers of lower rank, arrears represented the largest single source 
of money owed by the crown. Unsurprisingly, the men who had 
served the longest had received the most money, but also had the 
greatest arrears. These men had also increased their stakehold-
ing in the company by accumulating more horses than they had 
 68 Compensations and rewards included bonus for capturing prison-
ers, pensions for wounded and widows, ransoms and even funeral 
expenses. For examples of officers providing salary for their men: 
TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 555–556, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
20.9.1610 and 16.6.1612, pp. 649–652, Evert Horn to Måns 
Mårtensson Palm 16.9.1613; TUL Lossius A2 pp. 843–845, Jacob 
De la Gardie to Evert Horn 10.6.1614, p. 728, Jacob De la Gardie to 
Gustavus Adolphus 6.2.1616; AOSB II:5 pp. 460–476, Jacob De la 
Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 14.11.1615.
 69 Officers’ wages were set high to compensate for and recognise their 
personal and financial risk, the responsibility of command, and 
the personal funds that they were expected to advance. Typical 
wage rates were: 500 dalers/month for colonels; 100 dalers/month 
for överste wachtmestare; 100 dalers/month for foreign captains or 
ryttmästare + 10–12 dalers/month for his 6–10 horses; and 40 dalers/
month for domestic captains or ryttmästare + 10 dalers/month for 
his horses.
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started out with, also receiving pay for these extra mounts. Offic-
ers consistently had the maximum number of horses allowed in 
their contract. Others arranged horses from Finland or Novgorod, 
and then sold these to their captain or to the unit (the crown).70
Regarding how large a portion of their wages the men had in 
arrears, there is no real difference between NCOs and common 
troopers. However, the two senior officers, Ryttmästare Lorenz 
Wagner and Lieutenant Oluf Bengtsson, had higher arrears than 
common troopers who had served the same length of time: 
65% for the ryttmästare compared to 52% for troopers, and 37% 
for the lieutenant compared to 25% for troopers who had served for 
20 months. Another way to look at this is that 27% of the arrears 
owed to the unit were owed to the three officers alone. The situ-
ation was similar in Colonel Patrick Rutherford’s personal com-
pany of 103 men, mustered in February 1611, where the foremost 
three officers were owed 31% or 5,083 dalers of the total arrears of 
16,643 dalers, on top of which the colonel had separately advanced 
1,500 dalers for some of the men.71
Besides these arrears, the crown was indebted for the pay of men 
lost along the way due to death or desertion. The number of 
men actually serving in the unit could only be calculated when a 
muster was held, which the men refused to do unless they received 
pay.72 Because this was such a rare occurrence, the discrepancy 
 70 For example, Fendrik Johan Jacobsson delivered three horses to the 
unit from Finland for 78 dalers, while interpreter Erik Andersson 
and commissary Jören Thomasson provided four horses to replace 
losses in May 1609. See RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.3, 6.12.1609 and 
10.5.1610 entries in Jören Thomasson’s account for cash and provi-
sion to the army 1609–1613.
 71 RA, Rullor vol. B7 (1611–1625), Account of what is owed to Colonel 
Rutherford and his men 1611.
 72 Foreign troops’ service contracts expressly guaranteed that they 
would not be mustered unless they received pay, which was also 
customary. See RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, La Borde to 
Charles IX 1608; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 56–570, Jacob De la Gardie 
to Gustavus Adolphus 20.4.1614.
50 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
between how many men the unit had previously mustered and 
how many still remained could become quite large.
In central Europe, it was accepted practice that officers were 
allowed to collect pay based on the starting strength of the unit 
for the period of service, rather than the men remaining at mus-
ter. This extra pay was intended to provide compensation for the 
widows of dead soldiers and the enterpriser who had provided 
supplies to the men during the period, as well as informal interest 
for the delayed payment of wages.73
In the Swedish army of the Ingrian War, this practice seems 
to have been partly followed. Units continued to receive länung 
(upkeep) regularly based on the last known muster strength. Out-
standing sold, on the other hand, was paid based on the number of 
men actually present at the muster at the end of a period.74 Indeed, 
the crown seems to have counted on the loss of some of the men 
to reduce the amount of arrears it would have to pay.75 This meant 
that officers who provided pay, equipment and supplies for their 
men ran the risk of losing their investment if the man was killed.
However, officers had several means of offsetting this problem. 
Issues of pay and acknowledgement of debt left significant room 
for negotiation and interpretation. At times, when the crown could 
not provide full payment to the unit or they could not be prop-
erly mustered due to the enemy, a partial muster was held instead, 
 73 Parrott 2012, p. 206.
 74 This led to at least one major argument between a German colonel, 
Linck, and Jacob De la Gardie, after the former lost 500 out of 1,000 
men on the march into Russia. Linck demanded pay for the original 
1,000 men, while De la Gardie wanted to pay only for the remaining 
strength. Eventually, a compromise was settled. See RA, Proviant-
räkenskaper 11.3, 25.1.1610 entry in Jören Thomasson’s account for 
cash and provision to the army 1609–1613.
 75 Gustavus Adolphus assumed that 1,500 men would be lost over 
the winter of 1614–1615 to desertion and death. Although the king 
needed men for the coming siege of Pskov, he chose to prioritize the 
recruitment of new troops rather than maintaining the existing ones. 
Generalstab 1936, p. 500.
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whereby the exact composition of the unit was not so rigorously 
examined and pay was issued based on paper strength instead. 
Officers of course made use of such situations to receive pay for 
non-existent passvolants, which the crown grudgingly accepted 
as ‘customary’ compensation for its inability to provide pay in a 
timely or regular fashion.76
Captains and colonels would also hold regular musters on their 
own initiative and, presumably, in part at their own expense.77 
These musters helped fix the amounts owed for specific periods of 
time, even if the men were subsequently lost. For example, De la 
Gardie’s personal company in his infantry regiment reported hav-
ing served with 237 men from 10 February to 15 September 1611 
to the value of 13,916 dalers, with 234 men for the next 5.5 months 
(10,802 dalers), 230 men for the five months after (9,660 dalers) 
and so on.78 Then, when it came time settle debts, the regiment 
clerk would compare the sum of what was owed for all these peri-
ods to how much each company had actually received from the 
crown, which would form the basis for the commanding officer’s 
debt claim.
Officers did not automatically receive the full sum owed to the 
unit. When units were discharged or depleted units that owed dif-
ferent amounts were merged together (reformed), arrears were 
paid for surviving individuals. However, officers could make a 
claim that they should receive some or all of what was owed to the 
dead men, and would support their claim with receipts, accounts, 
and muster rolls. Settlement of debts was a process of negotiation 
 76 TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus 
Adolphus 16.12.1613; RA, Strödda handlingar M 1286, Ryska kriget, 
Evert Horn to Arvid Tönnesson and Erik Elfsson 16.2.1610.
 77 It is hard to substantiate whether these were at the officers’ expense. 
However, units were mustered more frequently than ‘official’ sold 
was issued and, due to the unwillingness of soldiers to be mustered 
without pay, it makes sense to assume that the officers provided some 
form of compensation. At least this is what the officers claimed later, 
when demanding repayment for debts.
 78 KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12.
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between the crown and the officers. How much each enterpriser 
received depended not only on the strength of their claim but 
many tertiary factors, which shall be discussed later.
By the end of the war, many officers had lent considerable sums 
to the crown to finance the war. The biggest creditor was the com-
mander of the army, Jacob De la Gardie, who had lent 45,736 dal-
ers to pay his own regiment, as well as 58,568 dalers to the army 
more generally.79 Other officers followed suit in proportion to 
their rank and involvement. Field Marshal Evert Horn had at least 
36,000 dalers’ worth of receivables from the crown by the start of 
1614, and continued to lend money until his untimely death the 
following year.80 Duke Julius Heinrich of Saxony had been with 
the army for only a year by the time he was discharged in 1614, 
but even in this short period he had accumulated receivables from 
the crown to the sum of 22,122 dalers.81
Colonels also advanced significant sums to their regiments. 
Dutch Colonel Johan van Mönnichhofen served as the head of his 
regiment for three years, before being killed leading an assault in 
1614. After his death, the crown recognised a debt of 6,093 dalers 
and 8 öre owed to his estate.82 Scottish Colonel Samuel Cock-
burn was lucky enough to survive and served for the duration of 
the war (1609–1617). By the end of 1612, Cockburn had already 
loaned at least 8,000 dalers, and by the summer of 1614 had lent 
an additional 10,000 dalers for the upkeep of his regiment, plus 
6,241 to the rest of the army.83
 79 LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 11-1 fol. 47, His Majesty’s 
account with count Jacob De la Gardie for his loans and what he has 
given to matters of war.
 80 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 658–659, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
21.5.1614; Gillingstam ‘Evert Horn’ (Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon).
 81 TUL, Lossius C p. 145, Gustavus Adolphus to Duke Julius Heinrich 
of Saxony 24.5.1614.
 82 RA, Kammarkollegiets skuldböcker vol. 1, Account with Colonel 
Mönnichhofen’s estate 1615–1623; Generalstab 1936, p. 478.
 83 Brännman 1950, p. 45.
Officers as Creditors during the Ingrian War (1609–1617)  53
Regarding the total volume of lending, these examples are only 
the tip of the iceberg. Many loans were repaid during the course 
of the war, besides which these sums only represent the debts 
that the crown accepted. For example, the crown repaid Colonel 
Pierre De la Ville 23,955 dalers and 21.5 öre for credit advanced 
1611–1613, yet refused to recognise an additional debt of tens of 
thousands from 1613–1614.84 The bulk of debts to captains and 
lower-ranking officers remain vague as well, although the 9,230 
dalers Ryttmästare Lorentz Wagner had in arrears (Table 2.1) is 
perhaps indicative of the amount owed to cavalry captains.
Finances
Having established the scale of funds advanced by the army’s offic-
ers, let us now turn to look at how these loans were financed, and 
the credit networks that were involved. There were three sources 
for these funds: officers might advance their own capital, they 
could borrow funds, or they could use their personal credit to 
guarantee loans taken by the crown from third parties.85
Advancing capital
The simplest means for officers to lend money to the crown’s war 
effort was to advance their own capital. This capital could come 
in various forms, including buying provisions and paying salaries 
 84 La Ville recruited a regiment 740 men in 1613 at the bequest of 
Jacob De la Gardie, the senior commander. However, the king had 
come to mistrust La Ville in the interim and wished to reduce costs, 
thereby refusing to accept the troops and acknowledge the debt. See 
RA, Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, 19.4.1614 
Account with Monsieur La Ville including attached letter from 
Jacob De la Gardie dated 18.5.1614; TUL, F6 Cordt 1A pp. 42–43, 
Gustavus Adolphus to Jacob De la Gardie 23.9.1613; TUL, Lossius A2 
pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 16.12.1613.
 85 Redlich 1964, pp. 245–255.
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with cash, importing and distributing grain from the officers’ 
estates, redistributing equipment such as arms, armour and horses 
that had come into the officers’ possession, and so forth.
The source of this capital was either inherited or accumulated. 
Inheritance was often important in establishing officers in their 
command, particularly for those domestic and foreign officers 
who undertook to recruit soldiers on behalf of the crown. Inher-
ited estates were also important for providing a steady, reliable 
income to supplement officers’ regular wages during the course of 
the war. However, inheritances did not go far in financing invest-
ment in the war, let alone suffice for large-scale loans. The bulk 
of inheritances were tied in estates, with only a small amount of 
liquid capital available for loan. Domestic captains and junior 
officers were mostly small provincial nobles or commoners with 
meagre estates. Aristocratic senior officers were not much bet-
ter off. Jacob De la Gardie’s inherited estates produced only 1,500 
dalers annually, and the commander in fact commenced the war 
heavily in debt.86
Foreign enterprisers necessarily needed to have the available 
funds to recruit their units. However, their initial capital does 
not seem to have sufficed for much more than this endeavour. As 
Henri de la Borde de Luxe, senior commander of the French in 
Swedish service, complained, he had inherited little else besides 
his prestigious name and prowess at arms.87 In any case, foreign 
officers serving far from home did not have access to their estates, 
and were dependent on payment from the Swedes and the profits 
of war.88
As the war progressed, officers started to accumulate capital in 
the form of salaries received, enfeoffments from the crown granted 
as either rewards or as recompense in lieu of salary, loot, profits 
 86 Grill 1949, pp. 16–18.
 87 RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, La Borde to Charles IX 
6.6.1608.
 88 RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, French captains to Charles IX 
25.10.1608.
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from buying and selling equipment, and other sources. These 
profits could be substantial, and, unless some calamity struck, 
could surpass the officers’ inherited wealth in only a few years.89
Only a small portion of this accumulated capital was retained 
as cash and movables – mainly silverware and clothing – to cover 
running expenses and provide liquidity in case of emergency. The 
bulk was invested in land and realty such as town houses or man-
sions back home, or reinvested in the military enterprise.90 How 
much officers chose to send back home and how much to rein-
vest in the army depended on their level of commitment to the 
Swedish crown and this particular war, expected risk and reward 
in financing the war, as well as the availability of other sources 
of investment.91
Some foreign officers served only to gain an apprenticeship in 
command or were otherwise merely ‘passing through’. These officers 
would send virtually everything back home and were reluctant to 
invest anything but the bare minimum in the war. Other foreign-
ers, the Scots in particular, were looking to enter Swedish service 
more permanently and eventually settle in the Swedish Realm. 
These foreigners, as well as those professional military migrants 
who had no desire to return home – if such a place even existed 
– were more committed and also more ready to reinvest their 
 89 Of course, we must remember that the war was much more profitable 
in the early years than towards the end, when the crown was running 
out of funds and most of the warzone had already been picked bare. 
See AOSB II:5 pp. 61–69, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 
18.12.1613.
 90 It was common for officers to seek to purchase ownership of those 
farms whose taxation the crown had already enfeoffed to the officer as 
payment of salaries or debts. Also existing estates were enlarged and 
new estates purchased from other nobles. Nilsson 1990, pp. 290–291.
 91 For many, reinvestment in the army might be the only or most secure 
place to invest profits, which also saved the trouble and risk of send-
ing profits back home. See TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 649–652, Evert Horn 
to Måns Mårtensson 16.9.1613; Nilsson 1989, pp. 162–167; Nixon 
1610; Grill 1949, pp. 16–18.
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earnings. The same was also true of ambitious domestic officers, 
who stood to gain from the war not only economically, but also 
through career advancement and advancement in royal favour.
There were two methods by which officers might reinvest in 
the war: providing wages and provisions for existing troops, or 
by recruiting additional forces. Owing to the mounting arrears 
detailed previously, officers were often called upon to use their own 
wages and other means to provide for the troops under their 
command. These additional investments in the officer’s own unit 
in effect increased the crown’s debt towards the officer, as well as 
the officer’s vested interest in seeing the war through to a victori-
ous conclusion. Owing to the desperation of the situation, such 
loans were not always voluntary, since, without added investment, 
the unit might collapse and the officer might lose his best chance 
at reclaiming the debt, as well as his command. As such, the choice 
was more about how much to reinvest and how much he could 
afford to send to safety. Another option was to pull out completely, 
although this was not always feasible without incurring the wrath 
of the Swedish king or without losing everything invested.92
However, during the Ingrian War we also find ample evidence of 
officers of all ranks, as well as NCOs and common soldiers, actively 
seeking to increase their investment in the army by recruiting 
more soldiers and providing mounts. Captains such as Pierre De la 
Ville, who had recruited and commanded a company since 1607, 
arranged the recruitment of an entire regiment from France in 
1612. Lieutenant Edmund Kolb managed to ‘buy’ the captaincy 
of his company after the former captain had died by recruit-
ing an additional 20 men and settling the debts of the former 
 92 Some foreign officers managed to withdraw from the war while 
still recovering their funds by finding buyers for their units, as did 
domestic officers who were excused by the king due to wounds or old 
age. The two most senior Swedish commanders, Jacob De la Gardie 
and Evert Horn, each petitioned the king to discharge them at least 
temporarily so that they could get their finances in order, but were 
repeatedly denied.
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captain’s widow at better terms than his competitors were offering.93 
Another lieutenant, Daniel Hepburne, went on to recruit his own 
company and ended up lieutenant colonel in Count Jacob De la 
Gardie’s regiment, which De la Gardie and the other officers 
recruited largely with their own funds in 1613.94
Far more numerous were the captains who undertook to recruit 
new troops for their devastated companies or, in several cases, 
recruit completely new ones after the former had been destroyed 
or had deserted en masse. Furthermore, as the accounts for De la 
Gardie’s lifeguard cornets (Table 2.1) show, officers, NCOs, and 
common troopers alike would also reinvest their earnings to fur-
nish additional mounts for their company.95
Borrowed funds
What the officer corps lacked in inherited wealth, they made up 
with social capital. Positions of command went hand in hand with 
social hierarchy and, although the officers were in many ways the 
runt of the litter in their own class, they were nonetheless mem-
bers of the elite. Through their familial, clientage, and social net-
works, officers had access to significant wealth. Moreover, thanks 
to their connections and status, officers had credit and networking 
value, which they could use to gain access to mercantile credit.
Using these connections, officers would frequently borrow what 
was needed and advance these funds to finance the war on the 
crown’s behalf. This followed the common early modern pattern 
identified by Laurence Fontaine: the officer borrowed money 
primarily from his family, close friends and acquaintances, and 
secondly from the outer circle of his social network. Only after 
 93 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 631–632, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
13.12.1612.
 94 RA, Västergötlands handlingar 1607:1, Älvsborg och Gullberg, 
Receipt for Lieutenant Daniel Hepburn 4.3.1608; KrA, Mili-
tieräkningar 1613/14; Generalstab 1936, pp. 433–434. 
 95 KrA, Militieräkningar 1610/1.
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that did he resort to ‘outsiders’, such as professional moneylenders 
and merchants.96
Family and friends were an important source of funds, particu-
larly at the start of an officer’s career. Foreign enterprisers relied 
heavily on their innermost network to find and equip the men 
they were to lead. Military enterprise was often a family affair, with 
most captains or colonels having one or more brother, cousin or 
other close relative serving as their second, not to mention more 
removed kith and kin as NCOs or in the ranks. On top of these 
serving relatives, foreign officers would receive financial support 
from relatives staying afield to provide starting capital, and in 
some cases further loans while abroad.
Domestic officers would also borrow extensively from fam-
ily and friends. At the outset of the war, Jacob De la Gardie was 
very dependent on some 4,500–5,000 dalers’ worth of funds and 
resources provided by his siblings, as well as their aristocratic 
contacts, Councillor Axel Oxenstierna and Admiral Henrik 
Tönnesson.97 Evert Horn also borrowed at least 1,000 dalers 
from his mother and several thousand from his brother Henrik 
Horn, and seems to have enjoyed further support from his family 
through the transfer of estates to finance loans, although the exact 
nature of these dealings remains vague.98
Family and friends were more or less socially obliged to lend 
funds, particularly when the need was dire.99 Even when they did 
not actually lend money, the existence of a wealthy inner network 
 96 Fontaine 2014, p. 26.
 97 LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 6-1, Receipt to Henrik 
Tönnesson 18.1.1609, vol. 4, Order to Mats Olsson 12.2.1609, 
vol. 12:1, Account of items purchased from Johan Grönwald 1608, 
vol. 6-1, Copy of receipt for Johan Grönwald January 1609, vol. 11.2, 
Lasse Abrahamsson’s account of items sent by Jacob De la Gardie and 
taken to Runsa 1611.
 98 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 557–558, 561–564, 658–659, 663–664, Evert 
Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 28.9.1610, 13.11.1610, 21.5.1614 and 
30.10.1614.
 99 Fontaine 2014, p. 44.
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provided important security in case the officer hit a rough patch or 
if he needed additional guarantors for loans he wished to obtain. 
Moreover, through a network of family and friends an officer 
could call upon an even broader social network of potential credi-
tors. To continue the example of Evert Horn: after his family could 
not (or would not) lend any more, the field marshal still managed 
to borrow 700 dalers from Brita De la Gardie, the sister of his 
friend and superior Jacob De la Gardie, who had asked his sister 
to advance these funds.
Moving outward from an inner ring of family and friends, 
the next source of lenders were colleagues and associates. On the 
front, fellow officers and civil-military administrators were often 
the readiest source of funds for an officer strapped of cash. As 
members of a military collective and in close proximity for pro-
tracted periods, officers got to know each other and form a rap-
port. Though officers did not always see eye-to-eye, members of 
the community – one could even call them a guild – were expected 
to trust and look after each other, while the shared military struc-
ture provided multiple mechanisms for arranging repayment.100
Most numerous were the multitude of small short-term loans 
officers would give and receive from each other to alleviate 
the chronic shortage of coinage or to help each other through 
fluctuating fortunes. Many of these loans were meant to cover 
mundane personal expenses, such as gambling debts, wages to 
servants and cash needed to purchase supplies for their house-
holds. Others were given for the maintenance of a fellow officer’s 
soldiers by providing a few horses or some cash to pay wages and 
purchase provisions.101
At times, officers would also lend more sizeable sums to one 
another. This often occurred during moments of crisis, such as 
when supply failed or a particular unit met with some disaster. 
If a commander was unable to meet the unexpected shortfall, 
 100 Fontaine 2014, p. 32.
 101 See for example the multitude of personal accounts in the De la 
Gardie family archives: LUL, De la Gardieska Samlingen vol. 12:1.
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then fellow officers with deeper pockets might lend a hand. This 
was the situation during the crisis of 1610, where Field Marshal 
Evert Horn had to borrow 1,000 dalers from Colonel Mönnich-
hofen and 500 dalers from Captain La Ville to purchase clothes 
for his men, besides which he took out loans on behalf of the 
crown and asked his subordinates to provide additional funds.102 
Similar round sums were advanced by other officers such as the 
Duke of Saxony, who borrowed 1,000 dalers in 1614, and Jacob 
De la Gardie, who in turn borrowed 1,000 riksdalers from Count 
Mansfeld in 1608 and another 1,000 dalers from Colonel 
Mönnichhofen in 1613.103
The multitude of overlapping loans issued by officers to one 
another meant that many, if not most, officers were connected 
through a web of debts. This interconnectivity is visible in Count 
Jacob De la Gardie’s personal accounts. Between 12 February and 
30 April 1614, the Feldherre received 1,350 rubles (4,820 dalers), 
of which at least 506.92, possibly up to 1,070 rubles, were loans 
from nine officers and civil administrators working in his chan-
cellery. The accounts indicate that the officers had in turn taken 
many of these loans from other officers or from merchant bank-
ers. This money was used to pay all sorts of personal and military 
expenses and repay debts, including some of those received dur-
ing this same period, but also to issue a loan of 280 rubles (1,000 
dalers) to Duke Julius Henrik of Saxony, and a similar sized loan 
to Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm.104
By lending to each other, officers could manage their personal 
debts and their level of commitment to the war. Loans were not 
 102 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 567–568, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
26.4.1611.
 103 LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 3:3 fol. 288, Jacob and Johan De 
la Gardie’s obligation to count Mansfeld; AOSB II:5 pp. 61–69, Jacob 
De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 18.12.1613.
 104 LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 12:1, Jacob De la Gardie’s 
accounts for 8.5.–16.9.1611, 13.1.–5.6.1613 and 12.2.–30.4.1614, 
Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm to Jacob De la Gardie 24.2.1614.
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only financial transactions but also formed social ties and marked 
out hierarchies. In the military context, traditional notions of 
credit and patronage – of patrons lending to their clients, who in 
return owed loyalty and friendship – did not apply in exactly the 
same way as in the civilian world. Rather, military subordinates 
would advance funds to their superiors, who would guarantee 
repayment, but also advance their own funds to those above them. 
The amounts advanced and who owed who were expected to fol-
low military hierarchy, which meant that superiors were expected 
to ‘bail out’ their subordinates, and the total sums advanced were 
expected to increase with military rank.
Credit advanced between officers added few new resources to 
the sustenance of the war. However, these loans were important 
in a number of ways. First, they enhanced the fiscal resilience of 
the officers and, by extension, the army. Second, by lending to each 
other, officers could manage and share the burden of financing the 
crown’s shortcomings and weather the worst of fluctuating fortunes. 
Furthermore, these loans also alleviated problems caused by a short-
age of coinage and helped keep the existing money in circulation, 
thereby stimulating the market sustaining the army. Finally, the 
interlinked web of debts created bonds between officers. Although 
it is hard to prove, this bond probably strengthened social and mili-
tary hierarchies, and helped tie the officers into one cohesive force.
Finally, let us turn to look at officers’ connections with the civil-
ian market, and their effect on financing and supplying the war. 
Sutlers, peddlers and tavern keepers, as well as local and inter-
national merchants, were a vital group in supplying the army on 
both private and public levels. A large and active market developed 
around the army, which officers and common soldiers would turn 
to sell loot and to purchase provisions and equipment, ranging 
from beer and garments to armour and horses. This market was 
vital in shoring up the shortcomings of military supply, which 
was not only slow and unreliable but also unable to deliver many 
of the individual items required by the troops.
Owing to the lack of coinage, much of this commerce took place 
with credit. Sales credit was a common feature in purchases made 
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by all ranks. Common soldiers would often buy food and drink 
based on a running tab, with a promise to settle their debts when 
their pay came in.105 Officers would purchase equipment and pro-
visions for themselves and their men with short-term sales credit 
of a few months or even a year. International merchants were 
often willing to accept payment in agricultural produce from the 
officer’s estates or with a bill of exchange abroad, which facilitated 
commerce, as the officers did not have to transport or sell the 
agrarian products themselves.106
Some officers also conducted personal businesses with mer-
chants, increasing the interconnectivity of military and mercan-
tile groups. For example, in 1614 or 1615, Evert Horn was selling 
60 lasts of tar worth 1,500 dalers as well as some hemp obtained 
from the conquered territories to Dutch merchant Gert van der 
Heyden, which he intended to use to repay some other loans. Heyden 
was also a major provider of clothes to the army, to whom Evert 
Horn and Jacob De la Gardie were indebted at various times.107 
Claes Grambou, who had provided cash, clothes and provisions 
for Evert Horn’s ill-fated detachment in 1610, continued to offer 
wares for many years. Grambou became a trusted supplier to Jacob 
De la Gardie and Evert Horn, and the commanders went out of 
their way to ensure that the merchant’s business would prosper, 
including arranging reparations for Grambou’s wares that were 
destroyed in a fire.108
 105 When the army left Moscow in June 1610, many units had to be 
issued advance payment of their wages to settle debts accrued 
over the previous three months. See RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.1 
pp. 239–240, 12.6.1610 receipt.
 106 LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 12:1, Accounts with Johan 
Grönewaldt for January 1609 and 6.12.1611.
 107 TUL, Lossius B1 p. 95, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie.
 108 Arguably, the commanders were also motivated by their own debt to 
Grambou and it was mutinying French soldiers in Swedish service 
who caused the fire that destroyed his warehouse. TUL, F6 Cordt 4 
pp. 559–560, 658–659, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 6.10.1610 
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However, despite these connections, relations with merchants 
remained far more detached, formal and professional than with 
fellow officers, friends and family. Although officers frequently 
made use of merchants’ services to obtain supplies, in terms of 
borrowing they were the last, outermost circle to which officers 
would turn to. This more stringent relationship is evident in the 
contractual nature with which officers received credit from mer-
chants. Whereas loans from their inner circle were very open-
ended verbal agreements or simple IOUs, the terms of mercantile 
credit, such as repayment schedules and interest, were formally 
drafted with promissory notes and contracts. Quite often, these 
contracts would also stipulate some form of security for the loan.
All the purchase and cash loans that I have found were made for 
the short term. Repayment was tied to established market days, 
such as Pentecost or Michaelmas, and were usually due within six 
months or a year. Most had an annual interest rate of 6%, which 
was perhaps a norm for short-term loans with good securities. 
Less secure loans were at 8% annual interest, which seems to be 
in line with rates charged by merchants from one another in risky 
overseas transactions.109 We also find a case of Evert Horn paying 
interest on a monthly basis at a high but unspecified rate for a loan 
of 1,000 dalers taken in Tallinn, which suggests that short-term 
credit might be lent at even more exorbitant rates.110
Most loans required some form of security. For small loans, offic-
ers might pawn silverware or jewellery, which the creditor could 
sell if the loan were not repaid within a certain period after it was 
due. For example, at the outset of the war, Jacob De la Gardie had 
to pawn a gold chain worth 532 dalers in order to obtain a loan 
and 21.5.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 843–845, Jacob De la Gardie to 
Evert Horn 10.6.1614.
 109 Möller 1954, pp. 261–262.
 110 AOSB II:1 pp. 68–69, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 
25.7.1614; LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 6:1 p. 10, Jacob De la 
Gardie’s receipt to Axel Oxenstierna 4.1.1609; TUL Lossius B1 
p. 95, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie; Möller 1954, pp. 261–263; 
Heckscher 1936, pp. 577–578.
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of 400 dalers needed to outfit himself for the coming campaign.111 
Similarly, in 1614, Understadtholder Claus Schlang pawned a sil-
ver pitcher and quart for a loan of 176 dalers, as well as a golden 
chain for a loan of 286 dalers, to obtain pay for the soldiers of 
his garrison.112
For larger loans, officer’s estates or their revenues often acted as 
security. Such loans were arranged so that, after they became due, 
repayment of interest was tied to the produce of the mortgaged 
estate. If the debt remained unpaid for some time, the creditors 
would gain control of the estate and, depending on the contract, 
retain it either in perpetuity or until the yield of the estate had 
cleared the debt. I have been unable to find out how well defined or 
long this period of grace was before the estate would be handed 
over. However, some indication is provided by a loan of 5,000 
dalers taken by Jacob De la Gardie in 1613, with the Feldherr’s 
Livonian estates mortgaged as security. The debt remained unpaid 
three years later, and although the creditor, a merchant from 
Tallinn, had received interest this whole time, he was now becom-
ing impatient and demanding the transfer of the estates.113
The most extreme example of mercantile borrowing during the 
war is provided by Evert Horn. By the end of 1614, the field mar-
shal was heavily indebted to various merchants for purchases of 
military supplies. Having expended other sources of credit, Horn 
decided to turn to the open market to obtain new loans to pay off 
 111 Remarkably, the jewellery was borrowed first from Henrik Tönnesson, 
so that De la Gardie could pawn it to merchant Henrich Schmidt. 
De la Gardie promised to repay the loan to Tönnesson within three 
months, with 50 dalers (9%) interest and revenue from his estates as 
security. LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 6:1, Contract between 
Jacob De la Gardie and Henrik Tönnesson 18.1.1609.
 112 RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Account with 
underståthållare Claus Schlang on 22.3.1614.
 113 AOSB II:5 pp. 118–121, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 
9.9.1616.
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his previous debts, as well as advance a further 20,000 dalers ‘to 
keep the army willing to serve’.114
To obtain the loans, Horn provided his representative Philip 
Scheding with the deeds of Saris, Mallahof, Parikkala and 
Kankainen manors with their underlying farms, three smaller 
estates, a number of farmsteads, and a royal patent he had received 
to collect an annual rent of 2,000 dalers from four Finnish par-
ishes.115 Scheding was to take these documents to Tallinn and 
find willing merchants to accept the documents as security for 
an unspecified sum of money. Should the debt be repaid within 
a year, Horn asked that he should repay only the principal. Oth-
erwise, the estates would pass to Horn’s creditors, who would use 
the revenues to amortise the debt with an annual interest of 8% 
collected from the cash revenue portion of the estates’ rent.116
Guarantors of loans
The third and final way in which officers financed the Swedish war 
effort was by acting as guarantors for loans taken by the crown 
when procuring supplies from merchants. This is similar to the 
personal loans taken by officers from the merchants outlined 
above, yet distinct in that the state was the debtor, with the officers 
simply acting as guarantors.
During the course of the war, the crown depended heavily on 
merchants to supply the army with wares that could not be obtained 
through taxation. Clothes and armaments were particularly 
 114 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 663–664, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
30.10.1614; TUL Lossius A2 pp. 441–443, Gustavus Adolphus to 
Evert Horn 22.1.1615.
 115 Kankainen and Mallahof had recently been transferred to Evert 
Horn from his brothers Henrik and Gustaf (Mallahof temporarily 
for five years) and, in all likelihood, constituted loans or some other 
form of support for their indebted brother. 
 116 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 663–664, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
30.10.1614.
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necessary and were imported in large quantities from abroad. 
Eventually, as the economic basis of Novgorod deteriorated, the 
army also became dependent on horses, grain and provisions pur-
chased from foreign merchants.
Procurement of these supplies was a shared responsibility 
between agents of the central administration operating from 
Stockholm, and the senior commanders and civil administrators 
responsible for supplying the army in Russia. Initially the army’s 
supply officers were able to procure most of what was needed on 
their own, using local tax revenues to repay merchants. However, 
as the cost of purchases increased and they had to be procured 
from further afield, supply officers increasingly requested the cen-
tral administration to pitch in and arrange payment from Sweden. 
Unfortunately, the central administration was slow to act and usu-
ally possessed only a superficial and out-of-date understanding of 
the situation. Owing to the urgency of the moment, senior officers 
thus assumed an increasingly active role in contracting merchants 
on behalf of the crown.
As was customary for most commercial transactions of this mag-
nitude, these purchases took place with short-term, interest-free 
credit. In this case, senior officers acting in their role of state agents 
would promise repayment by the crown from copper mined in 
Sweden, butter taxed in Finland, or other sources of revenue, as the 
crown would see fit. The broad and ambiguous range of goods for 
repayment does not seem to have been a problem for merchants, 
who traded in a variety of goods on the international market.
However, many merchants had reservations with lending directly 
to the crown, which was notoriously bad at repaying debts and 
difficult to hold accountable if it failed to pay. In 1612, the crown 
was already having trouble paying all of its debts in the allotted 
time and found it impossible to purchase wares on credit except 
at exorbitant rates and with heavy securities. The state was repeat-
edly embarrassed to find out that, due to lack of co-ordination, 
the same sources of revenues had been allocated to the repayment 
of multiple debts. In 1613, the crown’s credit sunk further, as the 
new king, Gustavus Adolphus (Sw. Gustav II Adolf), cancelled 
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all previous assignments of state revenues to service debts (invis-
ningar). The following year, a strict regime of prioritisation was 
undertaken to decide which debts would be serviced and which 
neglected, further increasing the reluctance of merchants to 
provide credit.117
As the crown’s credit standing sunk, senior commanders and 
administrators procuring supplies on behalf of the crown were 
increasingly forced to guarantee repayment with their own credit. 
Merchants were far more willing to sell to noblemen, who were 
easier to hold accountable, and who possessed sizeable estates, 
which could be used as securities. Furthermore, merchants per-
ceived credit as a means of building bonds with powerful aristo-
crats, who might in return petition the crown on their behalf or 
enable them to do commerce in other areas.118
The primary commodity purchased with the credit of senior 
commanders was clothes. In the early years of the war, these pur-
chases could be repaid with property confiscated from Russian 
‘traitors’ or the tax revenues of conquered Novgorod, which the 
commanders administered. In this situation, acting as guarantor 
for the crown’s purchases was hardly a risk or a burden worth men-
tioning. However, by the end of 1611, the army had grown in size 
and the resources of Novgorod were becoming thin. With winter 
approaching, Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie and Field Marshal Evert 
Horn contracted the Tallinn-based merchant Claes Grambou to 
provide the army with 7,200 dalers’ worth of clothes repayable 
by the crown but guaranteed by the officers. Because of the lack 
 117 AOSB I:2 pp. 42–48, Privy Council to Queen Christina 25.3.1612, 
pp. 873–884, Privy Council to Karl Bonde 18.4.1614; AOSB II:1 
pp. 43–47, 53–55, 68–69, 89–90, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel 
Oxensiterna 17.5.1614, 31.5.1614, 25.7.1614 and April 1616; AOSB 
I:2 pp. 199–202, 264–266, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustavus Adolphus 
4.8.1614, 13.8.1614 and 26.4.1616, pp. 238–240, Axel Oxenstierna to 
Jakob van Dyk 26.8.1615, p. 218, Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte 
to Gustavus Adolphus 3.11.1614.
 118 Möller 1954, pp. 220–227; Fontaine 2014, p. 87.
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of resources, De la Gardie sent a letter to Stockholm, requesting 
the crown to arrange payment by the following Pentecost, or 
Midsummer at the latest.119
De la Gardie received no reply. Together with Evert Horn he 
started to arrange repayment on their own from Finnish and 
Russian revenues, with meagre results. Taxes and confiscated 
property from the Novgorod region proved insufficient, and local 
administrators in Finland refused to provide payment without 
express orders from Stockholm. The debt went unpaid, yet Grambou 
continued to advance funds, providing at least another 7,985 dalers 
of supplies in 1612 and 1613, before his premature death.
The clothes purchased during the crisis of 1613–1614 followed 
the same pattern as with Grambou, but on a larger scale. 40,000 
dalers’ worth of clothes were purchased at the end of 1613 by De la 
Gardie and Horn on behalf of the crown, of which De la Gardie 
guaranteed 30,000 dalers and Horn secured repayment for the 
remaining 10,000.120 The pair made additional purchases in 1614 
and 1615, and by 1616, De la Gardie had personally guaranteed 
crown loans of some 38,000 dalers to Dutch merchant Gert van 
der Heyden and 41,729 dalers to a Tallinn merchant Bogislaus von 
Rosen, as well as others for which we have no records.121
The crown recognised these debts and promised payment. How-
ever, because of the lack of revenues, this became a long-drawn-
out process. Only 77% of the debt to Bogislaus von Rosen had 
 119 TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 854–849, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus 
Adolphus 10.4.1612.
 120 AOSB II:5 pp. 58–69, 71–73, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxen-
stierna October 1613, 18.12.1613 and 13.3.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 
pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 16.12.1613.
 121 Von Rosen 1938, p. 44; AOSB II:5 pp. 85–87, 118–121, Jacob De la 
Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 10.1.1616 and 9.9.1616. A large amount 
of clothes was apparently also purchased from a merchant named 
Herman Timbermann on behalf of the crown, though the value 
of these purchases and how they were repaid remain obscure. For 
Timbermann see AOSB II:5 pp. 79–80, 107–110, Jacob De la Gardie 
to Axel Oxenstierna 23.5.1615 and 6.4.1616.
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been paid by 1617, while De la Gardie’s commitment to van der 
Heyden continued until at least the end of 1623.122 All the while, 
De la Gardie’s and Horn’s credit was tied up with guaranteeing 
the debt, and the commanders continued to actively remind the 
crown of its obligation and to ensure that the funds were actu-
ally transferred. It does not seem as though De la Gardie or Horn 
handed over any of their estates, but they were forced to pay inter-
est on behalf of the crown.123
For the most part, merchants appear to have been willing to 
settle for longer repayment periods, with steady interest. However, 
there were instances where repayment was hurried. Merchants 
who lost confidence in the Swedish crown’s or its aristocratic 
intermediaries’ ability to repay – which was closely connected 
to how well the war was perceived as going – were less willing to 
wait. A merchant’s financial overcommitment or the demands of 
his own creditors could also add pressure for speedy repayment. 
Moreover, because lending remained a very social, inter-personal 
practice, the death or withdrawal of a debtor would push creditors 
to demand swift repayment.124
The death of Claes Grambou in 1613 caused a small crisis, since 
this incited his creditors to demand what the merchant owed 
them. In March 1614, De la Gardie warned that, unless Gram-
bou’s widow could be repaid by the following Bartholomew’s Day 
(24 August), De la Gardie would be forced to repay everything, at the 
cost of ruining his own finances. The king heeded the plea, and on 
19 July 1614 Grambou’s widow received estates in Estonia as secu-
rity of the still-outstanding debt of 12,000 dalers, which she could 
retain and use to recover the funds advanced by her husband.125
 122 Von Rosen 1938, p. 44; AOSB II:5 pp. 241–244, Jacob De la Gardie to 
Axel Oxenstierna 27.10.1623.
 123 TUL, F6 Cordt 3C pp. 10–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Erik Andersson 
10.6.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 83–85, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel 
Oxenstierna 14.11.1615.
 124 Fontaine 2014, p. 50.
 125 AOSB II:5 pp. 5–12, 32–35, 58–60, 71–73, Jacob De la Gardie to 
Axel Oxenstierna 22.4.1612, 21.3.1613, October 1613 and 13.3.1614; 
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Besides financial self-interest, De la Gardie and Horn had a 
national interest in safeguarding the repayment of merchant 
creditors, which the king and the Privy Council (Sw. Riksrådet) 
also recognised. The default, or even rumoured lack of liquidity 
of one of these merchant bankers could lead to their financial col-
lapse. Besides losing a good supplier, this would close access to an 
important source of mercantile credit and hurt the crown’s reputa-
tion. Because of the interconnectivity of debts, the default of a sin-
gle creditor could also reverberate through the rest of the network 
and threaten to topple the entire system of mercantile borrowing 
on which military supply depended.126
Repayment
As the previous sections demonstrated, officers served as impor-
tant intermediaries in the mobilisation of resources for war: both 
lending funds by various means, as well as borrowing from the 
civilian market on behalf of the crown. It now remains to look at 
how these debts were repaid, and what sorts of reward the officers 
could hope to reap.
Settling debts
The bulk of the debts by the crown to officers and by officers to 
others started out very informally. Except for some of the com-
mercial loans taken from merchants, debts were ill-defined in 
RA, Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Summary of 
debts to Claes Grambou; RA, Riksregistraturet, Mortgage letter for 
Grambou’s widow 19.7.1614.
 126 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 559–560, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
6.10.1610; TUL F6 Cordt 3C pp. 10–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Erik 
Andersson 10.6.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 556–560a, Jacob De la 
Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 13.3.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 85–87, Jacob 
De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 10.1.1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 238–240, 
Axel Oxenstierna to Jakob van Dyck 26.8.1615.
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terms of means and time of repayment, securities and interest (if 
any). Credit advanced on behalf of the crown was seldom agreed 
beforehand with the central administration, owing to the urgency 
of the situation and the difficult communications to Stockholm. 
On the other hand, arrears and purchases made on behalf of an 
officer’s company or regiment were constant, ongoing affairs, 
which were expected to be settled at some indeterminate point in 
the future.
As debts went unpaid and started to accumulate, pressure to find 
a solution guaranteeing their repayment increased. At this point, 
the original debt was usually renegotiated, and formally confirmed 
in official contracts. There was usually significant room to rene-
gotiate debts in order to find a secure solution for repayment, and 
debtors could usually postpone repayment for some time, espe-
cially if they were high up in the military or social hierarchy.
As far as possible, debts were managed and repaid within the 
military organisation. The commissariat and senior commanders 
controlled the military treasury, the taxation of occupied Russian 
territories and, to a degree, revenues from Finland and Estonia 
allocated to supply the forces. Merchants and officers who had 
provided cash and supplies for the army might be repaid by the 
commissariat from the revenues of the occupied territory and 
from the property of Russian merchants and boyars labelled as 
‘traitors’. In some cases, the debts between officers could even be 
repaid through the army treasury by transferring part of the wages 
of one officer to another.127
Debts were also redistributed within the military. Senior officers 
were personally responsible for the pay and supply of their juniors 
and the men under their command. As arrears began to mount 
and officers were forced to advance funds, restitution was always 
sought from the next rung of military hierarchy: soldiers and 
 127 Regarding repayment of merchants from Russian resources, see for 
example TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 555–556, 602–603b, 614–617, Evert 
Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 20.9.1610, 27.2.1612, 16.9.1612 and 
27.9.1612.
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junior officers from captains, captains from colonels, and colonels 
from the commissariat and senior commanders. Superior officers, 
under increasing pressure from below, would frequently appro-
priate part of their subordinates’ debts by repaying them or their 
creditors, or by leaving the debts unpaid but assuming responsi-
bility for them.
For example, Evert Horn was eventually forced to repay Cap-
tain Pierre De la Ville for some of the funds which the latter had 
been forced to advance while under Horn’s command.128 Horn, 
in turn, complained of his mounting debt to Commander Jacob 
De la Gardie, who assumed part of this debt.129 In the end, credit 
advanced by officers followed military and social hierarchies, and 
the transfer of debts from subordinates to seniors served to rectify 
any irregularities in this hierarchy.
The rearrangement of debts within the army helped waylay the 
problem but could not overcome the insufficient means at 
the army’s disposal. Soldiers became unwilling to serve or out-
right mutinous and would require payment or additional rewards 
before they could be expected to undertake difficult or dangerous 
tasks. By 1614, the situation had become so bad that De la Gardie, 
the senior commander responsible for all wages, could not appear 
in front of his troops for fear that this would spark a mutiny.130
To ease these mounting debts, commanders sought to shift 
responsibility for repayment directly to the king. Already in 1612, 
De la Gardie was forced to send Colonel Samuel Cockburn’s regi-
ment to Finland to receive pay and provisions either from local 
administrators or by force from Finnish peasants. The colonel was 
given leave to travel to Stockholm to demand repayment directly 
from the king. To aid his cause, De la Gardie wrote strong letters 
 128 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 567–568, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
26.4.1611.
 129 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 555–558, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
20.9.1610 and 28.9.1610.
 130 AOSB II:5 pp. 74–75, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 
29.3.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 577b–581, Jacob De la Gardie to 
Gustavus Adolphus 8.7.1614.
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praising Cockburn’s services and the necessity of repaying him 
and gave them to the colonel to deliver to the king and Chancellor 
Axel Oxenstierna.
Colonel Cockburn was successful in petitioning his case. His 
long and loyal service, De la Gardie’s strong support, and the 
fact that the colonel still commanded a sizeable regiment of vet-
erans, which could continue to offer good service if paid, prob-
ably aided his cause. In December 1612, Cockburn was enfeoffed 
with several estates in the Finnish parishes of Pernaja and 
Porvoo, which he could hold for life, as well as 465 royal home-
steads in the Finnish provinces of Ostrobothnia and Satakunta, 
which were mortgaged against a loan of 8,000 dalers recognised 
by the royal accounting chamber (räknekammaren). The annual 
rent of the homesteads would be used to repay the debt over a 
number of years, and the rights of the peasants were secured so 
that they could not be evicted or forced to pay more than the 
customary annual rent.131
Over the following years, Cockburn successfully negotiated the 
repayment of additional loans. By summer or autumn of 1614, 
the crown accepted a further debt of 16,241 dalers, which 
Cockburn had used to pay his own regiment and for the upkeep 
of the rest of the army. Cockburn requested that this sum should 
be paid in cash, probably so that he could repay his creditors, 
to which Gustavus Adolphus concurred. However, repayment 
was drawn-out, and in 1615 new settlements were made. In 
June, Cockburn was enfeoffed with the parishes of Kroneby and 
Karleby in Ostrobothnia and was promised cash payment when 
the king arrived in Narva.132
However, the cash which the king brought from Sweden was 
insufficient to repay all the creditors waiting in Narva, especially 
since a major siege against nearby Pskov was in the works.133 
 131 Brännman 1950, p. 45; Boëthius ‘Cockburn’ (Svenskt Biografiskt 
Lexikon).
 132 Brännman 1950, pp. 45–49.
 133 Some of the funds brought with the king were used to repay Cock-
burn, besides which the king asked Jacob De la Gardie to advance 
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Instead, a new agreement was ironed out in September 1615, 
whereby Cockburn received a multitude of additional estates 
across southern Finland against a shortening of the debt by 6,000 
dalers. These new estates, as well as those enfeoffed for life in 1612, 
were now endowed as inheritable property (donations), with all 
the freedoms and privileges that nobles enjoyed for their inherited 
estates. There were also stringent requirements: the estates could 
not be sold or mortgaged without first offering them to the crown; 
only male heirs134 could inherit the estates; and these rights would 
have to be confirmed with every future king. Finally, Cockburn 
received a promotion to the rank of generalfältvaktmästare, and 
started to receive higher wages.135
These settlements with Samuel Cockburn were typical of how 
the crown managed its overgrown debts to the army’s offic-
ers. Repayment was a long-drawn-out process, requiring active 
petitioning by the creditor and multiple rounds of negotiation. 
Amount of debt and terms of repayment were negotiable, and the 
crown repeatedly reneged on its promises. Every time the debt 
was renegotiated, even those settlements that had already been 
agreed upon were reconfirmed, suggesting that they were not so 
secure after all. After a settlement was reached, it could take some 
time and much work before the funds were actually arranged. It 
was quite common to find the revenues assigned to service the 
debt already directed elsewhere, or to prove to be far less than 
the optimistic administration had calculated. Furthermore, bailiffs, 
toll masters, and other civil servants could prove quite intransi-
gent in handing over the promised estates or sources of revenue, 
even after receiving direct orders from the king.
5,000 dalers, of which some or even all were used to repay Cockburn. 
However, the total sum repaid in cash remains obscure. AOSB II:5 
pp. 102–103, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxensiterna 22.3.1616.
 134 If no male heirs were present, the estates would return to the crown 
and female inheritors would be repaid with the original 6,000 dalers 
against which the estates had been donated.
 135 Brännman 1950, pp. 45–49; Boëthius ‘Cockburn’ (Svenskt Biografiskt 
Lexikon).
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As in Cockburn’s case, many debts were serviced by enfeoffing or 
donating land, or by farming out the collection of taxes from par-
ishes, tolls, and other sources. The heavy cost of the Ingrian War 
and the crown’s other military ventures led to a massive increase 
in the alienation of crown revenues during Gustavus Adolphus’s 
reign (1611–1632). Enfeoffments and donations often took place 
within the newly conquered territory. In the case of the Ingrian 
War, virtually all of the annexed territory consisting of the prov-
inces of Kexholm and Ingria was enfeoffed to the largest creditors, 
Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie and merchant Bogislaus von Rosen. 
Besides gaining the title of count and a number of estates in 
Finland, Sweden and Estonia, De la Gardie was repaid for his ser-
vices and the credit he had advanced with 4,500 rubles (15,000 
dalers) from Russian war indemnities and the enforcement of 
Kexholm province and Nöteborg for six years, which was later 
extended to 12 years.136
In general, officers appear to have been content to receive land in 
lieu of payments in cash. As Evert Horn put it, allocations of land 
were much better than promises of repayment in cash, since the 
Treasury (Sw. Räkningekammaren) was so flooded with demands 
that repayment would take years or be neglected altogether.137 
Though repayment from enfeoffed land was slower, it provided 
security and a steady and predictable stream of revenue, and, if 
the terms of enfeoffment allowed, the land could be mortgaged or 
sold to settle an officer’s debts with his own creditors.
Enfeoffments and donations also served to tie officers to the ser-
vice of the state. As long as the debt continued to be serviced, 
officers and the crown remained connected by the personal bond 
of credit. For officers, control of land and debts from the crown 
 136 Besides repaying the 104,304 dalers’ worth of credit he had advanced 
to the crown, Grill calculates that Jacob De la Gardie made a profit 
of 170,218 dalers from the enfeoffment over the 12-year period. 
Hallenberg 2009; Grill 1949, pp. 26–44.
 137 TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 658–659, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 
21.5.1614.
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provided influence, prestige and the promise of future employ-
ment and advancement. From the crown’s perspective, land grants 
were part repayment, part reward, which increased an officer’s 
stakeholding and enticed him to continue in the crown’s service. 
Donations and their promise were an important component in 
enticing Swedish elites to serve, but also a tool for retaining the 
services of good foreign officers.138
Prioritisation of payments
Not everyone was as lucky as Colonel Cockburn or Feldherr Jacob 
De la Gardie. The massive cost of the war meant that, even with the 
alienation of crown revenues, the means to repay everything owed to 
the army simply did not exist. In 1613 and 1614, an increasing num-
ber of disgruntled officers received a leave to travel to Stockholm, 
overwhelming the central administration with their petitions. In 
April 1614, the Privy Council wrote to the king asking for prompt 
instructions what to do with the ‘multitude of soldiers’ who arrived 
daily from Russia and Finland to demand payment. The councillors 
also reminded the king that the country was overcommitted, and 
asked the king to outline which debts they were to pay, and what 
would have to be left unpaid, even with some peril.139
The king and Privy Council settled on a form of triage. Priority 
was given to the repayment of those senior officers deemed abso-
lutely necessary for the prosecution of the war: Feldherr Jacob 
De la Gardie, Field Marshal Evert Horn, and Colonels Mönnich-
hofen and Cockburn. These men were to receive some payment 
immediately, with which they could repay their creditors and 
their subordinates. More permanent, long-term settlements were 
to be arranged to cover the rest of the debt. Bogislaus von Rosen, 
the principal contractor supplying the army at the time, was also 
 138 Fontaine 2012, pp. 129, 249; Nilsson 1990, pp. 117–146.
 139 AOSB II:5 pp. 17–26, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 
17.1.1613; AOSB II:2 pp. 170–174, Axel Oxenstierna and Johan 
Skytte to Gustavus Adolphus 18.4.1614.
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included on the priority list, but other merchants who had lent 
money in the past would either be made to wait or promised 
repayment in the distant future, if the situation and their mer-
its allowed. Individual creditors owed very little could be repaid 
more freely, since this would not jeopardise the royal finances.140
Some officers such as Colonel Pierre De la Ville, who had served 
since 1607 and lent significant sums of money, were neglected. 
Despite being close to Jacob De la Gardie and receiving strong 
endorsement from the feldherr, La Ville had fallen out of favour 
with the king, who did not trust him. Gustavus Adolphus was also 
furious that La Ville had recruited more troops at De la Gardie’s 
bequest without consulting Stockholm. De la Gardie, on the other 
hand, was not reproached for allowing this, nor for conducting 
an identical recruitment of his own. The feldherr was ‘part of the 
system’, favoured and indispensable, and thereby received repay-
ment, whereas La Ville was not.141
Unlike other senior officers who received land, La Ville received 
pay merely in cash, mostly in the form of bills of exchange 
redeemable in Lübeck and Hamburg. Moreover, the crown 
refused to acknowledge a substantial part of La Ville’s claim. The 
royal accounting chamber calculated that the colonel had received 
955 dalers and 21.5 öre in excess of the acknowledged debt of 
23,000 dalers, and that the Frenchman in fact owed the crown. 
The colonel’s outstanding claim went unpaid, and a petition was 
made as late as 1781 – 170 years later – asking for recompense to 
his descendants!142
 140 AOSB I:2 pp. 170–174, Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte to 
Gustavus Adolphus 18.4.1614; AOSB II:1 pp. 44–45, 68–69,Gustavus 
Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna, Johan Skytte and Broder Andersson 
17.5.1614, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 25.7.1614.
 141 TUL, F6 Cordt 1A pp. 42–43, Gustavus Adolphus to Jacob De la 
Gardie 23.9.1613; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie 
to Gustavus Adolphus 16.12.1613; TUL, Lossius A1 pp. 556–560a, 
Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 13.3.1614.
 142 RA, Hären löneavkräkningar 1620–1680 series 4, Memorial for the 
outstanding debt to Pierre De la Ville’s descendants 5.3.1781; RA, 
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The choice of who would receive repayment was in part a mat-
ter of utility: could the crown expect to have future use for this 
individual, and what would be the cost if it refused to pay? Credi-
tors knew this, and most petitions for repayment of officers and 
merchants alike promised to serve faithfully and to advance 
further sums, but only if the previous debts were first repaid. 
Officers who still commanded sizeable units might also use the 
threat of mutiny or licentiousness to pressure the crown, although 
this required subtleness and a balance of threat combined with 
justified grievance and ability to negotiate in order to succeed.
For example, in 1616, when the situation in Russia was unten-
able, a number of units that had fought well were sent to Finland 
with promises that the crown would repay all its debts from the 
treasury of Turku Castle. Unsurprisingly, the money was not avail-
able, but the threat that the soldiers would forcibly exact repay-
ment from the peasantry prompted the crown to divert funds 
from other ventures. It still could not afford to pay the officers and 
men in full but managed to negotiate settlements with the officers. 
Some of the troops were retained in service, which enabled the 
crown to postpone repayment still further. In the case of others, 
the crown offered to pay part of its debts and give the officers good 
commendations, and then sought to find a foreign sovereign who 
would accept them into his service and assume responsibility for 
the remainder of the debt.143
Besides utility, patronage was important for securing repay-
ment. Evert Horn and Samuel Cockburn could rely on Jacob De la 
Gardie’s support, who in turn relied on Chancellor Axel Oxen-
stierna’s patronage. Even the Duke of Saxony, who failed as a 
military commander, received repayment through the patron-
age of Queen Dowager Christina, who pressured her son to repay 
the duke. Truly ‘mercenary’ officers who remained detached from the 
Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Peder Olofsson’s 
account for Pierre de la Ville’s company 18.3.1614.
 143 TUL, Lossius A2 p. 439, Gustavus Adolphus to Jacob De la Gardie 
29.3.1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 271–273, 281–828, Axel Oxenstierna to 
Gustavus Adolphus 22.5.1616 and 30.5.1616; AOSB II:1 pp. 93–95, 
Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 10.6.1616.
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Swedish crown and aristocratic elite stood little chance of receiv-
ing pay over those creditors more closely integrated to the state.144
Finally, repayment was very much a question of moral obligation 
and reciprocity. Those officers who had served well and, above all, 
loyally, could expect to receive both repayment and reward. In 
their petitions, officers emphasised the sacrifices they had made 
both to their health and to their inherited wealth on behalf of the 
crown. In particular, the widows of officers killed in combat could 
expect recompense. The most prominent examples were Colonel 
Mönnichhofen, killed leading an assault on Gdov, and Field 
Marshal Evert Horn, who died repelling an attack at the siege of 
Pskov. The king was present to witness both these deaths and did 
not fail to repay the estates of his brave subordinates.145
Conversely, officers who failed in their duties or proved disloyal 
stood little chance of recovering their investment, even if war-
ranted. Charles IX refused to repay his debt to many of the French 
officers who recruited troops between 1606 and 1610, because 
he considered that they had not earned it. Henri de la Borde de Luxe 
planned to complain to the King of France Henry IV and make 
this a diplomatic matter, but the assassination of the French mon-
arch prevented this. Naturally, those French troops who defected 
to the enemy in 1610 – arguably with little choice – forfeited all 
chance of repayment. Despite their latter successes, Charles IX 
held Evert Horn and Jacob De la Gardie partly responsible for the 
defeat at Klushino in 1610 and refused to repay the funds they had 
advanced to maintain the army before this defeat.146
Most successful were those officers who proved their commit-
ment to the war effort, often with great financial and personal risk, 
and managed to integrate themselves in Swedish social networks. 
These officers were favoured with not only repayment of their 
outstanding debts but also additional gifts of land and wealth, 
 144 AOSB I:2 p. 211, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Skytte 2.10.1614.
 145 Generalstaben 1936, pp. 478, 522; RA, Kammarkollegiets skuldböcker 
vol. 1, Account with Colonel Mönnichhofen’s estate 1615–1623.
 146 Le Mercure Francois 1615, pp. 49 – 56; TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 557–558, 
561–564, 567–568, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 28.9.1610, 
13.11.1610 and 26.4.1611.
80 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
money and jewellery, social advancement and offices in the rap-
idly expanding state bureaucracy.
Conclusion
Victory often goes to the army that makes the least mistakes, not the 
most brilliant plans.
— Charles de Gaulle
The history of the Ingrian War can be presented as a series of 
failures in military supply. Despite best efforts, state-run mili-
tary finances and supply proved utterly inadequate to pay, feed 
or clothe the Swedish army in Russia. However, in spite of recur-
ring crises and steady deterioration, the army managed to out-
last the enemy and limp its way to victory. The ensuing Treaty of 
Stolbova gave the Swedish Realm control over the entire Gulf 
of Finland, tighter control of Baltic trade revenues, the new prov-
inces of Ingria and Kexholm, and a more secure eastern border.
This victory was largely the result of the commitment and credit 
advanced by the entrepreneurial officers of the Swedish army. The 
men, money and materials provided by both native Swedish and 
foreign officers alike greatly expanded the resources at the state’s 
disposal at the point where they mattered the most, increasing the 
longevity that the army could be kept in the field. Moreover, 
the personal resources of officers helped the army tide over the 
worst supply crises, thereby making the army more robust and 
preventing its collapse on multiple occasions.
As well-connected members of the elite, officers also functioned as 
crucial intermediaries at the nexus between the civilian and mili-
tary economies, obtaining resources from the civilian market and 
putting these to use for the benefit of the war effort. This helped 
tie disparate economic agents within the realm and beyond its 
borders behind the crown’s interests in support of a common war 
effort. Moreover, tapping into the credit network of the army’s 
officers gave the crown access to a larger resource base, and other-
wise inaccessible resources at potentially lower transaction costs, 
than if the entire affair had been state-run.
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An important yet often overlooked component of military 
entrepreneurship was the devolution of risk from the crown. 
Officers were not merely subordinates but investors and stake-
holders in the ‘military enterprise’. So long as the war went well, 
officers could expect to make a profit and enjoy a prestigious 
position in the king’s service. However, if they failed in their 
duties or the war was lost, officers stood to lose their investment 
and reputation.
Morals and social ties governed reward and repayment, which 
encouraged officers to serve faithfully and integrate with Swedish 
networks, rather than remain detached mercenaries. Many offic-
ers accepted a vested interest in the outcome of the war and were 
prepared to commit both their person and their wealth. Through 
military entrepreneurship, members of the elite were enticed to 
participate in the crown’s military venture and integrated more 
closely with the interests of the nascent Swedish empire.
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CHAPTER 3 
The Burghers of Nyen as Creditors  




During the Great Northern War, some of the burghers of the town 
of Nyen supported the Swedish crown in organising supply for 
the army and navy. Interestingly, this was mainly done at the same 
time as the burghers were forced to flee the war.
Before the war, Nyen had become an important Swedish town 
at the far end of the Gulf of Finland, located in the same place 
that Saint Petersburg is located today. In the last decades of the 
17th century, timber trade prospered and the economic develop-
ment in the town was rapid.1 In 1703, Nyen was destroyed by the 
Russians and the merchants fled to different coastal towns in 
the north-eastern Baltic Sea region. As refugees, they played 
 1 Kepsu 2019; Kepsu 2018.
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in many cases a crucial role in financing and supplying military 
units close to the front.2
Earlier research has pointed out the important role of private 
entrepreneurship in supporting military forces in early modern 
Europe. Since the end of the 16th century, states had paid private 
contractors and entrepreneurs to supply military services, even to 
raise and maintain fully equipped units. This was a consequence 
of rulers’ limited power, even though early modern states are 
generally described as absolutist. In practice, powerful private 
individuals were necessary for a centralised power as allies in gov-
erning the state, particularly in peripheral border regions. Early 
modern rulers and governors tried to win over these local elites 
to support the state apparatus, including financing military units, 
which required economic power and wealth.3
However, earlier research has focused more on binding mem-
bers of the landowning nobility to the state, and using them as 
military entrepreneurs who were responsible for recruiting, 
arming and officering their own troops, as well as organising 
their supply.4 The role of burghers as private financers of war in 
Northern Europe is known to a lesser degree. In addition, earlier 
studies have mostly dealt with food supply and the billeting of 
soldiers, but to a lesser degree with credits.5
In this chapter, I analyse the burghers of Nyen as creditors for 
the Swedish army. The main question is how the crown used the 
burghers’ extensive transnational networks and commercial com-
petence to finance the Great Northern War. I will also discuss how 
this benefited the burghers themselves, who as refugees were in a 
vulnerable position. This gives an interesting perspective on the 
relationship between the private and public sphere, in particular 
 2 Kepsu 2020.
 3 Parrott 2012, especially pp. 2–3; Hårdstedt 2002, p. 56; Black 1998, 
pp. 88–89; Reinhard 1996, pp. 6–7; Parker 1996, p. 64. See also Kepsu 
2014, pp. 60–61 with references.
 4 Parrott 2012, p. 57; Black 1998, p. 89; Parker 1996, pp. 64–65.
 5 See e.g. Hatakka 2019; Hårdstedt 2002.
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in how the army could utilise civilian society in fulfilling its sup-
ply needs. The role of burghers in early modern state formation is 
also dealt with.
Nyen is not well known in historical research, nor are its burgh-
ers. Their arrival as refugees in Viipuri and Helsinki during the 
Great Northern War is, however, noted in the histories of those 
towns.6 Primary source material about the Nyen burghers is also 
scarce, as no private account books of the burghers have been pre-
served. However, some administrative documents, such as court 
records and correspondence between the burghers and crown’s 
officials, have survived. To this study, the most important source 
material is the credit documents filed by the Chamber College 
(Sw. Kammarkollegium), located in the Swedish National Archives 
in Stockholm.7
Nyen and Its Burghers
The town of Nyen (Fin. Nevanlinna, also called Nyenschanz and 
Schanzdernie) was located at the mouth of the river Okhta, close 
to the place where the river Neva runs into the Gulf of Finland. 
The town was protected by the fortress Nyenskans, where con-
struction began during the Ingrian War in 1611. Nyen was 
founded de jure in 1642, when it was granted town privileges.8
Even though the location of Nyen was ideal for Russian trade, 
transit trade was almost constantly characterised by various prob-
lems during the 17th century. The turning point came in the 
1680s, when trade and commerce increased in the whole Baltic 
region. The final decades of the 17th century can be seen as an 
economic boom, as for the towns of the Swedish eastern Baltic 
provinces. The aims of the crown’s derivation policy, which aimed 
 6 See in particular Aalto 2016. See also Ruuth 1906.
 7 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96.
 8 Jangfeldt 1998, pp. 18–19; von Bonsdorff 1891, pp. 361–363, 381–387.
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to channel the transit trade between Russia and Western Europe 
via Nyen and Narva instead of Archangelsk, were partly fulfilled.9
Sawmills, shipyards and the timber trade were the base for the 
economic boom in Nyen, and timber exports increased greatly 
during the last decades of the 17th century.10 According to the 
Sound Toll Registers, which catalogue all maritime traffic in and 
out of the Baltic Sea via the Danish Sound, some 30 ships from 
Nyen sailed yearly through the Sound between 1681 and 1703. 
They were loaded with the so-called naval stores, or timber and 
other shipbuilding material, and sailed mostly to Amsterdam. In 
addition, ships also sailed to other Baltic ports, particularly to 
Stockholm and Lübeck.11
The increase in trade would not have been possible without 
a great demand for naval stores in Western Europe during the 
time.12 The Nine Years War (1688–1697), where the Netherlands 
and England fought against France, had also a favourable effect on 
trade in the Gulf of Finland. During the war, Dutch shipmasters, 
merchants, and technological experts moved some of their com-
mercial activities to neutral countries in order to avoid French pri-
vateers.13 Some 15 Dutch shipmasters became burghers in Nyen 
in 1691–1696.14 With the help of Dutch capital and professionals, 
new fine-blade sawmills and shipyards were established along the 
Narva and Neva rivers.15 The Dutch interests in acquiring naval 
stores from ports around the Gulf of Finland continued even after 
the Great Northern War broke out in 1700.
The most powerful burghers in late 17th-century Nyen were of 
German or Baltic-German descent and closely tied together by 
marriages. Among the most influential families were Hueck, Luhr, 
 9 Kepsu 2018, pp. 62–64; Küng 2008.
 10 Kepsu 2018, pp. 63–66; Åström 1988, pp. 30–31, 44–46.
 11 Sound Toll Registers (www.soundtoll.nl); Kepsu 2018, pp. 75–76; 
Kepsu 2017, p. 427.
 12 Davids 2008, especially pp. 347–349, 362.
 13 Müller 2019, pp. 54–56; Bruijn 2004, pp. 42–43.
 14 Kepsu 2019, pp. 470–472; von Bonsdorff 1891, p. 495.
 15 Kepsu 2018; Åström 1988, pp. 30–31, 44–46.
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Frisius, Siliacks (Zilliacus), Blom and Pölck (Pölke).16 Most of 
them had settled in the town quite recently. Although the crown 
encouraged foreign merchants to settle in Nyen, many immigrants 
moved there through their personal networks as chain migration, 
in particular from Lübeck and Tallinn.17 In the Swedish Realm, 
the ‘imported burghers’, as Åke Sandström has called them, were 
important connections to the international market.18 The crown 
especially craved different kinds of specialists of trade and manu-
facturing.19 Another important but less noticed motive was the 
possibility to get credit from the foreign merchants, which was 
needed for financing the continuous wars. 
The elite merchants in Nyen had an important position as 
mediators in the transit trade between the merchant houses in 
Western Europe and the raw material markets of North-Eastern 
Europe.20 The rapid economic development during the last dec-
ades of the 17th century provided the burgher elite in Nyen with 
valuable trading connections, which in turn proved to be vital 
after the destruction of the city in 1703. Beside good transna-
tional networks, they had commercial experience and they could 
communicate with the merchant houses in Amsterdam in Middle 
Low German.
To sum up, the merchant elite in Nyen was quite powerful at 
the time of the outbreak of the Great Northern War. It dominated 
both the economic and political sphere in the town. The elite was 
not as powerful as the top burghers in Riga, Tallinn or Narva, but 
clearly wealthier than the burghers in Finnish coastal towns like 
Viipuri (Sw. Viborg, Ru. Vyborg) or Helsinki (Sw. Helsingfors). 
According to Seppo Aalto, refugee merchants from Nyen who 
arrived in Helsinki after 1703 were superior to the local burghers 
 16 Kepsu 2019.
 17 Kepsu 2019.
 18 Sandström 2016, pp. 223–224.
 19 Naum & Ekengren 2018, p. 107; Villstrand 1989, pp. 10, 17–19, 29.
 20 Kepsu 2019.
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regarding both ships and networks, as well as capital and com-
mercial competence.21
Even after the merchants of Nyen lost a major part of their real 
property along with their hometown, most of their private means 
seemed to have been invested in Amsterdam. Politically, they were 
also quite well integrated in the Swedish Realm and seems to have 
been relatively loyal towards the central government.22 Altogether, 
these factors made it possible for the Nyen merchants to support 
the crown by financing war costs and supplying military units 
during the Great Northern War.
The First Financial Agreements
Conquering Ingria was the main objective of Peter the Great dur-
ing the Great Northern War, as he wanted Russia to get access to 
the Baltic Sea.23 Russian troops had already invaded parts of east-
ern Ingria in the summer of 1700. In Nyen, the situation became 
even more threatening in September, when Russian troops initi-
ated the siege of Narva. Some of the burghers chose to leave the 
town at this point, but many returned in 1701 when the military 
threat was temporarily decreased. In the autumn of 1702, the 
town was struck by panic when Russian troops lead by Czar Peter 
himself conquered the fortress of Pähkinälinna (Sw. Nöteborg, 
Ru. Oreshek/Shlisselburg). More or less all burghers remaining in 
Nyen left the town at this point.24
There is not a lot of information on war financing from Ingria 
during the first years of the Great Northern War. Yet, the intensive 
trade between Nyen and Amsterdam came up for discussion at 
the beginning of the war. According to James Cavallie, Nyen was 
used as security in credit negotiations between Swedish Realm 
and the Netherlands in 1700. Dutch merchants trading with cit-
 21 Aalto 2016, pp. 488–491.
 22 Kepsu 2019, pp. 486–492.
 23 Scheltjens 2011, pp. 115–116; Jangfeldt 1998, p. 23.
 24 Kepsu 2020, pp. 133–134, 138; Kepsu 1995, pp. 110–111.
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ies in the eastern Baltic provinces and willing to provide credit to 
the Swedish crown were to be given toll exemptions in Nyen and 
other ports in order to shorten the loans. These attempts were, 
however, unsuccessful.25 It is likely that Dutch merchants regarded 
the geopolitical location of Nyen too insecure for a credit security.
Some attempts to acquire credit from private individuals were 
made at the beginning of the war. Otto Wellingk, governor-general 
for Ingria and Kexholm Province, was ordered to investigate if he 
could find any individuals who could give credit to the crown. As 
a pawn, they could receive some of the crown’s manors or incomes 
in Ingria. Wellingk was advised to make contracts between the 
crown and the possible creditors; these contracts were appar-
ently supposed to function as a model for similar agreements in 
the future. The central government in Stockholm had seemingly 
high hopes for credit, but Wellingk regarded them as unrealistic. 
According to him, difficult and turbulent times in the province 
had made people fearful and concerned, and therefore he feared 
that not many persons were ready to please His Majesty’s will.26
Even though only a few contracts were signed, at least one 
burgher from Nyen was involved in pawning of a manor. In 
1702, Henrik Luhr, one of the most powerful merchants in Nyen, 
provided Lieutenant Axel Bure with 3,663 silver dalers and got 
the Porits crown manor in Järvisaari pogost in eastern Ingria as 
a pawn. Bure was not able to pay Luhr back, which meant that 
Porits passed on to Luhr. However, Luhr could not benefit from 
the manor, as it was conquered by Russian troops in the early 
autumn of 1702.27
 25 Cavallie 1975, pp. 94–100. See also Frost 2000, p. 281.
 26 RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Governor-General Otto Wellingk to 
Charles XII, 16 March 1700. See also Cavallie 1975, p. 70.
 27 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Skrivelser från Kammarkollegiet 1717, 
1134:4, vol 92, The Chamber College to Charles XII, 13 May 1717. 
Henrik Luhr pleaded in 1717 to be compensated for the loss of his 
pawn manor. His undated petitions are attached to the letter from 
the Chamber College.
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Another problem for the crown seems to have been that the gov-
ernment had a very poor credit standing.28 This fact made it dif-
ficult to loan money on the international credit market in the late 
17th and early 18th centuries. The Swedish crown did not have 
any long-term credit relations to international creditors and was 
in general regarded as an unsecure borrower. During the Great 
Northern War, the state made further attempts to get loans on the 
international market, but they were not very successful. Competi-
tion on the international credit market was tough, while Europe 
was also ravaged by the War of the Spanish Succession.29
An interesting preserved document illustrates the attitude of the 
Nyen burghers towards financing the military when the war broke 
out. In a meeting held at Nyen courthouse in the end of January 
1700, Governor-General Otto Wellingk discussed the building 
of new vaults in Nyenskans fortress with the town council and 
burghers of Nyen. The vaults were intended as a bomb shelter to 
protect both the inhabitants and their most valuable possessions. 
The crown hoped that the burghers would either build them on 
their own or finance the building project. After the Nyen burghers 
had discussed the matter, the town council answered by a written 
letter at the end of February, when the war had already broken out 
and the siege of Riga began.30
In its answer, the town council declined in subservient terms 
to finance the vaults. By highlighting setbacks during the last 
few years, such as wrecking and seizing of ships, the burghers 
emphasised their poverty. According to them, their wealth was 
tied up in house building and merchandise, which made it impos-
sible for them to cope with extraordinary fortification costs. The 
town council implied between the lines that the crown should 
 28 Cavallie 1975, p. 70.
 29 Winton 2010, pp. 172–173.
 30 RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Nyen town council to Governor- 
General Otto Wellingk 21 February 1700; Governor-General Otto 
Wellingk to Charles XII 10 March 1700. See also von Bonsdorff 1891, 
p. 377.
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strengthen the defence of the town with its own resources. In that 
case, the burghers could for their part strengthen the town by 
building their own houses in stone.31 Clearly, the council regarded 
military protection and fortification to be the crown’s responsibil-
ity. In fact, the town had repeatedly requested stronger fortifica-
tions from central government during the 17th century.32
Otto Wellingk, who forwarded the letter to King Charles XII 
(Sw. Karl XII) along with his own comments, did not recommend 
that the burghers should be encouraged to build stone houses, 
since the town was not to be fortified. According to military plans, 
only the star fortress of Nyenskans was to be enlarged. In his letter, 
Wellingk confirmed the poverty of the burghers. He also pointed 
out that most of the merchants were young and at the beginning 
of their careers.33 However, both Wellingk and the town council 
mentioned an interesting fact: the merchants were trading mostly 
by credit, which they received from foreigners.34 This proved to be 
essential in later financial contacts between the Nyen merchants 
and representatives of the crown.
Charles XII did not give up and ordered Otto Wellingk to discuss 
the matter once more with the burghers of Nyen. They were to be 
persuaded by fair means (Sw. ‘gode ock lämpa’). Wellingk assem-
bled the burghers in May 1700, just before the governor-general 
himself was appointed as commander of the Finnish troops 
about to march to reinforce the besieged Swedish army in Riga. 
His persuasions did not change the burghers’ stand in Nyen.35 
 31 RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Nyen town council to Governor- 
General Otto Wellingk 21 February 1700. On shipwrecks and priva-
teering of ships from Nyen, see Kepsu 2018.
 32 Kepsu 2019, pp. 474–475.
 33 RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Governor-General Otto Wellingk to 
Charles XII 10 March 1700.
 34 RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Nyen town council to Governor- 
General Otto Wellingk 21 February 1700, Governor-General Otto 
Wellingk to Charles XII 10 March 1700.
 35 RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Governor-General Otto Wellingk 
to Charles XII 24 May 1700. Wellingk’s appointment is mentioned 
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It seems that the town council had a positive attitude towards 
the building project, but the burghers in general were against it 
because of their poverty. Persuasion did not have an effect on the 
insistent burghers.36
In general, the Swedish crown had difficulties in getting credit 
from wealthy merchants in its cities and in this way binding them 
to the war effort. The crown paid 6% interest, but normal trade 
probably yielded a much greater profit.37 In addition, repayment 
from the crown was quite insecure. Because trade connections 
to Western Europe were still functioning more or less normally, 
it was more profitable to focus on trade than to lend money to 
the crown.
According to the Sound Toll Registers, the number of mer-
chant ships departing from Nyen and sailing through the Sound 
was at a normal level during the first years of war. During the 
last decades of the 17th century, around 30 ships on average had 
departed yearly from Nyen. In 1700, when the Russian attack in 
Ingria started at the end of the sailing season, 55 ships sailed from 
Nyen. The number dropped to 18 in 1701, when most of the lead-
ing merchant families lived as temporary refugees in Viipuri, but 
returned to 36 ships in 1702. In 1703, the year of Nyen’s destruc-
tion, only one ship passed through the Sound.38
In Narva and Tallinn, the downfall in trade seems to have been 
far heavier than in Nyen. In Viipuri, on the other hand, the num-
bers of departing ships actually increased. After the losses of 
Nyen and Narva, Viipuri became the centre for transit trade in the 
in RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Lieutenant Colonel Johan Stael 
von Holstein to Charles XII 21 May 1700.
 36 RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Nyen town council to Governor- 
General Otto Wellingk 9 May 1700.
 37 Cavallie 1975, pp. 125–135.
 38 Sound Toll Registers. The number of departures shows variations 
also during peaceful years in the registers. For Nyen, yearly depar-
tures varied from 13 to 62 in the period 1681–1703.
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eastern Gulf of Finland, and refugees from Nyen settled in the 
town also boosted trade in Viipuri.39
Trade in Narva and Riga was affected by the Russian offensive, 
followed by sieges in both towns. The Privy Council (Sw. Riksråd) 
and the Chamber College pointed out that there were major 
obstacles in trade on these locations, which has resulted in loss 
of income, particularly from the profitable licence toll in Riga 
(Sw. licent). The financial situation overall was considered alarm-
ing. Because of the war, incomes in the state budget had decreased 
while expenses had risen.40
However, some credit arrangements involving traders from 
Nyen were made. They were arranged through personal networks, 
not through the crown. In July 1704 Christian Hueck, one of the 
most wealthy and powerful burghers in Nyen, advanced 1,500 
dalers to the town of Tallinn. In the document, it is stated that the 
means would be used for the fortification of the town. Like the 
Swedish crown, Tallinn offered an interest rate of 6%.41 Apparently, 
the town council accumulated private means in order to protect the 
town. The military situation in the eastern Baltic provinces was 
threatening since Dorpat had surrendered to the Russians a cou-
ple of weeks earlier and Narva was under siege.42
It is very likely that the loan was organised through the family 
network. Christian Hueck, a member of Nyen town council, had 
already migrated from Lübeck together with his brothers in the 
middle of the 17th century. Some of his brothers had settled in 
Tallinn and become very influential. Christian Hueck’s brother 
Wendel still lived in Tallinn, as did his nephew Johann, who later 
became burgomaster in the town.43
 39 Kepsu 2020, pp. 135, 144.
 40 Historiska handlingar I p. 116, The Privy Council and the Chamber 
College to Charles XII 25.2.1701.
 41 TL, Fond 230:1, BB 45, Bond of Christian Hueck 7.7.1704.
 42 Kujala 2001, p. 219.
 43 Möller & Luther 1981, pp. 89–90.
98 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
Organising Credits and Military Supply in  
Viipuri and Helsinki
By far the most prominent burgher from Nyen who financed the 
Swedish war effort was Johan Henrik Frisius. His father, Heinrich 
Frisius, was one of the town’s many German migrates. He moved to 
Nyen from Rostock in the mid-17th century and in 1662 became 
the vicar in the German church of the town.44 Johan Henrik 
became a burgher in 1691, but court records from Nyen show that 
he had already been involved in trade a few years earlier.45 His 
position was strengthened by his marriage in 1696 to Catharina 
Barckman, who was the daughter of a former elite burgher, Daniel 
Barckman, and a widow to Diedrich Blom, a relatively powerful 
merchant with a background in Lübeck.46
At the beginning of the 1690s, the burghers of Nyen were involved 
in a heavy increase of timber trade and shipbuilding. Johan 
Henrik Frisius was amongst the first to invest in ships. Together 
with his brother-in-law Detleff Jochims, he founded a shipyard 
just outside Nyen along the Neva river. In addition, he owned 
parts in at least eight ships.47 Frisius travelled to Amsterdam 
and Paris and managed to become wealthy before the outbreak 
of the Great Northern War. His private means were apparently 
invested abroad, mostly in Amsterdam.48
Frisius arrived to Viipuri in 1702 with his stepchildren, mer-
chant Didrik Blom Jr and Catharina Blom, who later married 
Christian Hueck’s son Johan Hueck. During the first years in 
Viipuri, Johan Henrik Frisius and the other refugee merchants 
from Nyen focused on trade. Until around 1708, merchant ships 
 44 Mäkelä-Alitalo 2014; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d. (www.frisenheim.se).
 45 See for example KA, Town Court of Nyen 1687, n:1, pp. 285–288; 
Town Court of Nyen 1688, n:2, pp. 225–229, 231–234; Town Court 
of Nyen 1690, n:4, pp. 248–250, 252–254.
 46 Mäkelä-Alitalo 2014; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
 47 For shipping and shipbuilding in Nyen, see also Kepsu 2018; Küng 
2009.
 48 Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
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could sail quite safely in the Baltic Sea, and the flow of goods 
was more or less normal.49 In Viipuri, a refugee network started 
to develop between the former merchants from Nyen. A young 
merchant, Jobst Dobbin, later one of the wealthiest burghers in 
Hamina (Sw. Fredrikshamn), worked as Frisius’s merchant’s 
apprentice (Sw. köpgesäll) and lived in his house.50
Frisius seems to have quite quickly reached an important posi-
tion in the town. He also organised business possibilities for other 
merchants in Viipuri. Just before the siege in Viipuri in 1706, when 
the Russians tried to take the town, Frisius made a contract with 
some merchants on salt trade. He had ordered a large quantity of 
salt, which he sold forward to other merchants. One of them was 
Jacob Danneberg, who belonged to the old elite in Viipuri. He had 
ordered a hundred barrels of salt from Frisius but did not receive 
it since he would not agree to all of Frisius’s transaction terms.51 It 
is possible that there were some controversies between Frisius 
and Danneberg.
As the war went on, difficulties in trade became more evident. 
However, fortification works opened new business possibilities. 
After the loss of the Ingrian fortresses Nyen and Narva, Viipuri 
was once again a border stronghold. After the siege in 1706, for-
tification works intensified even more.52 Financing military units 
and fortification works was, however, problematic. The Swedish 
military administration, which was based on the allotment farm 
system and static budgets, worked excellently in peacetime, but 
faced difficulties when the outbreak of war raised the expenditure 
to another level.53 The new governor and commander-in-chief, 
Georg Lybecker, solved the problem by starting to use burghers in 
organising supply for the army. His main companion was Johan 
 49 Ericson Wolke 2011, pp. 86–87.
 50 KA, Town Court of Viipuri 1707, x:43, pp. 27–28; KA, Lower Town 
Court of Viipuri 1707, x:83, pp. 36–37.
 51 KA, Lower Town Court of Viipuri 1707, x:83, pp. 34, 36–37, 65, 
67–68, 149, 153–154.
 52 Ruuth & Halila 1974, pp. 403–405, 412–414; Ruuth 1906, p. 472.
 53 See e.g. Frost 2000, pp. 281–282, 316–317.
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Henrik Frisius, but also other Nyen burghers, like Matthias Pylse 
(Pülse, Pylss), participated. Still, Frisius was the key to all deliver-
ies and credits. The other burghers advanced means only if Frisius 
guaranteed the loan.54
Frisius also organised means to fortification works in Viipuri. He 
continued to support the fortress until the bitter end of Viipuri 
as a Swedish town. In addition, Carl Dobbin from Nyen organ-
ised means and supply just before the second siege of the town in 
1710. This was very important, since the Swedish defence system 
in general was based on strong fortresses. However, the fortresses 
in the eastern part of the realm were in bad condition and difficult 
to defend. Even though Swedish fortresses had been strengthened 
during the reign of Charles XI (Sw. Karl XI), the main emphasis 
was on the newly captured provinces, in particular Scania.55
Because of strategic choices and the crown’s limited resources, 
the local governors and military commanders had no other option 
than to rely on the burghers. When Russian troops had already 
occupied the outskirts of Viipuri, Lieutenant Colonel Lorentz 
Stobæus – later ennobled as Stobée – sent a letter to General Quar-
termaster Magnus Palmqvist and pointed out in harsh words that 
the crown’s fortification funds were exhausted. As communication 
lines were broken, Stobæus had not received any answers on his 
letters to Stockholm.56 Frisius broke through the siege and left 
the town when surrender was evident. Interestingly, he made an 
agreement with the other burghers where he took all the claims to 
the crown on his responsibility.57 This arrangement strengthened 
his position towards the crown, and probably allowed Frisius to 
continue with his supply business.
 54 Hjelmqvist 1909, pp. 107–108.
 55 Sundberg 2018, p. 42; Kepsu 2014, pp. 77–80.
 56 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Johan Henrik Frisius’s claims.
 57 Ruuth & Halila 1974, pp. 424–425, 434; Ruuth 1906, pp. 477–478, 
484.
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Altogether, the support of the Nyen burghers was substantial 
before and during the siege of Viipuri. Before the siege of the town 
started in 1710, Johan Henrik Frisius had claims of around 82,000 
silver dalers.58 According to Frisius himself, as well as many later 
historians, the activity of Frisius encouraged the brave resistance 
in Viipuri. Antti Kujala states that Frisius was among the crown’s 
most reliable income sources in Finland during the Great North-
ern War, because of his excellent networks to the Netherlands 
and Hamburg. Without Frisius and other burghers like Pylse and 
Dobbin, the fortress would most likely have surrendered 
much earlier.59
After the fall of Nyen, some burghers fled to Helsinki. Initially, 
Henrik Luhr became the most influential merchant from Nyen 
in Helsinki. He managed to escape to Helsinki in the autumn of 
1702 after dramatic incidents. His ship Tre stjärnor från Nyen 
was almost wrecked outside Nyen, but eventually he managed to 
reach Helsinki along with his ship, loaded with salt and tobacco.60 
The Nyen refugee community in Helsinki was quite large, in 
1708 about 10% of the total adult population in the town.61 
Besides Luhr, other important traders from Nyen fled to Helsinki, 
most notably Berend Dobbin, Jobst Hueck, Jürgen Pölck and 
Casper Everding.
In addition, Jochim Donner, the schoolmaster from Nyen’s 
German school, fled to Helsinki. He taught the children of the 
 58 Ruuth 1906, pp. 477–478, 484.
 59 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Chamber College memorandum, 
13 July 1714; Kujala 2001, p. 248, 256; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d. The 
Russians captured some of the burghers from Nyen after the surren-
der of the town in 1710. Quite many families settled in the Russian 
Viipuri and were during the following decades important in trade and 
city administration. Among the prisoners of war was also Friedrich 
Wittstock, who was appointed, not surprisingly by Frisius, burgo-
master in Hamina after the war. See Kepsu 2020, pp. 137–143.
 60 Kepsu 2020, pp. 133–134, 138–140.
 61 Aalto 2016, p. 456.
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Nyen elite but started later to build a new career as a merchant. 
It is also important to mention Henrik Luhr’s sister Anna Luhr. 
As a widow to the Nyen merchant Conrad Siliacks, she had 
taken care of family affairs in Nyen. Their daughters Christina, 
Maria and Anna Elisabeth were married to Jobst Hueck, Jürgen 
Pölck and Casper Everding, and formed a base to the network of 
Nyen burghers in Helsinki.62
Former Nyen burghers in Helsinki were also connected to the 
merchant families who resided in Viipuri. The most important 
link was Henrik Luhr, who was a brother-in-law to Johan Henrik 
Frisius. During the first years after the fall of Nyen, Luhr partly 
resided in Stockholm, which presumably provided both him and 
the Nyen refugee network important connections to the central 
government.63 Like in Viipuri, the Nyen burgers in Helsinki seem 
to have mostly focused on trade during the first years in the town. 
They were active in timber trade, in particular Henrik Luhr and 
Jobst Hueck.64
It is not clear when the Nyen burghers in Helsinki got involved 
in supplying the Swedish army, but deliveries to the crown soared 
when Frisius arrived after the surrender of Viipuri. While in 
Helsinki, Frisius continued to supply the army using other 
burgers in Helsinki as subcontractors. His contacts to the credit 
market in Amsterdam were valuable for the Swedish crown. The 
Netherlands were officially neutral in the war, but it was impor-
tant for the merchant houses in Amsterdam to secure the import 
of naval stores from the ports of the Gulf of Finland. Helsinki 
became an important centre for the Swedish–Dutch timber trade 
in 1710, when Viipuri as well as Tallinn and Riga were conquered 
by Russian troops. This made it possible for the burghers in 
Helsinki to quite successfully organise supply and to fulfil the 
enormous needs of the army.
 62 Kepsu 2020, pp. 138–141; Möller & Luther 1981, pp. 83–84, 92–99; 
Donner 1891, pp. 4–13.
 63 Aalto 2016, pp. 478–479.
 64 Aalto 2016, pp. 363–364; Kuisma 1992, pp. 137–138.
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According to Seppo Aalto, the merchants from Nyen had an 
exceptional ability to get means and to turn money into goods and 
goods into money.65 In addition, the connection between the Nyen 
network and the armed forces was strengthened by the fact that 
many former Nyen merchants held positions in the army’s com-
missariat. Besides Frisius, who was appointed commissary gen-
eral (Sw. överkrigskommissarie) in 1710, Lars Malm served also 
as a commissary general, while Frisius’s stepson Didrik Blom was 
appointed field commissary (Sw. fältkommissarie) in 1711.66 Con-
sequently, the Nyen network focused more and more in crown 
deliveries, as normal trade became more difficult.67
One of the most successful operations for the burghers was sup-
plying the Swedish navy in Helsinki during the winter 1711–1712. 
In the autumn of 1711, the naval high command ordered parts of 
the Swedish naval squadron, ironically still called ‘the Nyen fleet’ 
(Sw. Nyenska eskadern), to stay the winter in Helsinki. As a fleet-
in-being operation, the purpose of the squadron was to control 
the Gulf of Finland and to block the Russian navy to the far end of 
it. This prevented Russian marine operations in the Baltic Sea and 
secured the Finnish coast and above all Stockholm.
Usually, the squadron returned to the navy’s main base in 
Karlskrona in Blekinge for the winter before the northern parts 
of the Baltic Sea were covered by ice. However, in 1711 the naval 
strategic situation in the Gulf of Finland was threatening for the 
Swedes. The Russian navy had been expanded quickly under 
the strict command of Peter the Great, and already consisted of 
numerous vessels waiting for a chance in what earlier had been 
Nyen. Staying in Helsinki during winter meant that the Swedish 
navy was operational immediately after the ice broke up.68
 65 Aalto 2016, pp. 488–491. See also Kujala 2001, p. 256.
 66 Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
 67 Kepsu 2020, pp. 144–145.
 68 Ericson Wolke 2011, pp. 113–173, in particular pp. 122, 158–159; 
Kujala 2001, pp. 254–256.
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Johan Henrik Frisius agreed to organise the supply for the naval 
squadron. There was a great demand for both victuals and cash. 
A document by the Chamber College states that Frisius supplied 
and fitted out very promptly the naval squadron (‘mycket promt 
utrustat och providerat Kongl. Majts. Escadre wid Helsingfors’).69 
Other burghers in Helsinki, many with a background in Nyen, 
took part in the supply operation. Jobst Hueck delivered 2,389 
silver dalers in cash for the squadrons needs at the beginning of 
March 1712.70
A year later, Frisius and his merchant contacts were again given 
the responsibility to supply the naval squadron, which indicates 
that the supply of Nyenska eskadern in 1712 was successful. In 
the spring of 1713, Russian troops, in particular their galley fleet, 
increasingly threatened southern Finland. This time, however, the 
Swedish naval squadron had not stayed the winter in Helsinki but 
returned to the main base in Karlskrona in late autumn 1712. The 
fleet was expected to arrive in Helsinki as soon as the ice melted.71
The supply of the army and navy units in Finland was for all 
practical purposes privatised to Frisius in spring 1713. Former 
Nyen merchants were active in the supply operation. War com-
missioner Frisius was the main organiser, while Nyen burghers in 
Helsinki delivered grain. Source material in Stockholm reveals 
that Jobst Hueck delivered 750 barrels of barley and 400 barrels 
of rye to the crown magazine in Helsinki. The prize was fixed at 
9 copper dalers for barley and 8 copper dalers for rye (3 and 2⅔ 
silver dalers, respectively). Hueck appealed three years later for the 
crown to liquidate his claim, in total 3,880 silver dalers, including 
 69 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Chamber College memorandum, 13 July 
1714.
 70 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 24, State Treasury memorandum, 23. 
November 1716.
 71 Aalto 2016, pp. 496–501; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
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interest.72 Initially, the grain was expressly reserved to the 
Swedish navy.73 Later, grain was stored to Helsinki also for 
the army as a preparation for the anticipated Russian offensive 
according to orders from Governor Johan Creutz.
Jochim Donner, the former schoolmaster turned merchant, was 
also involved in supplying the armed forces. Like Hueck, Donner 
delivered grain (170 barrels of barley, 70 barrels of rye) to the 
crown magazine in Helsinki in May 1713, just a few days before 
the battle of Helsinki. Compared to Frisius and Hueck, his claim 
was at this time modest, in total 696 silver dalers.74
The efforts to store grain proved to be in vain. The decision to 
order the ‘Nyen fleet’ to Karlskrona for the winter had been a 
mistake. The Russian army attacked Helsinki in a surprising 
amphibious operation. Hundreds of galleys with some 17,000 men, 
including Peter the Great himself, appeared outside the town and 
caused major concern amongst the townspeople. When Russian 
troops managed to get a foothold in the outskirts, the town along 
with the crown magazine was set on fire. Ironically, Johan Henrik 
Frisius was one of the four men who made the decision to burn 
down both the magazine and the grain that had after energetic 
efforts only just been stored there.75
Before the Great Wrath
After the destruction of Helsinki, supplying the armed forces 
in Finland became a more difficult task. The naval squadron, 
 72 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 24, Jobst Huecks claims.
 73 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 24, State Treasury memorandum 23 November 
1716.
 74 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 8, Jochim Donners claims. 
 75 Aalto 2016, pp. 500–501. The other men in charge were Major General 
Carl Gustaf Armfelt, Governor Johan Creutz and burgomaster and 
Quartermaster (Sw. proviantmästare) Henrik Tammelin.
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which arrived just a day too late to prevent the Russian attack to 
Helsinki, still had to be supplied. However, the magazine had went 
up in flames and the port of Helsinki was lost.76 This increased 
the chronic Swedish military problem.
The Swedish army was not prepared to fight a defensive war-
fare. Even though food and victuals were occasionally stored in 
fortresses and magazines for garrison troops, a systematic supply 
system with strategically located magazines was introduced only 
in the mid-18th century. Therefore, no distinctive magazine sup-
ply system existed for war on home soil at the time of the Great 
Northern War. During the 17th century, the Swedes had almost 
entirely fought in enemy territory, where the armed forces were 
sustained mainly by contributions and plunder. During the Great 
Northern War, this was also the case for the main army, which 
in 1702–1708 could supply itself moving around in Polish ter-
ritories.77 Finland, however, was poor and could not support a 
large army.
In this difficult situation, the crown had to rely even more on Fri-
sius and other merchants. Commander-in-chief Georg Lybecker 
took the initiative. He was once again in charge of the Finnish 
army and had used Frisius and other merchants already in Viipuri. 
In practice, supply of the armed forces in Finland was privatised 
to Johan Henrik Frisius. He obtained means and goods in his own 
name and sent the receipts to authorities in Stockholm. Letters 
written to Charles XII by Lybecker and his successor, Major Gen-
eral Carl Armfelt, show that Frisius was responsible for purchases 
 76 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Chamber College memorandum 13 July 
1714.
 77 Kuvaja 2013, p. 49; Frost 2000, pp. 281–282, 315–317. On mag-
azines in Finland, see Hatakka 2019. During the Norwegian cam-
paigns 1716–1718 magazines played, however, a central role in sup-
plying the Swedish troops, see Florén, Dahlgren & Lindegren 1992, 
pp. 200–210.
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for both the army and the navy until the Battle of Napue/Storkyro 
in February 1714.78
According to Armfelt, who took command in August 1713 
when Lybecker was dismissed, the army would have perished 
without the efforts of Frisius. He organised provisions like grain 
and dried meat, but also other important necessities like tobacco, 
salt and horseshoes. He was assisted by Commissary General Lars 
Malm, who focused on the administrative and fiscal aspects, while 
Frisius travelled around and took care of purchases. Frisius dis-
cussed with the burghers in Ostrobothnian towns and with their 
help managed to improve the clothing of the troops.
The key to Frisius’s success was his credit. Armfelt described 
how repressive methods do not function in order to supply the 
army, as they usually made the common people to hide or deny 
their possessions. Frisius, in turn, managed through his account-
ability to acquire whatever there still was to be had in the coun-
try, even though it demanded a lot of travelling along the coasts 
and the countryside.79
The navy was also satisfied. Frisius organised its supply, and the 
navy was surprised by the good quality of the goods, which kept 
the crew in good health. During the autumn of 1713, however, 
Frisius’s means were out, and in January 1714 he planned to travel 
to Stockholm in order to receive payments from the crown.80 In 
addition, it was more and more difficult to get loans from other 
merchants, like the Nyen burghers. Most of them had at this point 
fled to Stockholm and probably pressured Frisius to repay his 
 78 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Major General Carl Armfelt to Charles 
XII 19 January 1714; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
 79 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Major General Carl Armfelt to Charles 
XII 19 January 1714; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
 80 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Major General Carl Armfelt to Charles 
XII 19 January 1714; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
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earlier loans.81 However, Armfelt convinced Frisius to stay with 
the army for a few months more. Frisius’s travel to Stockholm was 
also delayed by the Battle of Napue/Storkyro in February 1714, 
where Russian forces won a decisive victory. Before the battle, 
Frisius promised one month’s salary to all soldiers and officers. It 
greatly improved the morale of the troops, but it was not enough 
to prevent a military defeat.82
Frisius got regularly in trouble with his creditors because the 
crown had difficulties in liquidating his claims. He wrote contin-
uously to the central government in Stockholm and pleaded in 
subservient words to get at least some of his loans repaid. In other 
case, he would lose his creditworthiness and not be able to organ-
ise cash and necessities to the armed forces. Frisius struggled with 
this problem during the whole war.83
In 1715, for example, he applied the State Treasury (Sw. Statskontoret) 
to liquidate at least some of his claims, altogether 16,500 silver 
dalers, in order to keep his creditworthiness. Frisius stated that he 
had financed the Finnish troops both with his own means and by 
providing credit. However, in 1715 he was in Stockholm, where 
he discussed his financial situation in the Chamber College. Fri-
sius declared his loyalty to the king and assured that he would 
continue to supply the army. In addition, he did not prefer to 
be repaid at the expense of the Finnish troops, while this would 
make his attempts to supply the army even greater.84
Interestingly, Frisius’s motives as a supplier and creditor have 
been presented in different ways in earlier research. The debate 
is a part of the discussion of whether burghers who supported 
states should be considered patriots or mere war profiteers.85 
 81 Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
 82 Hornborg 1953, pp. 203–213; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
 83 Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
 84 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Skrivelser från Kammarkollegiet, 1134:4:89, 
Chamber College to Charles XII 18.3.1715. However, the State 
Treasury did not recommend Frisius’s proposal.
 85 Hårdstedt 2006, pp. 133–135; Hårdstedt 2002, pp. 261–264, 282. See 
also the introduction chapter in this book with references.
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Antti Kujala has doubted that Frisius was motivated by patriotic 
reasons, even though military commanders and Frisius himself 
highlighted this aspect to the central government in Stockholm. 
According to Kujala, Frisius profited from the interest the crown 
had to pay him.86 Yet, Jakob Jakobsson and Anna Guttorp have 
pointed out that Frisius did not always receive his claims with 
interest. In addition, his merchant activities were seriously dis-
rupted, which on several occasions almost ruined him.87
Frisius’s patriotism is difficult to evaluate. He was indeed very 
loyal to the crown, but, at the same time, financing the war effort 
and organising supply to the armed forces was a way to continue 
business in a situation where the political situation made nor-
mal trading difficult. Credits and supply were probably not very 
profitable for Frisius in pure economic terms. In this case, David 
Parrott’s emphasis on profit as the principal motivation for offer-
ing credit and services to the state is not adequate.88 In fact, many 
scholars have pointed out that there was not much profit in sup-
porting the state. Seppo Aalto notes that war supplies were not a 
gold vein for the burghers in Helsinki, but they prevented them 
from falling into poverty.89 And, as Martin Hårdstedt has pointed 
out, the crown paid quite low prices for deliveries to the army.90
It is also possible that Frisius became so deeply involved in 
supporting the crown that it was difficult for him to return to 
his previous life as a merchant. However, Frisius gained a lot 
of social status through his hard work for the crown. He was 
 86 Kujala 2001, p. 256. See also Aalto 2016, p. 489.
 87 Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d. See also Jakobsson & Guttorp 2013. Teemu 
Keskisarja and Eirik Hornborg also highlights the patriotic aspect in 
Frisius’s activity, see Keskisarja 2019, in particular p. 88; Hornborg 
1953, pp. 110–111, 203–204.
 88 Parrott 2012, pp. 241–250.
 89 Aalto 2016, p. 491.
 90 Hårdstedt 2002, p. 253. However, Hårdstedt’s research deals with the 
Finnish War 1808–1809.
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ennobled and after the war appointed governor of Kymenkartano 
and Savonlinna Province (Sw. Kymmenegårds och Nyslotts län).91
In the autumn of 1714, most parts of Finland were occupied 
by the Russians. At the same time, Frisius returned from Stockholm 
to the Finnish troops, which were retreating to Västerbotten. He 
continued to supply the Finnish attachments until the end of the 
war, and again during the catastrophic campaign to Norway in 
1718, when thousands of soldiers froze to death in the mountains.92
There is not a lot of knowledge of the activities of the other for-
mer Nyen burghers regarding the years of the Great Wrath (1714–
1721). At least Henrik Luhr, Jobst Hueck, Jochim Donner, and 
Carl Dobbin resided in Stockholm, where they constituted a tight 
network.93 However, the years in Stockholm have not yet been 
properly studied and it is not clear to what degree they participated 
in supplying armed forces. Documents in the Chamber College 
archives imply that it continued. In 1718, Henrik Luhr delivered 
wood, some of it intended for brewing, to a royal purchase depu-
tation (Sw. Upphandlingsdeputationen) in Stockholm.94
Financing and Supplying War through Improvisation
Burghers with a background in the town of Nyen took part 
in financing and supplying the Swedish army during the Great 
Northern War, in particular regarding military units in Finland 
from 1708 to 1714. The former Nyen burghers spread around the 
coastal towns from Viipuri to Stockholm and became more and 
more involved in deliveries to the crown.
It is evident that above all Johan Henrik Frisius had extraordi-
nary skills in supplying and financing armed forces, even though 
 91 Mäkelä-Alitalo 2014. 
 92 Hornborg 1953, pp. 225–272; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.
 93 Möller & Luther 1981.
 94 RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 
Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 30, Henrik Luhr’s claims. Henrik Luhr’s son 
Jürgen applied for the claim to be liquidated in 1734.
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commanders-in-chief Lybecker and Armfelt probably exagger-
ated his importance to support his efforts to receive payments in 
Stockholm. Frisius became deeply involved in state administra-
tion by war financing efforts, and acted more and more as a crown 
servant, while his personal trade faded, especially after the loss of 
Helsinki in 1713. His merchant skills were, however, of great ben-
efit in his efforts to supply the army. Frisius used his personal net-
works, both to the West European merchant houses and to local 
merchant partners, not the least those from Nyen.
The former burghers from Nyen were essential in providing 
supply for the armed forces in Viipuri and Helsinki. After Finland 
was occupied by the Russians in 1714 the Nyen network seems 
to have faded, but it became relevant after the Treaty of Uusikau-
punki (Sw. Nystad) in 1721. When Frisius was appointed gover-
nor in Southeastern Finland, he recruited former Nyen burghers 
to key positions, in particular to Hamina, the new Swedish centre 
for Russian transit trade.95
During the Great Northern War, the loss of the eastern Baltic 
provinces, in particular the Russian conquest of Ingria, trans-
formed Finland once again to a border region. Since the Treaty of 
Stolbova in 1617, Finland had had a protected strategic position, 
the Russo-Swedish War 1656–1658 exempted. Thus, a functional 
supply organisation for wartime troops in Finland was lacking. In 
addition, the fortresses in Finland were in decay. This was prob-
lematic not only for their military capacity but also for supply 
reasons. The fortresses were centres where grain, victuals, ammu-
nition and weapons were stored.96
Therefore, the armed forces in Finland had to be supplied with 
ad hoc solutions. Governors, military commanders and war com-
missioners had to improvise to provide food, clothes and ammu-
nition. This proved to be more or less impossible, since Finland 
was relatively poor, with forest as its main natural resource. It 
could not support a large army for a long period, even though 
 95 Kepsu 2020, pp. 141–145.
 96 Mickwitz & Paaskoski 2005, pp. 17–18.
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the activity of burghers and other suppliers eased the situation.97 
These problems also became evident for Peter the Great after the 
Russians had occupied Finland. As Christer Kuvaja has shown, 
the Russians supplied their troops in Finland mainly with com-
modities from Russia, transported by the Russian galley fleet.98
In general, the case of the Nyen burghers as suppliers and 
creditors strengthens earlier analyses that the state in many 
ways tried to use private individuals with economic power and 
transnational networks to support the state apparatus. In war-
time, merchants were particularly important when the situation 
required improvisation. The absolutist early modern states, like 
the Swedish Realm, often referred to as power states, were rela-
tively effective in recruiting troops but not in supplying them. In 
Northern Europe, where resources were scarce, merchants could 
find a way to profit in supplying military units and financing the 
war. However, profit margins were not high, and repayment was 
insecure and time-consuming. Therefore, it seems that burghers 
were not particularly eager to support the state until the military 
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Early modern states were important landowners throughout the 
Nordic countries after the Reformation. In the mid-17th century, over 
half of all farms in Denmark and Norway were owned by the crown. 
In Sweden and Finland, the share of crown farms was at its highest 
level at the turn of the 18th century. As many as 70% of all farms in 
Finland were crown farms after the Great Northern War (1700–1721). 
In Sweden, the corresponding percentage was 36 in 1700.
The high proportion of state landowning in Finland resulted 
mainly from the large-scale desertion of farms during the severe 
famine years of 1695–1697, when approximately one-quarter of 
the population died. According to statutes, the crown was entitled 
to confiscate freeholding farms if the owner failed to pay taxes 
for three consecutive years. Hundreds of freehold farms also 
became crown farms in Norrland between 1695 and 1725 because 
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of tax arrears. Most of the crown farms in Sweden, however, were 
former Church estates confiscated by King Gustav Vasa (r. 1523–
1560) after the Reformation.1
This chapter discusses the selling of such a massive amount of 
landed property during the 18th century in Sweden and Finland. 
The operation was called skatteköp by contemporaries, literally 
meaning tax purchase. The term refers to the fact that every crown 
farm that was bought during the operation was converted into a 
‘tax farm’ (Sw. skattehemman), i.e. into a freeholding farm that the 
owner was entitled to bequeath to his or her offspring. The focus 
of the chapter is on state finances. The principal objective of the 
chapter is to analyse the role of skatteköp in the Swedish public 
economy and to illustrate that, initially, the entire phenomenon 
was closely related to the war economy. The Swedish crown began 
to sell its farms in 1701 to finance its war efforts, and after the year 
1719 to amortise the public debt generated by extensive military 
spending during the Great Northern War.
Several other European states also resorted to the same method 
of raising finances during the 16th and 17th centuries. The heav-
ily indebted Danish government was obliged to alienate crown 
estates to its creditors after the mid-17th century for several mil-
lion Danish rigsdalers. These sales signified a massive transfer of 
landed property from the public domain to private landowners, 
mainly to wealthy burgers and noble officers from Copenhagen, 
northern Germany, and the Netherlands. Owing to the sales, the 
share of crown estates in relation to all landed property decreased 
from 50% to 27% between 1660 and 1688. The same process also 
took place in Norway, which was part of Denmark until 1814.2
Likewise, several Tudor and Stuart kings and queens were forced 
to turn to crown estates to finance their warfare on the continent 
and on the British Isles. The sales began in the 1540s when King 
 1 Jutikkala 1976, p. 359; Hermansson 1979; Myking & Rasmussen 
2010, pp. 289–293.
 2 Jespersen 2000, pp. 96–97; Myking & Rasmussen 2010, pp. 292–293; 
Olsson & Morell 2010, p. 315.
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Henry VIII sold most of the estates he had confiscated from the 
Church during the Reformation because he needed money for an 
ongoing war against France and Scotland. Alienations also con-
tinued during the 17th century, gradually altering the structure of 
the state budget. At the turn of the 17th century, one-third of the 
fiscal incomes of the English crown originated from crown estates; 
a hundred years later, rents and other revenues derived from the 
crown lands comprised only 5% of public incomes.3 Crown lands 
were also sold in several German principalities after the Reforma-
tion, as well as in France during the wars of religion, despite the 
fact that French kings were not allowed to sell crown property 
without the consent of the parliament.4
This is not the first work to argue that the selling of crown farms 
was closely connected to state finances. Eli F. Heckscher mentions 
in his pioneering article on skatteköp that the operation was moti-
vated by fiscal goals during the Great Northern War. Also, Eino 
Jutikkala briefly refers to fiscal needs in some of his writings.5 
However, no scholar has actually investigated the motivations for 
selling crown farms before. Most studies concentrate on the legis-
lation regulating the sales as well as on the actual selling process, 
focusing on who the buyers were, what their social backgrounds 
were, and what the average sales prices were.6
Additionally, the social and economic consequences of the sales 
have been analysed to some extent. According to Heckscher, the 
extensive sales of crown farms were decisive for the strengthen-
ing of peasants’ political influence in 19th-century Sweden. Owing 
to skatteköp, peasant farmers were able to dominate the second 
chamber of the reformed parliament after 1866, when national 
voting and eligibility rights were determined by income or real 
estate ownership. Mats Olsson and Patrick Svensson argue that the 
 3 Hoyle 1992; Elton 1997, p. 196; O’Brien & Hunt 1999, pp. 60–61.
 4 Vann 1984, p. 228; Cohn 1987, pp. 167–174; Bonney 1995, 
pp. 447–448.
 5 Heckscher 1944, p. 111; Jutikkala 1963.
 6 Rydeberg 1985; Kyle 1987.
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process also had economic consequences, at least in Scania, where 
the productivity of agriculture increased from the 1780s onwards. 
Their conclusion is based on the fact that freehold farms produced 
more than crown farms in Scania during that period of time.7
Markku Kuisma likewise emphasises the economic effects by 
underlining the close relationship between forest-based industry 
and the sales of crown land. Most crown farms were sold to peas-
ant farmers, and, when the forest prices began to rise at end of the 
19th century, freeholding peasants were able to benefit from 
the economic upturn, and thus the operation quite probably 
reduced economic inequality in industrialising Finland.8
The purpose of this chapter is to point out that there was also a 
seller involved in the process, and that by analysing the motiva-
tion of the seller it is possible to complement the picture we have 
of skatteköp, which formed one of the most significant reorganisa-
tions of land ownership in Sweden and Finland during the early 
modern period.
Historical Background
Most of the crown farms in Sweden and Finland were sold during 
the 18th and 19th centuries. The roots of the phenomenon, how-
ever, are to be found in the 1580s, when John III (Sw. Johan III), the 
king of Sweden (r. 1569–1592), began to sell crown farms to finance 
an ongoing war against Russia. The first regulations were enacted 
in March 1582. During that time, the crown owned approximately 
one-third of all farms in Sweden. In Finland, the share of crown 
land was much lower, only 2–3%. Over 90% of farms belonged to 
freeholding peasants during the late 16th century.
There are several reasons why the sales began during the 1580s. 
The state budget was constantly running a deficit during the 1570s 
and 1580s because of a lengthy military campaign against Russia. 
 7 Heckscher 1944, p. 103; Olsson & Morell 2010, p. 332; Olsson & 
Svensson 2010, p. 291.
 8 Kuisma 2006; Bengstsson et al. 2018.
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The most important fiscal revenues came from taxes and custom 
duties, as well as from the sales of copper and iron. The flows of 
public money, however, were not enough to cover the expenses 
stemming from the recruiting of foreign mercenaries, from the 
transporting of troops and from the maintenance of the navy and 
army. King John III and his administration tried to borrow money 
from European credit markets, but these efforts were not success-
ful and the king had to resort to other means, including debase-
ment, the outsourcing of iron production, the pledging of crown 
estates as collateral for silver and cash, and the direct selling of 
crown farms.9
Also, the taxation burden increased during the Russo-Swedish 
War of 1570–1595. The Swedish system of taxation consisted 
of permanent taxes, such as annual rent (jordeboksräntan), and 
temporary taxes, such as contributions (war taxes) and auxiliary 
taxes. When the government wanted to levy a new auxiliary tax 
– a common occurrence during the 16th and 17th centuries – it 
had to consult the Swedish Parliament (Sw. Riksdag) and its four 
estates: nobility, clergy, burghers and peasants.
Until the late 16th century, most of the taxes paid by the peasant 
population were permanent taxes, the most important of which 
was the annual rent. After the 1570s, however, the share of auxil-
iary taxes rose, and by the end of the century over half of all taxes 
collected by the state in Finland were temporary wartime taxes. 
The burden was so high that hundreds of peasant families were 
incapable of managing their obligations, and the fiscal desertion 
of farms increased rapidly. The extent of desertion varied, but in 
some regions as many as 30% or even 50% of farms were unable to 
settle their taxes during the early years of the 16th century.10
The sales of crown farms during the reign of John III were called 
bördsrättsköp, which can be translated as the sales of hereditary 
rights. These sales were highly regulated. A peasant who bought 
 9 Odén 1955, pp. 354–375; Odén 1967, pp. 10–12; Loit 1979; 
Hallenberg 2008, p. 44.
 10 Jutikkala 1963; Seppälä 2009.
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a crown farm during the 1580s and 1590s was entitled to transfer 
the farm to his offspring after the purchase. He was also allowed to 
sell the farm, but only to other peasants, and he was not allowed 
to ask for more money than he had paid to the crown in the börds-
rättsköp. The nobility was not allowed to participate in these 
land markets. It should be underlined that the state did not lose 
anything in the process in fiscal terms because the annual rent 
and other obligations remained unchanged. Geographically 
speaking, the sales were relatively common in central Sweden. 
In the province of Upland, for instance, one-fifth of all crown 
farms were bought between 1582 and 1587. In other parts of 
Sweden, the sales were much rarer, and they were forbidden 
altogether in Finland and Estonia, as well as in the regions con-
quered from Russia.11
The sales of crown farms continued again after 1623. This time 
the phenomenon was called skatteköp. The sales were again closely 
connected to the Swedish war economy, this time to fund the mili-
tary campaigns in Poland and Germany. During the same period, 
the government also sought to benefit from crown lands by other 
means. In 1622, the king began to sell crown farms to the nobility. 
Tax revenues from freeholding farms were also sold. These sales 
(Sw. frälseköp) differed from skatteköp in that the former were 
intended only for the nobility, while the latter were open to all 
non-noble classes in Swedish society, including peasants, mer-
chants and industrialists. Another difference had to do with fiscal 
revenues. When a noble officer bought a crown farm, the peasant 
living on that farm began to pay most of his obligations to him. 
The state only received the sale price. In contrast, after skatteköp 
the fiscal revenues continued to flow to the treasury as before.12
The frälseköp purchases were quite important during the Swedish 
offensive in Poland. In the 1620s, the state derived half of its cash 
income from these sales. In 1624, the share of frälseköp accounted 
for as much as 60% of all incomes. No scholars have studied the 
 11 Loit 1979.
 12 Brännman 1950; Rydeberg 1985, pp. 39–41.
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importance of skatteköp, though revenues were probably much 
smaller considering that the sales were relatively infrequent in 
most provinces of the realm outside central Sweden. Little research 
has been done on the topic, but it seems as if most sales were con-
centrated in the provinces of Värmland, Närke, Östra Götaland 
and Västra Götaland. In Finland, in all probability not a single 
farm was sold.13
The Swedish Realm also continued its aggressive foreign pol-
icy after the 1630s. It participated in the Thirty Years War, and it 
fought against Poland, Denmark, Russia, Austria and Brandenburg 
between 1655 and 1661. The final military campaign of the 17th 
century took place Scania in 1675–1679. All these operations, 
however, were financed by resorting to means other than selling 
crown farms because the Royal Regency Council forbade the sales 
in May 1639. The motivations behind the decision are not known. 
Probably the regency wanted to stop the sales because the crown 
farms were needed for other purposes, namely for the noble 
officers who had distinguished themselves on the continental 
battlefields: A significant number of farms and fiscal revenues 
were donated to nobility by the regency and later on by Queen 
Christina (r. 1644–1654). The frälseköp purchases continued until 
the 1680s.14
The Sales During the Great Northern War
The third and the last phase in the history of skatteköp began in 
the spring of 1701, one year after the onset of the Great Northern 
War. This time the sales were also part of the Swedish war econ-
omy. In March 1701, King Charles XII (Sw. Karl XII), residing 
 13 Bergström 1920, pp. 45–47; Brännman 1950, pp. 245–260; Rydeberg 
1985, pp. 39–41.
 14 The sales of crown farms did not stop totally in May 1639. A few 
farms were sold to iron works during the 17th century. The extent of 
such sales is not known, however. Kuylenstierna 1916, pp. 104–106; 
Karlsson 1990, pp. 158–159. 
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in a winter camp in present-day Estonia, wrote to the Chamber 
College (Sw. Kammarkollegiet), the most important central agency 
in all issues related to taxation and crown properties, ordering the 
agency to initiate the sales once again because he needed more 
resources for his campaign in Livonia. He mentions in his letter 
that other former monarchs had also resorted to the same method 
in wartime situations.15
The king’s order was based on a memorandum composed at the 
Chamber College in the autumn of 1700. In this document, the sales 
were justified not just as a means to collect money for the ongoing 
war but also on the grounds that the state had nothing to lose in 
the trade. Every silver daler (hereinafter abbreviated sd.) that the 
state was able to obtain from the sales was pure profit because 
peasants continued to pay their rent as before. Thus, the logic was 
the same as with the bördsrätt sales. Furthermore, the members 
of the Chamber College estimated that peasant farmers would set-
tle their taxes more reliably after the skatteköp, because they did 
not want to forfeit the newly acquired property immediately to 
the crown. As mentioned above, the crown was entitled to confis-
cate a freeholding farm after three years of tax arrears. This legal 
norm was abandoned in 1789.
Both arguments reveal that state officials saw the crown lands 
as a source of fiscal revenues and not as capital having the poten-
tial to produce something more than just tax yields. Therefore, 
from the crown’s point of view, it did not matter who owned 
the farms in Sweden: the state or private persons. The Chamber 
College even considered that peasants would cultivate the farms 
better when they knew for sure that all their efforts to ameliorate 
the farm economy would also benefit their offspring.16
It was not a coincidence that the sales began in the spring of 
1701. The Privy Council (Sw. Riksrådet) was desperately looking 
for new sources of income at the beginning of the second year of 
war, because thus far expenditures had far outstripped available 
 15 Bergström 1919 vol. II, p. 79.
 16 Bergström 1919 vol. II, pp. 189–192.
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incomes. The Privy Council and the Chamber College wrote 
to the king in February 1701 that, according to their estimation, 
the budget deficit would be eight million sd. in 1701. There were 
several reasons behind the deficit. Severe crop failures and out-
right famine in the 1690s continued to negatively impact public 
finances in 1701 because many peasants had difficulties in pay-
ing their annual taxes. Also, the siege of Riga by Saxon troops 
and the associated loss of custom duties in 1700 affected the 
war economy.17
The central government in Stockholm made several proposals to 
the king to fix the deficit. They included the collecting of a war tax 
in Sweden and Finland, the launching of new loan negotiations 
with foreign and domestic lenders, the cutting of public spending, 
and the selling of crown farms. The Privy Council also expressed 
the desire that ‘God will bless the king’s righteous army’, so that 
it would manage to extract resources from the occupied territo-
ries in Livonia and elsewhere. What was common to all these sug-
gestions was that they had been made several times before. The 
collecting of war taxes was essential to the Swedish war economy 
throughout the 17th century, and King Charles XII had no inten-
tion of abandoning the method when he came to power in 1697. 
War taxes were collected almost every year from the year 1699 
onwards, except for the years 1713, 1715 and 1716, when the 
war tax was replaced by a wealth tax based on immovable and 
movable property.18
Likewise, the government had begun borrowing money before 
the spring of 1701. The crown began to pledge all kinds of crown 
properties, such as estates, mills, fisheries and customs duties, as 
collateral for cash or grain and other victuals in the winter of 1700. 
The operation produced over two million sd. between 1700 and 
1711. The selling of crown farms yielded nearly half a million sd. 
 17 Historiska handlingar 1861 vol. I, pp. 114–117; Cavallie 1975, 
pp. 48–50.
 18 Historiska handlingar 1861 vol. 1, p. 130; Åmark 1961, p. 530; 
Cavallie 1975, pp. 53–64.
128 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
by the year 1719, meaning a profit of 27,000 sd. annually, which 
can be considered a relatively low figure compared to other sources 
of income. The contributions brought in 8.7 million sd. between 
1700 and 1709, and the loans from the Bank of the Estates of the 
Realm (Sw. Riksens ständers bank), the national central bank, rose 
to 5.7 million sd. during the same time period. On the other hand, 
most of the crown farms were sold at the beginning of the cam-
paign. In 1704, for instance, the crown managed to sell its farms 
for 300,000 sd., which was not an insignificant figure.19
There is also some evidence that the crown actively tried to pro-
mote the sales during the first few years of war. For instance, in 
the province of Göteborg and Bohus in western Sweden, the local 
county governor sent his representatives to the countryside to ask 
the farmers who actually tilled the crown farms (Sw. kronobönder) 
whether or not they were interested in buying the farms from the 
crown. When the peasants reported that they were too poor to 
redeem the farms, the representatives responded that the crown 
was also entitled to sell the farms to outsiders. The threat was 
based on law. According to the regulations, enacted in the spring 
of 1701, all the crown farms were to be sold in public auctions, 
and everybody had the right to participate in these sales, inde-
pendent of his social position.
There was one exception. A farmer who lived on a crown farm 
being put up for sale was entitled to buy the farm if he managed 
to pay the same sum as the highest bidder. In practice, the sale 
prices were often so high that peasants were unable to participate 
in the auctions. One-third of all the crown farms sold were bought 
by officers, priests and other persons of high social standing in 
Sweden between 1700 and 1723. As regards Finland, only 19 crown 
farms were sold between 1700 and 1719. Thus, practically all the 
profits mentioned above came from Sweden.20
 19 Brandell 1941, p. 82; Ahlström 1959, pp. 79–82; Åmark 1961, 
pp. 603–604; Cavallie 1975, p. 197.
 20 RA, Kammarkollegiets kansliarkiv, register över skattebrev 1701–1730 
(B VI b 1, vol. 1); Kyle 1987, pp. 80–81.
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The Sales of Crown Farms and Public Debt
The Great Northern War ended in August 1721. The crown con-
tinued to sell its farms, however, without interruption. This was 
an unusual situation, because previously the skatteköp sales had 
typically been a wartime phenomenon. Why did the central gov-
ernment also want to continue with the sales in peacetime? To 
understand the reasons, it is necessary to take a closer look at a 
decision made in the Diet in the spring of 1719, when hostilities 
were still ongoing.
One of the most important questions the Diet had to address 
in 1719 was the heavy war debt, which is estimated to have been 
approximately 63 to 64 million sd. The sum was equal to all pri-
vate wealth in Sweden and Finland at that time, according to the 
wealth tax of 1713. It is possible to clarify the magnitude of the debt 
by comparing the sum to the state budget. According to estimates 
made during the spring of 1719, the fiscal incomes for the ongoing 
year were to be 3.5 million sd., that is to say, just over a twentieth 
the size of the debt. In reality, incomes increased to eight million sd. 
in 1719. The prospects, however, were much worse in April 1719, 
when members of the Diet discussed settling the national debt.21
The debt consisted of several elements, and the structure of 
liabilities is highly telling in terms of the Swedish war economy 
during the Great Northern War. Several public institutions, such 
as the churches, schools and poorhouses, had been obliged to 
loan cash and valuables to the crown. For instance, churches had 
been ordered to give to the state all the silver objects that were 
not needed for services. Officers and civil servants had been given 
promissory notes as compensation for unpaid salaries, and several 
wealthy families as well as foreign bankers and merchants from 
the Netherlands, France, England and Austria had lent money 
to the king. The sultan of the Ottoman Empire was also among 
the creditors, because King Charles XII had spent several years in 
exile in the Ottoman Empire after the defeat in Poltava.22
 21 Axelson 1888, p. 132; Malmström 1893, p. 120; Åmark 1961, 
pp. 598–599; Fregert & Gustafsson 2008, p. 4.
 22 Julén 1916, pp. 9–23.
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The single most significant element consisted of coin tokens 
(Sw. nödmynt, literally meaning emergency coins) and coin notes 
(Sw. myntsedlar) issued in 1715–1719. As regards the coins, the 
value of the copper metal from which they were minted was only 
0.5–1% of their face value. This was not the first time token coins 
had been used to finance military campaigns in the Swedish Realm. 
King John III had also issued debased coins in the early 1590s. The 
idea behind such emergency coins was that the state would redeem 
the coins at their full value after the war had ended. That was not the 
case, however. The Diet decided in April 1719 that all the coin 
tokens valued at one sd. would be redeemed for another token 
coin valued at two öre silvermynt (1 sd. = 32 öre silvermynt) and 
a note valued at 14 öre silvermynt. The decision meant that the 
token coins were devalued by 50%. The same principles were fol-
lowed for coin notes. As a whole, the redemption of coin tokens 
and coin notes cost the government nearly 27 million sd.23
The Diet made another important decision in April 1719 con-
cerning public debt. It decided to establish a special department 
for the purpose of redeeming the coins and notes and ultimately 
paying the liabilities to all the creditors in a special order speci-
fied in the statutes. The department was first called the Office 
of the Estates (Sw. Riksens ständers kontor) and later renamed 
the National Debt Office (Sw. Riksgäldskontoret). The Diet also 
decided to channel several flows of revenues to the office. The most 
important source of income was a new tax called lön- och betal-
ningsavgift, which was a personal auxiliary tax somewhat similar to a 
contribution. The level of taxation was determined according to 
one’s social position. High-ranking officers and bishops had to pay 
more than ordinary peasant farmers. The second most important 
source of revenue was an extra customs duty (Sw. licenten), which 
was collected upon all imported goods. This new tax was also col-
lected for such exports as copper, iron, timber, tar and grain.24
The sales of crown farms constituted the third most important 
source of revenue for the office. The idea to use skatteköp profits to 
 23 Åmark 1961, pp. 4–5, 683.
 24 Julén 1916, pp. 35–41; Åmark 1961, pp. 676–682.
The Sales of  Crown Farms and State Finances 1580–1808  131
amortise public debt was probably first proposed by senior judge 
(Sw. lagman) Bernhard Cederholm in a meeting of the Secret 
Council on 8 April. The secret council was the most powerful 
committee of the Diet, and most of the bills were first discussed 
there before the Estates took a stand on the issue. Other mem-
bers of the committee supported the proposition, and later, in 
May 1719, the Estates confirmed the new application of the 
skatteköp payments.25
The decision had far-reaching effects. All the skatteköp payments 
were used to repay government debt throughout the 18th century, 
except for the year 1764 and the years 1773–1789, when the sales 
were forbidden. After that, the sales continued in Sweden with-
out interruption until the 20th century. In Finland, the situation 
changed in 1809 when the country became part of the Russian 
Empire. Henceforth, the payments were used as any other public 
incomes, because the newly born Grand Duchy of Finland refused 
to take any responsibility for public debt originating before 1809.
The fact that the sale of crown farms was linked to the amortisa-
tion of public debt did not mean that all members of the political 
elite supported the sales after 1719. Members of the noble estate in 
particular criticised the continuation of the operation on several 
occasions during the 18th century. The aristocracy thought that it 
would be better to use the crown farms to support the manufactur-
ing industry and manorial economy than to sell the farms cheaply 
to the peasantry. Critics often had a personal stake in the debate.
Johan Ehrenpreus, an arms factory owner and a leader of the 
maritime customs house (Sw. Stora sjötullen) in Stockholm, 
wrote a long memorandum to the Diet in 1723, in which he asked 
the Estates to stop the sales once and for all because, in his 
opinion, it would become more difficult to manage iron works 
if all the farms around industrial plants were freeholding farms. 
Ehrenpreus wanted to remind the Estates that iron works needed 
two things above all: raw materials and cheap labour. He argued 
 25 RA, Frihetstidens utskottshandlingar, Sekreta utskottets protokoll 
8.4.1719, fol. 119–137 (mf. KA); Staf 1945 vol. I, p. 116; Thanner 
1980 vol. V, p. 62.
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that the sale of crown farms made it difficult to fulfil both these 
needs because freeholding farmers asked higher prices than the 
farmers of crown estates. He also wrote that the sales violated 
the privileges guaranteed to the manufacturing industry in 1668. 
According the statute, the founders of textile factories, glassworks 
and other manufactures were allowed to ask the crown to donate 
land to them to facilitate raw material acquisitions. In Ehrenpreus’s 
opinion, such privileges would be of no use if all the farms were 
freeholding farms.26
As regards the manorial economy, Ehrenpreus referred to 
the privileges of the nobility. This law-like prerogative enabled the 
aristocracy to change their tax-exempt farms (Sw. frälsehemman) 
into crown farms when located near manors to facilitate the emer-
gence of large and integrated stretches of cultivation. According 
to Ehrenpreus, the skatteköp legislation was inconsistent with the 
prerogative because such changes were only possible so long as 
crown farms were available in the vicinity of manors.27
Ehrenpreus’s objective did not win support from his fellow mem-
bers of the nobility. All the estates endorsed continuing the sales 
of crown farms in the Diet of 1723. However, a new law enacted 
during the same year did satisfy several of his goals. According 
to the statute, the owners of metal works and manufacturers had 
a pre-emptive right to the crown farms of surrounding area, and 
owners of cavalry farms (Sw. rusthåll), i.e. farms that provided a 
cavalryman, horses and equipment for the crown in exchange for 
a partial tax exemption, had a similar pre-emptive right to their 
auxiliary farms (Sw. augmentshemman). Both these preroga-
tives advanced the development of large domains in Sweden and 
Finland. The owners of iron works in particular managed to 
enlarge their landholdings by purchasing large numbers of crown 
farms during the 18th century.28
Twice, critics managed to prevent the sales altogether. The first 
time the sales were abolished in December 1763. The principal 
 26 Bergström 1919 vol. II, pp. 216–218.
 27 Ibid.
 28 Laine 1950; Karlsson 1990.
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reason was a heavy rate of inflation caused by the Swedish Realm’s 
involvement in the anti-Prussian alliance during the Seven Years 
War (1756–1763). The war effort was mainly financed by borrow-
ing money from the central bank. According to Patrick Winton, the 
loans from the central bank covered 44% of military expenditures 
in 1757–1764, while the share of French subsidies, the second 
most important resource base, was 20%. The central bank paid 
for the loan by issuing new bank notes. The number of notes in 
circulation increased from 13.8 million sd. in 1755 to 44 mil-
lion sd. in 1763, causing a rapid depreciation of the Swedish cur-
rency in relation to the most important foreign currencies, such 
as the Hamburger reichstaler, and consequently the cost of living 
increased throughout the Swedish Realm especially after 1759.29
The Privy Council reacted to the situation by abolishing the 
sales of crown farms for the time being, because the sale prices 
did not follow the overall rate of inflation, and consequently the 
crown lost money in every transaction. The argumentation was 
based on the fact that the level of skatteköp payments was tied to 
the annual rent paid by crown farmers. In Sweden, the minimum 
price was equal to six years of annual rent payments from 1723 
onwards; in Finland, the minimum price was equivalent to three 
years’ rent beginning after the year 1741. The prices of freeholding 
farms, however, were set by the markets, which meant that buyers 
were able to use the system to their benefit.
The council was under the impression that people were buy-
ing crown farms at low prices just to resell them at profit soon 
thereafter. As a solution, the Privy Council suggested that, in the 
future, all crown farms should be sold at auctions, as had hap-
pened during the Great Northern War. The government reminded 
the Estates that the purpose of the sales was to collect funding for 
repayment of the public debt and not to take care of the security of 
the peasant farmers, ‘since the farmers were secure enough as long 
as they cultivated the crown farms according to the law’.30
 29 Jörberg 1972, pp. 75–90; Winton 2012.
 30 Paloposki 1976, pp. 216–217.
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The abolishing of the sale of crown farms was short-lived at 
the end. The Diet decided to rescind the decision in 1765 with the 
support of all the non-noble estates (peasants, clergy and burgh-
ers), and no alterations were made to the pricing policy. The peas-
ant estate participated most actively in the process. Members of 
the clergy and burgher estates decided to support the peasants 
mainly for tactical purposes, as they wanted to count on peas-
ants’ support on issues important for them. Several members of 
the nobility would have liked to continue the decision to abolish 
sales made by the Privy Council, but they did not manage to find 
enough support for their views from the other estates.31
The sale of crown farms was abolished for a second time in 
October 1773, one year after the coup d’état of King Gustav III. 
This time, too, the ban was justified by referring to low sales prices. 
The Chamber College complained in 1779 that the skatteköp pro-
cess had enabled private persons to become rich at the expense 
of the crown, because the sales prices had constantly been far 
below the market prices. The college also argued that the sales 
were inconsistent with the privileges of nobility and the manufac-
turing industry, just like Johan Ehrenpreus had argued 50 years 
earlier.32 The new political situation affected the outcome, too. The 
coup put an end to the Age of Liberty (1719–1772), the period of 
early parliamentarism in Swedish history, meaning that the peas-
ants were less capable of having an impact on domestic policies. 
The Diet convened rarely, and it was the king, not the parliament, 
who was the supreme exerciser of power in the realm.
The ban was in force until the winter of 1789. During that time, 
King Gustav III was at war against Russia, and he had to summon 
the Diet in order to obtain more resources for his war efforts.
The central bank was unable to lend enough money to the king, 
and foreign investors in the Dutch Republic and Genoa were not 
as eager to give credit as they had been in the 1770s and early 
1780s. The king did not see any other alternative but to ask the 
Diet to accept a new financial programme consisting of a new war 
 31 Kyle 1987, pp. 184–185.
 32 Bergström 1919 vol. II, pp. 427, 436–437, 456.
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tax and new government debt of twenty million riksdalers, which 
the Estates promised to take over the administration of. To win 
over the peasants, the king promised to support several of their 
demands, including the withdrawal of the sales ban on crown 
farms. The withdrawal was put into force in February 1789.33
Sale Revenues in 1701–1808
Since the raison d’être of the sales of crown farms was fiscal at base, 
at least at the beginning of the operation, it is of interest to investi-
gate how much the sales produced for the treasury. The results are 
summarised in Table 4.1.
A couple of remarks are in order before analysing the results 
any further. First, the figures are chiefly derived from the nomi-
nal ledgers of the National Debt Office, founded in May 1719 by 
the Diet.34 Until 1777, the official accounting unit was silver daler; 
after the monetary reform of 1777, the principal unit was silver 
riksdaler (Sw. riksdaler specie). The official conversion rate 
was six to one (6 sd. = 1 riksdaler specie). However, after 1789 
the National Debt Office began to issue riksdaler paper notes 
(Sw. riksdaler riksgälds) to finance the ongoing warfare with Russia. 
These notes could be converted into silver riksdalers, but their 
value began to fall during the late 1790s, and until 1803 the silver 
standard was de facto replaced by a multi-currency with varying 
exchange rates. In 1789, for instance, the premium was 1–7%, and 
in 1798 approximately 50%. The National Debt Office used both 
currencies in its bookkeeping, and as a consequence it has been 
necessary to convert all the figures expressed in riksdaler riksgälds 
into riksdaler specie.35
Secondly, the column ‘returns’ in the table refers to the fact that 
the National Debt Office was obliged to return a varying sum 
of skatteköp payments to the countryside each year. Most of the 
 33 Åmark 1961, p. 633; Winberg 1985, pp. 187–189; Gärdebo 2009. 
 34 About the organisational changes see Åmark 1961.
 35 The conversion is done using the exchange rates calculated by 
Rodney Edvinsson. See Edvinsson 2010, p. 209.
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returns probably resulted from conflictual transactions. It was 
relatively common that two parties competed for the same crown 
farm. Sometimes it happened that both the competing parties paid 
the sale price to the treasury to further their chances. After the 
dispute was over, the Office sent the losing party’s payment back.
When the returns are also taken into account, the sales of crown 
farms yielded altogether approximately 5.7 million sd. between 
1701 and 1808. The impact of inflation is ignored here. On a yearly 
basis, the profits were approximately 60,900 sd., while allowing for 
the fact that the sales were banned between 28 October 1773 and 
21 February 1789. The crown received annual incomes of the same 
size from the renting of the crown demesnes and other crown prop-
erties (43,000 sd.), from lighthouse and pilot taxes (43,800 sd.), 
Table 4.1: Sales revenues in Sweden and Finland, 1701–1808 (nominal 
values).
Revenues Returns Total revenues
1701–1718 481,276 sd. no information 481,276 sd.
1719–1765 2,493,874 sd. 148,019 sd. 2,345,855 sd.
1766–1776a 281,273 sd. 52,839 sd. 228,434 sd.






Total 5,906,737 sd. 244,940 sd. 5,661,797 sd.
sd. = daler silvermynt; rdr sp = riksdaler specie (Exchange rate: 1 rdr 
sp = 6 sd.)
a Although the sales were banned in 1773–1789, the skatteköp payments 
continued to flow to the National Debt Office (Sw. Riksgäldskontoret) 
until 1776.
Sources: Ahlström 1959, p. 82 (1701–1718); RA, riksens ständers 
kontor, kammarkontoret, renskrivna huvudböcker (1719–1762); RA, 
riksens ständers kontor, kammarkontoret, koncepthuvudböcker (1764– 
1765); RA, Riksdagen 1765–1766, kontorsdeputationen (R3381); RA, 
statskontoret, kammarkontoret, memorialböcker över riksgälds- och 
manufakturfonderna (1766–1776); RA, riksgäldsarkiven, riksgälds-
kontoret, bokslutskontoret, renskrivna huvudböcker (1789–1808). 
Table by the author.
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and from fines (39,200 sd.). The annual rent levied on the crown 
farms and freeholding farms, the most important source of fiscal 
income during the 18th century, yielded approximately two 
million sd. annually between 1722 and 1776. In that respect, 
the profits were relatively small.36
The best way to place the profits in perspective is to compare the 
skatteköp payments to other revenues obtained by the National 
Debt Office. As mentioned before, the Diet assigned the Office the 
task of collecting several sources of income in 1719, including a 
new personal tax called the lön- och betalningsavgift, an extra cus-
tom duty (Sw. licenten) and the skatteköp payments. Other smaller 
resources were allocated to the Office as well, such as the incomes 
generated by the auctions of booties and by the sales of captured 
merchant vessels. Most of the proceeds came from the lön- och 
betalningsavgift tax and the custom duty between 1719 and 1765. 
They accounted for nearly 90% of all incomes. The share of the 
skatteköp payments was 6%.37
The proportions were approximately the same between 1766 
and 1776, although the data is more fragmentary. No nominal 
ledgers have been preserved; only two memorial books are availa-
ble that contain information on the three most important sources 
of income. According to these books, the share of the skatteköp 
payments was only 3%. Most of the incomes originated from the 
lön- och betalningsavgift tax.38
After 1789, the income structure of the National Debt Office 
changed significantly, as the crown began to collect a new extraor-
dinary tax (Sw. bevillning) in the middle of the Russo-Swedish 
War of 1788–1790. This new tax, the collection of which also 
continued after the war, was by far the most important source of 
income for the Office, yielding nearly 30 million silver riksdalers 
between 1789 and 1808. Its share was nearly 70% of all revenues. 
 36 Åmark 1961, pp. 417–418, 433.
 37 Åmark 1961, pp. 689–701.
 38 RA, Statskontoret, Kammarkontoret, Memorialböcker över riksgälds- 
 och manufakturfonderna (1766–1776).
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The lön- och betalningsavgift tax brought in 2.6 million riksdalers 
during the same period, forming the second most important 
income group. The share of the skatteköp payments in contrast 
was only 1% in 1789–1808.39 From a fiscal standpoint, their role was 
relatively insignificant. The National Debt Office would also have 
managed perfectly well without selling a single crown farm.
The Progress of the Sales of Crown Farms
The profits of skatteköp were distributed quite unevenly both in 
terms of time and space. Most of the yields came from Sweden. 
This can clearly be seen in the two diagrams (Figures 4.1 and 4.2), 
which describe the distribution of sales revenues in the Swedish 
Realm between 1719 and 1808. Approximately 80% of all the pro-
ceeds originated from the Swedish provinces during that period. 
The geographical difference was even greater before 1719, because 
only a handful of crown farms were sold in Finland during the 
Great Northern War, as mentioned before.
The lack of interest was quite probably related to the pre-famine 
situation in Finland. Hundreds of freeholding farms became 
crown farms during the late 17th century because of the large-
scale fiscal desertion rates. It would have been surprising if the 
crown peasants had been able to redeem the farms just a couple 
of years after the catastrophic famine. The Russian invasion of 
Finland and the subsequent military occupation put an end to the 
already faint interest after 1713.
As regards the post-1719 situation, the difference between Sweden 
and Finland partly resulted from the fact that, in Sweden, the mini-
mum price was two times higher than in Finland after 1741. In that 
sense, the diagrams do not convey a totally reliable picture of the 
geographical differences. The skatteköp sales were to some extent 
more popular in Finland than the spread of the revenues suggests.
The geographical differences become even more obvious when 
looking at individual provinces. The sales of crown farms yielded the 
most in central and southern Sweden as well as in south-western 
 39 Åmark 1961, pp. 637–639.
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Finland. In the province of Östergötland, the revenues increased to 
324,019 sd., while in the province of Turku and Pori they increased 
to 206,190 sd. and in the province of Skaraborg to 147,461 sd. in 
1719–1765. The sales revenues also exceeded one hundred thou-
sand sd. in the provinces of Södermanland, Jönköping, Älvsborg, 
Malmöhus, Göteborg, Uppsala and Kristanstad. In the province 
of Dalarna, in contrast, the sales yielded less than six thousand 
sd. during the same period. The profits were relatively low also in 
northern Sweden and eastern Finland.40
The distribution was approximately the same after 1789. The 
National Debt Office received the greatest profits from the prov-
inces of Östergötland (65,121 rdr sp), Kristianstad (59,095 rdr sp), 
 40 See Table 4.1 for sources. 
Figure 4.1: The total revenues from skatteköp sales in the Swedish realm 
as well as in Finland between 1719 and 1776 (sd.) 
Sources: RA, Riksens Ständers kontor, Kammarkontoret, renskrivna 
huvudböcker (1719–1762); RA, Riksens Ständers kontor, Kammark-
ontoret, koncepthuvudböcker (1764–1765); RA, Riksdagen 1765–
1766, kontorsdeputationen (R3381); Edvinsson & Söderberg 2010, 
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Malmöhus (52,046 rdr sp), and Turku and Pori (46,711 rdr sp). In 
most of the other provinces in Sweden and Finland, the revenues 
remained under 10,000 rdr sp. In Värmland, the proceeds were as 
low as 151 rdr sp between 1789 and 1808. That was by far the lowest 
figure in the Swedish Realm. The geographical differences reflect the 
prevalence of crown land in separate parts of the realm. In Dalarna, 
for instance, most of the farms were freeholding farms already in 
1700, whereas in southern Sweden (Götaland) the share of crown 
land was over 40%, on average, at the beginning of the Great North-
ern War. In Turku and Pori, the share of crown land was over 80% in 
the 1720s, when the sales began to increase in Finland.41
When it comes to the chronology of the sales, the most strik-
ing feature is the close temporal connection between the skatteköp 
sales and military campaigns, not just during the Great Northern 
War but also after the year of 1721, when the sales officially had 
nothing to do with the Swedish war economy. Most of the sales 
took place during the Seven Years War (1756–1763) and during 
the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790. The connection is not a 
coincidence. The rapid increase in sales after the outbreak of the 
Seven Years War was probably a reaction to the extensive issuing 
of paper notes mentioned before.
The notes began to fall in value rapidly after 1755, and people 
tried to exchange them as quickly as possible for specie coins, 
making the coins very difficult to come by.42 It is quite likely that, 
under these circumstances, the buying of real estate became an 
attractive option both in rural and urban areas. The forceful 
increase of skatteköp revenues after 1755 seems to point towards 
that kind of reaction. It should be noted in this connection that 
the increase was not caused by inflation but by real growth in 
sales activity, because sales prices were connected to annual 
taxes, which were not affected by governmental monetary policy.
Additionally, new statutes and sales bans affected the course of 
events. Probably the most important single new regulation was 
 41 Gadd 2000, pp. 43–44.
 42 Winton 2012, p. 23.
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one that broadened the pre-emptive rights of the owners of cav-
alry farms. The statute was enacted in 1756, and it had immedi-
ate consequences for the sales process. In Sweden, every second 
crown farm was sold to an owner of a cavalry farm in 1761–1765.43 
It is impossible to give corresponding figures for Finland owing 
to gaps in the source material. Deducing from the discussions at 
the Diet, however, it is possible to conclude that the cavalry farm 
owners were active also in Finland, and that the owners were often 
noble officers or other persons of standing.
The rapid decrease in sales revenues afterwards was caused by 
a ban on sales in 1764. This is clearly seen when comparing the 
level of inflation to the changes in skatteköp revenues during 
the mid-18th century (see Figure 4.1). The revenues peaked four 
years before the inflation, and sales began to decrease after 1763 
 43 Heckscher 1944, p. 116; Rydeberg 1985, pp. 99–103.
Figure 4.2: The revenues from skatteköp sales in the Swedish realm in 
1789–1808 (rdr sp). 
Source: RA, Riksgäldsarkiven, Riksgäldskontoret, Bokslutskontoret, 
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when the overall price level was still rising. As for the peak in 
1790, it was evidently related to the repeal of the second sales ban. 
Peasants seemingly wanted to redeem the crown farms they were 
tilling as quickly as possible, scared that the sales window might 
not be open forever.
Conclusions
The large-scale selling of crown farms is often quite straightfor-
wardly linked to the improved social and economic position of 
peasants in pre-industrial Sweden and Finland. The conclusion 
is understandable when looking at the final outcome. Tens of 
thousands of crown farms were sold to private persons during the 
18th and 19th centuries, and most of the farms were bought by 
peasants actually living on these farms. In Finland, the number of 
farms sold was over 40,000; in Sweden, the figure must have been 
significantly higher.
However, the original purpose of the process was not to improve 
peasants’ living conditions but to gather funds for ongoing mili-
tary expenditures during the Great Northern War. The Swedish 
crown had resorted to the same means earlier, first in the 1580s 
and later in the 1620s. What was different during the 18th cen-
tury was that the sales also continued after the war. The principal 
motivation was the heavy national debt caused by the war efforts 
between 1700 and 1718. The crown needed all available cash flows 
for a situation in which the national economy was in ruins.44
On a general level, the skatteköp sales were a method to mobi-
lise private resources for warfare. From the state’s point of view, 
the method was comparable to war taxes, debasement of coins, 
pledging of state property, short-term credits, or other ad hoc 
means to raise funding in a situation when military expendi-
ture rose exponentially. When it comes to the actual profits, they 
were relatively low throughout the 18th century. Sales proceeds 
were probably quite essential at the very beginning of the Great 
Northern War, and again in 1719, when the revenues were 
 44 Karonen 2008.
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redirected to the National Debt Office. In general, however, the 
incomes were quite insignificant compared to other fiscal incomes 
used to finance warfare or to amortise national debt. Some mem-
bers of the nobility considered that a problem during the Age 
of Liberty. They wanted to obtain better profits or put a stop 
to the sales once and for all, and twice they succeeded in halting the 
sales temporarily.
The principal reason why the Diet decided to continue with 
the sales time and again was that the continuation of the sales 
was extremely important for the peasant estate throughout the 
18th century. So long as the other estates wanted to cooperate 
with peasants, it was unwise to support the sales bans.
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Manufacturing Saltpetre  
in Finland in the Late 16th  
and Early 17th Centuries
Mirkka Lappalainen
University of Helsinki
Gunpowder was essential for early modern warfare. Without it, it 
would have been impossible to increase firepower, develop weap-
onry and equip the ever-growing mass armies. Scarcity of gun-
powder would have been fateful for a ruler who wanted to take 
part in the wars in Europe or in the battle for the dominion of the 
seas. The rulers of the Swedish Realm shared this problem, as its 
rise to a north European great power would not have succeeded 
without an adequate and reliable supply of gunpowder.
The making of gunpowder (black powder) was not in itself espe-
cially complicated. It was manufactured by mixing and grinding 
together coal, sulphur and potassium nitrate, also known as salt-
petre. Coal and sulphur were easily obtainable and relatively cheap 
How to cite this book chapter: 
Lappalainen, Mirkka (2021). Manufacturing saltpetre in Finland in the late 
16th and early 17th centuries. In Petri Talvitie & Juha-Matti Granqvist (Eds.),  
Civilians and military supply in early modern Finland (pp. 151–176).  
Helsinki University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.33134/HUP-10-5
152 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
ingredients. The problem was potassium nitrate, the key ingredient, 
as black powder was 67–75% saltpetre.1 Saltpetre could be bought 
from dealers in the great merchant cities such as Amsterdam and 
Danzig, but imports were expensive and uncertain, especially 
in times of war – in other words, most of the time.2 The rulers 
and their armies could not rely on such a risky method to obtain 
a product that was necessary for their existence. Historian David 
Cressy has compared saltpetre with oil and uranium in the mod-
ern world: no realm or country could exist without it, and the 
quest for saltpetre was an ongoing task for every king and govern-
ment up until the development of modern explosives.3
Luckily, saltpetre could be also produced locally by extracting it 
from the most mundane of ingredients: dung and urine-soaked 
soil, straw and ash. The required raw materials were seemingly 
low-cost and abundant, but production was logistically difficult to 
organise, very slow, and labour-intensive.
This chapter studies how the manufacturing of saltpetre was 
organised in Finland in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, 
specifically from the Peace of Teusina in 1595 to 1629, when all 
the saltpetre works in Finland were leased out to a private entre-
preneur. This was a key period of Swedish state-building and lay-
ing the foundation of the military great power it would become. 
During this period, the Swedish Realm waged wars against Russia 
in the east and against Poland in Prussia and in today’s Baltic 
countries. This made Finland a strategically important area due 
to its central location, crucial to the upkeep of armies in the field. 
Finland also played an important role in the Swedish Civil Wars in 
the 1590s and experienced a bloody peasant war in 1597, because 
it formed the base of support for the displaced King Sigismund. In 
these turbulent times, the production of saltpetre in Finland was 
very important.
 1 Kiuasmaa 1962, p. 361.
 2 Uola 1998; Cressy 2013, pp. 90–91; Parrott 2015, pp. 198–199, 
214–215.
 3 Cressy 2013, pp. 1–2.
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The early phase of Finnish saltpetre manufacturing was excep-
tional for both the means of production and for the active involve-
ment of civilians. The crown owned and operated fairly large 
saltpetre factories, to which the peasants were obliged to deliver 
enormous quantities of raw material. By 1634, the crown had 
already changed the ‘saltpetre tax’ to a monetary payment, and 
peasants were no longer obliged to supply dirt and wood to the 
factories. After the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the need for gun-
powder diminished and the required saltpetre could be imported 
from abroad. During the late 17th century, the production of 
saltpetre was revived, but now the system was based on itinerant 
workers, who travelled around with their equipment.4
This study shows how difficult saltpetre production was to 
organise in times of primitive administration. Although royal 
statutes were clear, they could not be put into action. There were 
problems with obtaining raw material, acquiring and maintaining 
equipment, and distributing the saltpetre itself. The production 
system could not meet the demands of the constant level of war-
fare, and therefore it is easy to understand why it had to be reor-
ganised. The necessity of supplying raw materials and equipment 
made the factories an integral but disliked and somewhat obscure 
part of their local communities and the broader power structure.
Late 16th- and early 17th-century Finland was a sparsely popu-
lated, cold and economically underdeveloped land that relied on 
a fragile agricultural system. Towns were few and small, and the 
huge inland tracts were covered with forests and swamps. Finland 
was, however, geopolitically important because of its proximity to 
the Russian and Livonian fronts. The coastal areas were buzzing 
with activity, and the Gulf of Finland in particular was filled with 
maritime traffic. This formed the local scene where saltpetre fac-
tories were established. In practice, they were the first industrial 
ventures established in the Finnish countryside.
 4 Haggrén 2007; Uola 1998, p. 19.
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Previous Research and Sources
In the late 1930s, Finnish historian Kaarlo Blomstedt complained 
that, despite saltpetre production’s huge importance for the state 
and its impact on Finland, historians had not taken an interest 
in studying it.5 Eighty years later, the situation is still much the 
same. The general picture is still very incomplete, especially con-
cerning the ‘golden age’ of saltpetre works, the first decades of the 
17th century.
The manufacturing of saltpetre has not been a core interest for 
economic or military historians – in Finland, Sweden or any-
where else. Whereas the history of mining or the manufacturing 
of guns has been researched extensively, the mundane process of 
making potassium nitrate has been almost forgotten. In Finland, 
the saltpetre production was hugely important in its own time, 
but it was also a dead-end industry – it did not develop into a 
more modern system. For the historians studying agrarian his-
tory and peasant societies, the production of raw materials for the 
factories has been a side note and seen as just another burden for 
the commoners. On the other hand, saltpetre has also been a side 
note for military historians studying the development of artillery. 
In recent international research, however, scholars have taken an 
interest in the economic and logistical aspects of military history, 
thereby bringing saltpetre into limelight. David Parrott writes 
about saltpetre as part of the international trade in army supplies 
in his Business of War (2012), and John Cressy focuses on England in 
his book Saltpeter: Mother of Gunpowder (2013).
The oldest work on the saltpetre industry and saltpetre tax 
in Finland is K. R. Melender’s extensive study about taxation in 
Finland from 1617 to 1634 (1894). After Melender, it was Kaarlo 
Blomsted who next studied the topic and published an article 
(1939) about saltpetre administration in the 16th century. In 
1962, Kyösti Kiuasmaa published a large volume about 16th- 
century officials and other employees of the crown, also including 
 5 Blomstedt 1939, p. 195.
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the manufacturing of saltpetre. After these earlier ‘classic’ works, the 
industry was more recently researched by Georg Haggrén in con-
nection with the archaeological study of the royal mansion and 
related saltpetre works in Perniö (1997). Recently, the production 
of saltpetre has been touched upon by Suvianna Seppälä in her 
dissertation (2009) concerning different forms of taxation from 
1539 to 1609. In addition, there is Mikko Uola’s non-academic but 
well-researched book about the history of explosives in Finland 
(1998). Saltpetre production has also been studied as a part of 
local history.
In Sweden, most of the few studies that concern saltpetre deal 
with the 18th and 19th centuries, local history, or the history of 
artillery, and are not especially relevant to this chapter.
In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the administrative 
system of the Swedish Realm was still in its infancy. Documents 
considering saltpetre are fragmentary and scattered in different 
archives and collections. The bailiffs’ accounts at the National 
Archives of Finland hold a variety of papers primarily dealing 
with factories’ expenses, which were compensated from tax rev-
enues (including, most importantly, wages). In the late 16th cen-
tury, Finnish saltpetre works were in principle directly under the 
control of the Chamber, but apparently this system had its faults, 
because in 1602 King Charles IX (Sw. Karl IX) ordered that the 
bailiffs must include the saltpetre tax and related payments in their 
accounts. In practice, the bailiffs did this very haphazardly. The 
bailiffs’ accounts from the 1610s and 1620s include receipts from 
saltpetre workmen, brief remarks about production amounts, and 
sometimes information about the saltpetre tax paid by the peas-
ants, but not the accounts of the works themselves.6
The Lagus Collection (Sw. Laguska samlingen) at the National 
Archives of Finland is a somewhat strange entity formed by a 
 6 The fragmentary nature of the archive material may have a con-
nection to the intermittent history of the chamber’s sub-division in 
Finland, the Turun laskukamari, which operated intermittently in the 
16th and 17th centuries. 
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notorious 19th-century history enthusiast, C. G. Lagus. It includes 
a volume about the mining industry, containing dozens of letters 
and other documents about saltpetre production. In addition to 
the Lagus Collection, other records in the National Archives of 
Finland have also been used in this study, mainly the district court 
records7 and the Acta Historica. The royal statutes and letters 
about saltpetre manufacturing play a central role in this research. 
Among the otherwise fragmentary material, they present them-
selves as a clear and well-preserved body, recorded in the Collec-
tion of King’s Letters (Sw. Riksregistratur) at the National Archives 
of Sweden. Most of these were printed in the 19th century in the 
so-called Waaranen’s source editions.
In general, most of the sources offer information about how 
expensive and labour-intensive it was to run these factories: 
there is information about wages, buildings, and the raw mate-
rial that local peasants had to deliver to the factories. There is also 
information about official plans and proceedings: how the crown 
wanted these factories to work. For the most part, however, these 
sources lack information about production amounts, delivery and 
the logistics of the actual production. Either this information was 
never documented or the documents have disappeared.
Kings and Saltpetre
During the 16th century, gunpowder changed from an expensive 
curiosity into a military necessity. The increasing role of firepower 
in warfare meant an increasing need for saltpetre. From 1570 to 
1595, Sweden was waging constant war with Russia, but the process 
of manufacturing saltpetre was still in many ways unestablished. 
There were numerous small saltpetre works, and gunpowder was 
made in mills close to the front.8 This system was primitive and 
could not meet the demands of expanding warfare. In 1593 Bengt 
 7 In order to find court cases related to saltpetre, an old index of 
keywords (‘Tuokko’) has been used. 
 8 Kiuasmaa 1962, p. 361.
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Söffrinsson Juusten, who was responsible for the artillery, wrote a 
letter to his brother-in-law, a bailiff in the south of Finland, under-
lining the importance of making steel bows. ‘Bowmen do not need 
gunpowder or lead, which are so scarce in this Realm and cannot 
be obtained without great cost.’9
King John III (Sw. Johan III) made several efforts to develop salt-
petre production and bring it under closer control. He appointed 
superintendents whose responsibility was to invent equipment 
and compile reports of production and costs. In 1581 Finland was 
designated as its own saltpetre manufacturing district. The king 
ordered every medium-sized farmhouse to deliver to its local salt-
petre work five barrels of dirt, two barrels of sheep or goat dung, 
firewood, straw and ash. This saltpetre tax was a huge burden for 
the peasants.10
King John died in 1593 and was succeeded by his son Sigismund, 
who was already king of Poland. Sigismund, a Catholic, was chal-
lenged by his uncle, Duke Charles (Sw. Hertig Karl), a devout 
Protestant who was widely considered a potential usurper. 
Sigismund remained in Poland, and his most loyal servant in 
the Swedish Realm was a military chief named Klaus Fleming, the 
commander of Finland. In 1595, the Peace of Teusina ended 
the long feud between the Swedes and the Russians. However, 
Fleming was convinced that Duke Charles wanted to overthrow 
his master and did not want to demobilise the troops in Finland. 
He was preparing for a civil war.11
Saltpetre was a problem for Fleming’s armament project. Besides 
cavalry, footmen, artillery, ships and swords, he needed gunpow-
der. It was unlikely that Fleming would get it from Sweden, as 
it was practically ruled by Duke Charles, who naturally opposed 
Fleming’s armament. Bengt Juusten, now steward of Turku Castle 
 9 KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Bengt 
Juusten to Lydig Henriksson, 10 May 1593. 
 10 Seppälä 2009, pp. 223–224.
 11 Lappalainen 2009, pp. 128–166.
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and Fleming’s loyal servant,12 was familiar with this problem. In 
November 1595 he sent similar letters to the bailiffs of Ostroboth-
nia and southern Finland. The former letter complained that the 
equipment of the Voitby saltpetre factory in Ostrobothnia was in 
bad shape, whereas the latter expressed similar complaints about 
a factory in Perniö on the south-west coast of Finland, where the 
manager had complained that he and his workmen had not got 
enough help and food. Otherwise, the letters were almost exact 
copies of each other.
For Juusten and Fleming, the problem was the Peace of Teusina. 
Without a declared state of war, it was difficult to motivate any-
one to take part in the making of gunpowder. Juusten wrote that, 
although God had mercifully given them peace, almost all their 
saltpetre had been used during the long war. Another problem 
was raw material, as only half of the bailiff ’s district supplied 
material for the factory each year.
According to Juusten, about ‘ten or twenty thousand skeppund 
saltpeter’ should always be stored in the artillery magazines, an 
absurd amount considering that one skeppund is equivalent to 
170 kg.13 Now, however, the magazines were almost empty. It is 
unclear if he was referring to the artillery magazine in Stockholm 
or in Turku, but his objective was nevertheless to obtain saltpetre 
and gunpowder for Fleming’s troops in Finland. Juusteen wrote 
that he had discussed with Fleming about what actions might 
be necessary in this case – a threatening note, for Claus Fleming 
was a notoriously ruthless character.14
The civil war ended in the victory of Duke Charles. In the autumn 
of 1599, he conquered southern Finland, imprisoned or executed 
his opponents, and replaced them with his own loyal men. Curi-
ously enough, his servants, led by Admiral Jochim Scheel, were 
 12 Syrjö 2002.
 13 Svenska Akademins ordbok SAOB [skeppund]. 
 14 KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Bengt 
Juusten to Thomas Jörensson, 24 November 1595; Bengt Juusten to 
Jören Ollsson, 24 November 1595.
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faced with the same problem as Bengt Juusteen: there was no salt-
petre in the Turku Castle. The duke had ordered them ‘both by 
word of mouth and in writing’ to investigate the situation regard-
ing saltpetre manufacturing in Finland. The bailiffs again received 
letters, this time from the new rulers. In these letters, they were 
ordered to make sure that the statutes of John III were followed.15
In 1604, Duke Charles was crowned and became King Charles IX. 
He was a hard, suspicious and despotic ruler whose goal was to 
build a strong and loyal government. However, his ambitions were 
constantly thwarted by lack of means, information and workforce. 
His style was to send furious letters to the crown’s servants and 
demand efficiency and loyalty. Still, little was done. The admin-
istrative system was primitive, and it was easy to ignore letters 
from Stockholm.16
Naturally, Charles’s demands for control extended to saltpetre 
and its production. On a visit to Finland in the winter of 1602 he 
had made a declaration on the manufacture of saltpetre in this 
part of his realm. In the opening chapter, he declared that there 
had been no regulations at all about the making of potassium 
nitrate in Finland. According to the (then) duke, this had led to 
mismanagement and abuse. Saltpetre makers had servants who 
bullied peasants and demanded too much raw material, building 
material and firewood. Still, ‘just a little or nothing’ was eventually 
produced for the crown’s purposes.17
Charles IX was accustomed to blame his servants’ laziness and 
lack of loyalty for all his misfortunes, and the production of salt-
petre was no exception. According to the king, the low production 
rates were due to the laziness of the manufacturers, as well as their 
habit of secretly selling potassium nitrate for their own profit.
 15 KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Axel 
Ryning’s, Jochim Scheel’s and Tönne Jöransson’s letters to Daniel 
Johansson, Jacob Nilsson and Jöran Bertilsson, 21 February 1600; 
Lappalainen 2009, pp. 247–249.
 16 Lappalainen 2014, pp. 34–39.
 17 Ordningh huru med Saltpetter bruken her i Finlandh skall holles. RA 
RR, 28 January 1602. Printed in Waaranen II, pp. 238–240. 
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It is impossible to know whether this actually happened or if 
it was just a part of the king’s rhetoric. The selling of potassium 
nitrate would have required markets and complicated networks, 
and someone willing to buy it. European rulers and armies were 
in constant need of gunpowder, but it is not likely that some pro-
ducer in a remote Finnish village would have managed to sell it to 
a foreign agent. Bailiffs and other servants were often accused of 
selling tax products; however, it was much easier to sell barrels 
of grain than potassium nitrate, for which the common people had 
no use. There is one letter, written in 1594, where a man named 
Sigfrid Olsson talks about the two barrels of saltpetre he was will-
ing to sell for eight barrels of rye. However, this document has 
been preserved out of its original context, and it is not possible to 
know what kind of ‘deal’ it actually was about.18
The reign of Charles’s son Gustavus Adolphus (Sw. Gustav II 
Adolf) (1611–1632) was a period of growing warfare and intense 
state-building. The Swedish Realm was engaged in wars with its 
archenemies Denmark, Poland and Russia. Eventually, Gustavus 
Adolphus’s troops also took part in the Thirty Years War in 
Germany. The growing scale of warfare meant an escalating need 
for weapons, guns and gunpowder. In 1616 Gustavus Adolphus 
was forced to double the amount of raw materials and firewood 
peasants had to deliver to saltpetre factories. He ordered Finnish 
bailiffs to make clear how transport to each factory would be 
arranged. He also reminded them that saltpetre production – 
according to the receipts from manufacturers – had to be included 
in the bailiffs’ accounts.19
During the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, the crown leased out 
various sectors and sections of economic life, such as ironworks 
or the right to collect certain customs or taxes. It was not an 
ideological privatisation but rather a way to guarantee a steady 
flow of cash and liberate the crown from laborious and risky 
 18 KA, Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Sigfrid 
Olsson to Jören Ollsson, 19 August 1594. 
 19 RA RR 27 February 1616; Waaranen V, p. 109. 
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responsibilities. The crown also began to lease out saltpetre works, 
and finally in 1629 a wealthy merchant named Jacob Wolle became 
the leaseholder of all the saltpetre factories of Finland. He leased the 
factories up until 1635, when all the saltpetre and gunpowder fac-
tories in the whole realm were leased out to a Frenchman named 
Fermin Mazalet.20
These leasing systems had already brought about numerous 
conflicts and suspicions of misuse in the 1620s.21 Recurring prob-
lems and low productivity were probably the main reasons why 
the saltpetre tax was soon changed to a money payment.
Organising the Production
Saltpetre factories were fairly large compounds by 16th- and 17th-
century Finnish standards. They consisted of several buildings 
and were sites of constant activity. They had to be located near 
waterways, both because good delivery routes were necessary, 
and because the industrial process itself required water. The staff 
consisted of the factory foreman (Sw. saltpeter sjundare), his clerk, 
and the workmen, the number of whom depended on the size of 
the factory.22
When John III ascended the throne in 1560, there were five 
saltpetre factories in Finland. During the Russo-Swedish War 
of 1570–1595, when gunpowder was needed in the eastern and 
southern borders of the realm, their number rose to 16 or 17. 
According to Kyösti Kiuasmaa, these ‘factories’ were mostly very 
small, and there were breaks and discontinuity in their opera-
tions. In the 1580s they produced just 1.5–5 skeppund (170 kg) 
of saltpetre per year, with total production being 18 skeppund. By 
1592 total production had risen to 55 skeppund, and the facto-
ries’ individual production rates were 4–6 skeppund.23 It would 
 20 Kerkkonen 1947, p. 165. 
 21 Melender 1896, pp. 419–420; Haggrén 1997, p. 166. 
 22 Kiuasmaa 1962, p. 363.
 23 Kiuasmaa 1962, pp. 362–363. 
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have taken 200–300 years to meet Bengt Juusteen’s demand of a 
10,000–20,000 skeppund saltpetre storage.
Known saltpetre factories were scattered around south and 
south-west Finland. In the 1590s, the largest factory was at Naantali 
in the south, with Moisio in the east and Voitby in the north fol-
lowing. During the first decades of the 17th century the number 
of saltpetre manufacturers plummeted, and production was con-
centrated in somewhat larger facilities (see Figure 5.1). In 1626, 
before Jacob Wolle took over saltpetre production in Finland, 
there were nine factories: Naantali, Ulvila, Perniö (Näse), Sipoo 
(Löparö), Hollola, Sääksmäki (Voipaala), Rantasalmi, Moisio and 
Viipuri.24 For some reason, production at Mustasaari (Voitby) was 
temporarily halted, but started again later.
Essentially, there were two factors that dictated where factories 
were established: raw material and access. The amount of soil and 
organic waste needed was so massive that saltpetre factories had to 
be close to populated areas. They had to get their supply from their 
surroundings, without need to transport the raw material from too 
far. Furthermore, the manufactured saltpetre had to be shipped 
to wherever it was needed. The first precondition posed a problem, 
as Finland was a huge, mostly desolated country with long distances 
between settlements. Factories had therefore to be scattered around 
the country. Luckily, delivery routes were not a problem, as the long 
coastline and many lakes and rivers formed an extensive network of 
water transportation. In wintertime, the country was likewise criss-
crossed with icy routes over the frozen, snowy landscape.
Early 17th-century saltpetre factories were all located near good 
waterways: Hollola, Sääksmäki, Moisio and Rantasalmi by lakes 
and inland water routes, Ulvila and Voitby by large rivers, and 
Naantali, Perniö, Sipoo and Viipuri close to the sea. The site of 
Löparö in Sipoo is a good example of an optimal location: it was 
on a large island by the shoreline, about 25 km from Helsinki. On 
the other side of the Gulf of Finland were the city of Tallinn 
and the fortress of Narva, an important Swedish outpost in wars 
with Russia and Poland.
 24 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 418:156 (Ledgers for Finland 1626–1627).
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The process of making saltpetre was slow and labour-intensive. 
First, the urine-soaked soil, rich in nitrates, was heaped up with 
rotten grass and hay, slaughter waste, dung, straw and sticks. These 
piles of soil were left to ‘brew up’ for two or three years, moistened 
and turned over at regular intervals. Then, this heap of soil was 
mixed with ash and laid in wooden tubs upon stacks of straw. 
Boiling water was added, and after 10–12 hours the mixture was 
drained from a hole in the tub’s bottom. This liquid was now boiled 
in large, heavy copper bowls called pans. The boiling took several 
days and was the heart of the process. The ensuing vaporisation 
resulted in granulated raw saltpetre, which was then dried and 
eventually purified by heating, dissolving in water, and filtration.25
Saltpetre factories consisted of several buildings, because every 
part of the manufacturing process required its own structure. 
 25 Uola 1998, p. 17; Soininen 1954, p. 188.
Figure 5.1: Saltpetre factories in Finland during the 1620s. 
Source: Map drawn by Petri Talvitie.
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First, the soil and ash were stored in separate barns. The soil and 
ash were then diluted with boiling water in an ‘ash house’, 
and the slow boiling itself, as well as the drying, were done in 
separate buildings. In addition to these buildings, there were 
the normal stables, barns and houses for the workmen, animals 
and foodstuff.26
Löparö in Sipoo, on the southern coast of Finland, is the only 
saltpetre factory that has been archaeologically investigated. The 
remains are located on a small hill, and consist of various bare 
stone constructions, earthen banks, and ditches. There are two 
large pits that are surrounded by earthworks, and inside them 
there are remains of three drystack furnaces.27 In the 16th and 
early 17th centuries Finland practically all buildings were made 
of pinewood and did not even have stone foundations. Compared 
with an ordinary farmhouse, the Löparö factory was in other 
words very robust.
The factories were in constant need of building material: timber, 
bricks, mortar and iron. The buildings had to be in relatively good 
condition and provide shelter from rain, sleet and snow. This was, 
however, by no means self-evident. In 1603, Duke Charles sent his 
servant to Finland to make sure that the necessary houses were 
built in saltpetre factories, so that work could go on ‘during winter 
and in the summer’.28 This turned out to be easier said than done. 
In 1623 Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm, one of the leading Swedish 
aristocrats, was sent to Finland to inspect the economic situation 
and military administration. He also took an interest in saltpetre 
manufacturing. In his report, Gyllenhielm wrote that that many 
of the saltpetre works’ buildings had been ‘derelict’ and were now 
being rebuilt. He also wrote that the saltpetre works urgently 
 26 Haggrén 1997, pp. 164–167.
 27 Finnish Heritage Agency, Guide for archaeological cultural heritage: 
Salpietarikeittimö. http://akp.nba.fi/wiki;salpietarikeittim%C3%B6; 
Register of protected heritage sites: Löparö. www.kyppi.fi/to.aspx 
?id=112.1000010857.
 28 KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Carl IX 
30 August 1603, signed by Erik Eriksson. 
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needed new copper ‘pans’, for they were in general old and in 
poor repair.29
Copper ‘pans’ (also called tubs) were the most valuable equip-
ment in a saltpetre factory. Owing to their heavy use and the con-
stant heat, the pans often broke and had to be fixed or replaced. 
Repairing broken pans and acquiring new ones was a constant 
problem that appears in the records repeatedly. Copper was expen-
sive, and the shaping had to be done by skilled coppersmiths. In 
1623 it was reported that a coppersmith in Turku had held onto 
one of the Naantali factory’s pans for a year and a half as a security 
for his unpaid wages.30
Pans were large and weighed several hundred kilograms, which 
meant that they were hard to move. In 1617 the Sääksmäki factory, 
then the largest, needed a new pan. It took four men six weeks 
to prepare.31 They were often made of miscellaneous confiscated 
items, such as stills that were used in distilling alcohol.32 They 
were also so valuable that at the Sääksmäki factory it was decided 
that the pans belonged to specific administrative areas (Satagundz 
Panna etc.). In other words, it was the local bailiff ’s duty to take 
care that the pan was in good condition.33
In order to then make gunpowder, saltpetre had to be mixed and 
ground up with sulphur and charcoal. This was done in special 
‘mills’. During the Russo-Swedish War of 1570–1595 these mills 
 29 RA, Archives of the Chamber (Kammarkollegiet ämnessamlingar), 
Bergsbruk 1592–1719, vol 133, Strödda bergverksakter 1620–1719, 
Hwad som widare öffuer min Instruction effter (…), undated, circa 
1623.
 30 KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Carl 
Carlsson Gyllenhielm to Joen Mårtensson, 25 June 1623; about 
payments to coppersmiths see also KA 3579:31 (Porvoo); 3607:36 
(Porvoo); KA 4897:65 (Etelä-Pohjanmaa). 
 31 KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Erik 
Axelsson’s receipt, 17 April 1616.
 32 Uola 1998, p. 17.
 33 KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Bertil 
Michilsson 7 July 1597. 
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were located closer to the front,34 but during the next century the 
making of gunpowder was concentrated in factories in Sweden. 
In general, it was easier to stock and transport potassium nitrate 
than gunpowder, because the latter had to be carefully protected 
from damp.35 Stocking gunpowder was also hazardous: a tiny 
spark could blow up an entire magazine or even a battleship.
Fragmentary sources show that in the early 17th century salt-
petre was delivered to various places, probably where it was most 
needed at the moment. The logistics of saltpetre transportation 
were clearly not planned beforehand and seem almost haphaz-
ard. It was logical to deliver saltpetre from Naantali to the nearby 
Turku Castle, as well as from the Viipuri factory to the local 
castle,36 but there were also other solutions. In 1609 a man named 
Jöns Pedersson travelled from Turku Castle to Stockholm ‘with 
the saltpeter’.37 Two years later, someone named Bastian Melch-
ersson was sent to Finland to visit the factories and ‘collect the 
saltpeter here in Finland to Sweden’.38
In the summer of 1613 the saltpetre manufacturer in Korsholm 
delivered 365.5  kg of saltpetre to the arsenal in Stockholm and 
circa 340 kg to Turku Castle.39 In the summer of 1614, 4 skeppund 
(680  kg) of saltpetre was delivered from Korsholm to Viipuri.40 
This is remarkable because of the extreme distance between 
Korsholm, on the west coast, and the town of Viipuri, in the south-
east of Finland by the Russian border. In those days, the Swedish 
Realm was at war with Russia and intervened in the struggle for 
the czar’s throne. It was thus natural that saltpetre production in 
 34 Kiuasmaa 1962, p. 361.
 35 Uola 1998. 
 36 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 1706:28 (Masku); 5985:13 (Jääski); 5966:13 
(Lappee); 5950:25 (Ranta).
 37 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 1710:73 (Turku castle).
 38 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 6751:27, 6752:158 (Pien-Savo).
 39 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 4879:25 (Korsholma and Etelä-Pohjanmaa).
 40 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 4897:64 (Etelä-Pohjanmaa); see also KA 
1710:73 (Turku castle and its estates).
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the eastern part of Finland did not meet the demands of the geo-
political situation.
Although several of the saltpetre factories were established close 
to different castles and larger cities, it seems that their product 
was shipped unsystematically wherever it was needed. To send 
someone from Sweden to collect saltpetre from the Finnish facto-
ries and travel with it to Stockholm does not sound sensible at all 
because of the excruciatingly long distances. It would have taken 
weeks or months to complete even a part of this task. In summary, 
saltpetre distribution reflects the problems of early 17th-century 
administration in general: the lack of personnel, established 
administrative practices and reliable information caused enor-
mous difficulties.
Conflicts – Materials, Wages and Local Power
In principle, it was the local bailiff ’s duty to ensure that the saltpe-
tre works received enough raw materials. The bailiff and his men 
worked as intermediates between the peasants and the saltpetre 
works. Sometimes the bailiff and his men took care of collecting 
and delivering the raw materials, while in other cases it was the 
duty of the factory workmen.
The factories needed huge amounts of material. For instance, 
in 1624 the Moisio factory required over 1,446 barrels of dirt and 
sheep manure and 99 barrels of ash from the district of Pien-Savo. 
During the same year, 2,131.5 barrels of dirt and sheep manure 
and over 266 barrels of ash were supplied to Moisio from the 
larger administrative district of Suur-Savo.41 In 1620 no fewer 
than 3,522 barrels of dirt and over 220 barrels of ash were taken 
to the Löparö factory from the surrounding administrative dis-
trict of Porvoo. In addition, peasants provided the factories with 
enormous amounts of firewood, straw and other raw materials. 
The deliveries made by the peasants were seemingly registered in 
 41 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 6801:24v (Pien-Savo); KA 6800:17 (Suur-Savo); 
see also KA 6791:22 (Pien-Savo).
168 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
the bailiff ’s accounts on a random basis; for instance, in 1620 
there is no mention of the saltpetre tax in the district of Kymeen-
kartano beside Porvoo, although it is not possible to know whether 
the tax was actually not collected or just not registered.42
In principle, no one was free from the saltpetre burden. Noble-
men’s mansions were normally free from taxes, but even they had 
to provide dirt to the factories. In reality, all sorts of defaults and 
exceptions were made. This caused disagreements and conflicts, 
especially after Wolle took over the saltpetre works. He soon 
noticed that there were people who routinely dodged the pay-
ments, and that large districts, such as the Åland archipelago, did 
not pay any saltpetre tax at all.43 However, Wolle’s complaint is 
odd, because in the years prior the payments of the saltpetre tax 
were carefully registered in the bailiff ’s accounts of Åland.44
By today’s standards, it seems that saltpetre was made of waste 
and garbage. In the early modern world, however, things like abat-
toir waste, muck and urine were valuable. Lack of manure was 
a life-threatening problem for agriculture in Finland. It was a 
vicious cycle: meadows did not produce enough fodder, so there 
were not enough cattle, and in turn not enough dung. Lack of 
manure made crops susceptible to frost and wet, which in turn 
caused harvest failures. Peasants were constantly threatened by 
food shortages and famines.45
Although the duties of the peasants were carefully listed in the 
royal statutes pertaining to saltpetre, it seems that practices and 
customs varied. The burden was not the same everywhere 
and depended on the bailiff ’s activity and the needs of the 
saltpetre factory in question.
 42 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 3607:40 (Porvoo); KA 3606 (Kymenkartano), 
3609 (Kymenkartano).
 43 Haggrén 1997, p. 165; Melender 1896, pp. 414–426.
 44 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 2902:14v (Åland); 2904:13 (Åland); 2906:21 
(Åland).
 45 Seppälä 2009, p. 224; Lappalainen 2012, pp. 47–55.
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The problems with raw material deliveries were foreseeable: 
insubordination, disobedience and loitering. In 1626 the saltpetre 
manufacturer of Viipuri went to the local court and demanded 
the dirt and ash the peasantry should have delivered. It turned 
out that many were so poor that they were unable to provide the 
factory with anything.46 One year later, the factory buildings were 
in such a derelict condition that they were in danger of collapsing. 
The local court had to order nearby peasants to fix them.47 The 
saltpetre maker was later also charged with hitting and abusing 
peasants. However, the claims were based on the testimony of 
only one man, who according to the jury was an old fool and not 
in his right mind.48
The problems in raw material deliveries had a direct effect to 
the livelihood of the manufacturers. According to the statutes 
established by Charles IX in 1602, saltpetre manufacturers were 
paid according to the amount of saltpetre produced, so that the 
larger factories were paid more than the smaller ones.49 Wages 
were marked in the crown’s budget,50 but the manufacturer and 
his workmen were only paid after they had delivered the saltpe-
tre to wherever it was needed. Records show that this royal order 
was generally abided by: the manager of the factory was only 
paid when he could prove that he had delivered the product to 
wherever it was needed.51 For example, in 1605 the saltpetre 
 46 KA District court records, Jääski, Ranta and Äyräpää, Jääski and 
Ruoholahti 9 January 1623, p. 8. 
 47 KA District court records, Jääski, Ranta and Äyräpää, Jääski 
and Ruoholahti 9 January 1624, p. 23. 
 48 KA District court records, Jääski, Ranta and Äyräpää, Jääski and 
Ruoholahti 10 October 1624, pp. 35–36.
 49 RA RR 28 January 1602. Printed in Waaranen I, pp. 238–241.
 50 KA Bailiff ’s records, 397:57–58v (Payroll for the crown’s servants).
 51 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 4376:35v (Hollola and Hattula) 5985:13 (Jääski); 
5966:13 (Lappee); 5950:25 (Ranta); 6624:29 (Suur-Savo); 6754:18 
(Suur-Savo); 1706:27v (Masku); 4897:29v, 64 (Etelä-Pohjanmaa); 
358:158 (Kokemäenkartano, Häme, Raasepori, Porvoo and Viipuri); 
2900:14v (Åland). Sometimes the amount of saltpetre is not 
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manufacturer of Rantasalmi could show the bailiff the receipt 
he had received from the arsenal in Viipuri. He had taken there 
circa 700 kg of saltpetre, and now the bailiff gave him (and his 
workmen) 89¼ barrels of grain.52
This was not the standard practice in paying the wages of the 
crown’s servants. For example, miners and prospectors were paid 
their wages whether they found anything or not. Mining was a 
hazardous activity, where no one could guarantee the results. Salt-
petre manufacturing, on the other hand, was in principle con-
trollable. Certain amount of raw materials and firewood meant 
a certain amount of the product. As a result, the system of tying 
payments to production linked the factories more closely with 
their local communities. If the manufacturers did not get enough 
raw materials, or if the equipment or buildings were in bad shape, 
the production would halt.
In principle it was the bailiff who was responsible for supply-
ing the raw materials and other needs of the factories. It seems, 
however, that the saltpetre manufacturers sometimes had to take 
things in their own hands. In the 1620s the former saltpetre manu-
facturer of Ulvila was charged with malpractice: he had arbitrarily, 
without the authorisation of the bailiff, levied peasants for grain, 
butter and a sheep and was ordered to pay them back. He had also 
taken a large tub (pan) and had not paid for it.53
In the late 1610s the long-time manager of the Löparö factory 
died. His son and son-in law started to run the factory after him 
but were faced with a legitimacy problem. They had to prove that 
they were entitled to get deliveries of raw materials, and spe-
cifically according to the king’s statute of 1616, which consider-
ably increased the peasants’ burden. Another problem was that 
registered. From the bailiff ’s viewpoint it was essential to register 
what payments he had made from the tax revenues, not what the 
saltpetre makers had done with their product.
 52 KA Bailiff ’s accounts, 6709:12v (Pien-Savo).
 53 KA District court records, Ala-Satakunta, Ulvila 11 November 1625, 
pp. 237, 242v.
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the father had died before he had settled accounts with the local 
bailiff. As a result, the son and the son-in-law were forced to appeal 
to other authorities and write a kind of proclamation that was then 
read in all district court sessions in the administrative area.54
Saltpetre manufacturers lacked formal authority over the peas-
ant community. They were not as frightening as the crown’s bail-
iffs, who claimed taxes and employed thug-like servants to help 
them. It was easy to neglect the manufacturer’s claims. In order 
to keep things going, saltpetre manufacturers had to rely on the 
bailiff and his men. The arbitrary actions of the saltpetre manu-
facturer of Ulvila can be explained by the fact that he was not on 
good terms with the local bailiff, and accused him of malpractice; 
according to the saltpetre maker, the bailiff had not correctly writ-
ten down the amount of taxes he had paid.55
By the late 16th century, the kings had already started to appoint 
superintendents whose task was to control all the saltpetre works 
in Finland. Receipts signed by the inspectors indicate that they 
really travelled around and visited the factories. However, their 
ability to actually control the production must have been very 
limited, and the position was abolished in 1621.56
When the crown began to lease out saltpetre works, new prob-
lems began to arise. It was in the leaseholders’ interest to make the 
production more effective and force the peasants pay their share. 
According to the contracts, the leaseholders undertook to deliver 
to the crown a certain amount of saltpetre in a year. It was no 
longer the bailiff who took care of collecting the raw materials 
from the peasants but the leaseholder and his men, who could be 
ruthless and were also accused of collecting too much tax. Some 
of the leaseholders did not even make any saltpetre: they col-
lected the saltpetre tax in money and bought the saltpetre abroad, 
 54 KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Sigfred 
Bengtsson and Mårten Hansson, 12 January 1619. 
 55 KA District court records, Ala-Satakunta, Ulvila 11 November 1625, 
p. 237.
 56 Melender 1896, p. 419. 
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letting the factories decay. In the 1620s this was not allowed, for 
the crown still wanted to support domestic production.57
Saltpetre factories were industrial ventures situated in other-
wise totally agrarian communities. Other than a few small min-
ing ventures, one ironworks (Mustio), the crown’s shipyards and 
the saltpetre factories, there really was no ‘industry’ in Finland 
at the time. Later in the 17th and 18th centuries, several mines, 
ironworks and timber mills were established around the coun-
try, but in the late 16th and early 17th centuries such ventures 
were still largely non-existent. Even tar-burning was small-scale 
compared with the upcoming decades. In other words, saltpetre 
factories were oddities. Some two hundred years later Finnish 
peasants were obliged to make saltpetre themselves, and agents 
travelled around the country teaching them.58 In the late 16th 
and early 17th centuries the peasants were probably not familiar 
with the process of making gunpowder out of dung. As a part of 
the war effort, saltpetre manufacturing was much less straightfor-
ward and less comprehensible than providing troops with food 
and accommodation.
Conclusion
In the late 16th and early 17th centuries the crown tried to ensure 
the supply of Finnish saltpetre by means of strict orders and state-
owned saltpetre works. This system replaced the more fragmented 
network of smaller manufacturers. Peasants were responsible for 
the delivery of raw materials, the amount of which was in prin-
ciple clearly defined. The expected output of the saltpetre works 
was also predetermined. In reality, the situation was much more 
 57 The National Archives of Sweden (RA), Archives of the Chamber 
(Kammarkollegiet ämnessamlingar), Bergsbruk 1592–1719, vol 133, 
Strödda bergverksakter 1620–1719, Hwad som widare öffuer min 
Instruction effter (…), undated, circa 1623; Melender 1896, 
pp. 418–421.
 58 Uola 1998, pp. 23–24.
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uncertain and chaotic – this kind of contradiction was essentially 
unavoidable in the early 17th century, when logistic as well as 
administrative structures were still primitive. In 1629 the crown 
‘solved’ the problems by leasing out Finnish saltpetre production.
Saltpetre works were difficult to run, because their output was 
dependent on the deliveries of raw materials. Peasants hated the 
‘saltpetre tax’ because the raw materials, especially dung, were 
extremely valuable as manure. To get anything done, the saltpe-
tre manufacturers had to have a good relationship with the local 
administration, in other words the bailiff and his men. The sys-
tem was essentially oppressive. Peasants were forced to give up an 
important part of life-saving manure to feed the endless demands 
of warfare. Saltpetre works did not benefit them directly in any 
way. The works did, however, increase economic activity in their 
areas. Like any industrial venture, they created work, tasks, and 
logistical connections that that had not existed before. For exam-
ple, someone had to make and repair the large copper pans the 
factories needed and was paid for it.
Saltpetre manufacturers were paid according to their output. In 
order to receive their wages, they had to deliver their product to 
wherever it was needed. For the crown’s part this was almost a 
genius resolution to the problem of control: it was in the saltpetre 
manufacturers’ interest to ensure that raw materials were deliv-
ered and that the buildings and equipment were in good shape. 
If the system did not work, the saltpetre manufacturers were not 
paid. This, however, resulted in conflicts with the manufacturers 
and local communities.
It is easy to overemphasise the failings in this saltpetre manufac-
turing system. Nevertheless, it worked well enough for decades, 
during times when the demand for gunpowder was constantly 
growing. However, more research should be done considering the 
actual logistics of gunpowder and the role of imported saltpetre in 
Gustavus Adolphus’s army.
Saltpetre works were usually established by waterways in tiny 
villages, most of them far away from towns. They were the first 
industrial ventures in otherwise deprived agrarian communities. 
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The making of saltpetre was in fact a complicated chemical pro-
cess that was different from all the other 16th- and 17th-century 
industries, which consisted mostly of processing wood or iron. 
Commoners might not have liked this prelude to industrialisa-
tion, and for them the making of saltpetre was just one of the 
never-ending burdens of the constant warfare. Nevertheless, salt-
petre connected Finnish peasants and craftsmen to the military 
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CHAPTER 6
The Supply Challenges of the Swedish 




The Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743 is arguably the most disas-
trous war in Swedish military history. The war was mainly moti-
vated by political reasons instead of military considerations. After 
the death of the Russian empress Anna in 1740, internal political 
strife in Russia offered an opportunity for the Swedish Realm to 
take advantage of the situation and try to restore the territories 
that had been lost in the Great Northern War (1700–1721). The 
Swedes decided to support the claimant to the throne, Princess 
Elizabeth, who was a daughter of Peter the Great. Their aim was, 
through a declaration of war, to help her into power and pres-
sure Russia to give up areas. This course of action was strongly 
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encouraged by France to prevent Russia taking part in the War 
of Austrian Succession (1740–1748). In addition to political sup-
port, France gave the Swedish Realm subsidies that were used to 
finance the war efforts.1
Although the Swedes declared war at the end of July 1741, the 
Russians crossed the border first. In August, the Swedish army lost 
the battle of Lappeenranta and one of its two frontier fortresses to 
Russians. The battle was a significant but not decisive defeat, and 
the Russians retreated afterwards. The Swedes, however, could not 
make a counterattack during the following months. It was only in 
November that relatively few Swedish troops (6,450 men) crossed 
the border near Säkkijärvi. This was a late season for an offensive 
operation, and the army could not achieve much before it had to 
stop due to the muddy roads and maintenance problems. Never-
theless, the pressure helped Elizabeth to carry out a coup d’état 
in Saint Petersburg. When the new empress offered a truce, the 
Swedish high command agreed to it without any guarantees of 
later concessions.
Russia broke the truce in the following year, and the Swedish 
army retreated continuously until it had to surrender in Helsinki 
on 24 August 1742. In the aftermath, the Russians conquered the 
whole of Finland and occupied it until the Treaty of Turku (1743). 
The Swedish Realm had aimed to reconquer territories, but in the 
end it had to cede more land to Russia (see Figure 6.1).2
The reasons for the outcome of the war have acquired surpris-
ingly little attention in Swedish or Finnish academic research. 
The most complete studies, based on archival materials, are from the 
19th century.3 Contemporaries blamed the disaster on an incom-
petent war leadership, and many later scholars have adopted the 
same view. In addition, Swedish politicians and government have 
been blamed for irresponsible gambling and risk-taking with 
 1 Jägerskiöld 1957, pp. 137–145; Winton 2018, pp. 230, 235–236, 240.
 2 Cederberg 1942, pp. 304–316; Alanen 1963, pp. 232–235, 238–239, 
248–257, 276–277.
 3 Tengberg 1857–1860; Lindeqvist 1889; Malmström 1897.
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the war. However, many scholars have also noted recurring supply 
problems that affected both the army and the navy. For example, 
there are reports that the crown had to give unground grain to the 
soldiers instead of bread. This is a clear indication that something 
was critically wrong in the supply system of the Swedish army.4
In the early modern period, bread constituted the most impor-
tant part of the diet of soldiers. Because armies had thousands 
of mouths to feed, it took a great effort to continuously arrange 
enough bread for everyone. Large quantities of readily avail-
able bread were uncommon in towns or the countryside. There-
fore, bread had to be specifically manufactured for the military 
needs. For a sizeable army, this was a large-scale operation, which 
required numerous mills and bakeries. When bread was ready, it 
 4 Juvelius 1919, pp. 206–207; Cederberg 1942, pp. 299–301, 312; 
Alanen 1963, pp. 221–226, 237–239, 250–252; Nikula 2011, p. 186; 
Kaukiainen 2012, pp. 301–305.
Figure 6.1: Swedish territorial losses in the Russo-Swedish War of 
1741–1743, and the placenames mentioned in the chapter. 
Source: Map drawn by Petri Talvitie.
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had to be transported to the location where soldiers were staying. 
This was a difficult task. Land transportation was slow and inef-
ficient, while sea transportation was hazardous and depended on 
sailing season.5
In this chapter, I analyse how the Swedish Realm organised the 
manufacturing of bread and transport for the army during the war 
preparations and early part of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743. 
The study examines some of the main supply problems the Swedish 
military leadership had to face and the reasons why these difficul-
ties existed. The manufacturing of bread and organising transport 
involved both officials of the crown and civilians. These challenging 
undertakings required wide cooperation between different groups 
of people. Therefore, the chapter will also deal with the essential 
role of the civilians in the supply organisation of the army.
Earlier research has already demonstrated how difficult it was 
to provide food supplies for a large military force in Northern 
Europe. Jan Lindegren has described the numerous supply chal-
lenges Charles XII (Sw. Karl XII) had to overcome when the 
Swedes attacked Norway in 1718. Most of the supplies had to be 
transported from Sweden, contrary to the principle of utilising 
local resources, which was common in the early modern warfare.6 
Christer Kuvaja has shown that Russians also had to import a 
large amount of their supplies when they invaded and occupied 
Finland in 1713–1721.7 The Swedish army encountered the same 
challenges as Russians when fighting took place in Finland. Even at 
 5 Perjés 1970, pp. 5–11; Lynn 1993, pp. 19–21; Lynn 1997, p. 108; 
Hatakka 2019a, pp. 168, 203–215.
 6 Lindegren 1992, pp. 197–210; Van Creveld 1977, pp. 5–39. Van Creveld 
has argued that armies mainly gathered their supplies locally 
instead of transporting them from magazines. Lynn has criticized 
this argument and has stressed the importance of magazines in the 
early modern warfare. According to him, in addition to utilising 
the local resources, armies depended on magazines in general and 
not just in sieges or in other special conditions. See Lynn 1993, 
pp. 15–21.
 7 Kuvaja 1999, pp. 276–277.
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the time of the Finnish War (1808–1809) the Swedes had not fully 
resolved these problems, as can be seen from Martin Hårdstedt’s 
in-depth study of the supply conditions of the Swedish army 
during the war. In addition, both Lindegren and Hårdstedt have 
emphasised how important the baking of bread and the organis-
ing of transport were for the war efforts.8
These studies, however, have not fully taken into consideration 
the significance of crisis preparedness and war preparations in the 
northern geographical conditions. Research of the Russo-Swedish 
War of 1741–1743 gives ample examples of how vital these were 
for the fate of the whole war. This chapter will also highlight 
the supply challenges that existed generally whenever wars were 
fought in the northernmost part of Europe.
The first few months of the war, from August to December 1741, 
constituted the most critical part of it. It was during this period 
when the Swedes had an opportunity to take advantage of political 
turmoil inside Russia by staging a surprise attack. In the following 
year, Elizabeth had already secured the power to herself, and the 
Russians were prepared to conclude the war. I will therefore con-
centrate on these crucial first months of the war. The questions are 
why the Swedes could not take the initiative in the war, and how 
the supply problems can explain this inactivity.
Supply Situation at the Beginning of the War
Although the Swedish army suffered from serious supply problems 
during the war, the Swedish Realm was not entirely unprepared 
for it. In fact, the war had been planned for many years, ever since 
the Hat Party, who rallied for military aggression against Russia, 
had risen to power at the Diet of 1738–1739. For this Diet, General 
Axel Löwen, who was a commander-in-chief in Finland from 
1737 to 1739, made a comprehensive defence and attack plan.
 8 Lindegren 2000, pp. 41–58; Hårdstedt 2002, pp. 21–22, 126–130, 
139–146, 337–347.
182 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
In his plan, Löwen put a great emphasis on logistics. He argued 
that it was important to prepare for a war already during peace-
time. Experiences of the Great Northern War had shown that, 
when the conflict took place in Finland, the ability to supply forces 
was more important than actual fighting. The Swedish army had 
had serious supply problems even at that time. There had been not 
enough magazines or foodstuffs stored in them, and the crown 
could only have provided unground grain for soldiers. Löwen also 
stated that, when the inhabitants of Finland heard of hostilities, 
they fled to the forests, and there was nothing anyone could do to 
force them to support the military forces.9
Löwen suggested many improvements to the supply organisa-
tion to prevent the misfortunes of the Great Northern War hap-
pening again. In the late 1730s, the whole of Finland had only 
three crown storage magazines (in Hamina, Lappeenranta and 
Hämeenlinna) and one crown bakery (in Hamina). The situa-
tion was even worse regarding the grinding of grain because there 
were no crown mills. Löwen wanted to establish new magazines in 
Helsinki, Turku, Savonlinna and Ristiina. All these places should 
also have mills and bakeries nearby. Löwen also recognised 
that there had to be an efficient way to transport bread to the troops. 
Therefore, he recommended acquiring bread carts for the 
army. These carts were intended to constantly move back and 
forth between magazines and troops during a war.10
Löwen’s proposals were considered carefully at the Diet and 
they were mostly accepted in principle, but in practice the supply 
organisation did not change much before the war began in 1741. 
The Secret Committee of the Diet 1738–1739 argued that there 
were enough mills in Finland for the grinding of grain. Though 
this claim was later questioned by the Privy Council, new mills 
were neither built nor acquired. Regarding the baking of bread, the 
 9 Defence plan of Löwen, 3 April 1738 (published by Juva 1939, 
pp. 308–314).
 10 Löwen to the King, 1 December 1737 and Defence plan of Löwen, 
3 April 1738 (published by Juva 1939, pp. 200, 308–314).
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official aim was to establish as many bakeries as there were maga-
zines. However, in the end, only the magazine of Hämeenlinna 
got funding for a bakery.11 Hamina, Lappeenranta and Hämeen-
linna remained the only towns with permanent storage magazines 
(Sw. förråds magasin), although four additional magazines were 
established before the war began. Two of these, the storage mag-
azines of Turku and Savonlinna, were founded at the beginning 
of the year 1741. In addition to these, field magazines (Sw. fält 
magasin) were formed in Helsinki and Porvoo.12
In preparation for the right moment to declare war, 7,600 Swedish 
soldiers were transported across the Gulf of Bothnia in 1739. 
These troops had to be fed and supplied in Finland in the midst of 
a subsistence crisis, which was caused by poor harvests of 1739–
1741.13 For this reason, the magazines were under hard pressure 
long before the war began. The stores dwindled because thousands 
of soldiers needed grain, flour and bread, while peasants were 
given grain as loans.14 Table 6.1 shows how much grain (rye and 
barley), flour and bread was stockpiled in storage magazines 
and field magazines in April 1741, which is the last date when 
comprehensive storage calculations are available.
Table 6.1 reveals that none of the magazines in Finland had large 
storages, and that two of the most important ones, in Hamina and 
Lappeenranta, were almost empty. They were situated nearest 
the border, and therefore military operations were dependent 
on them during wartime. Some grain had been bought in Turku, 
but it was not enough for the needs of a large military force. In 
addition, this grain had still to be ground into flour and baked 
into bread, which took a lot of time. Baking had already begun in 
 11 Juvelius 1919, p. 164.
 12 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, Calcula-
tions of stores in the crown magazines in Finland 1739–1741; 
Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to 
Supply Commission, 14 April 1741 (No. 304).
 13 Juvelius 1919, pp. 182–185, 206–207; Cederberg 1942, pp. 299–303.
 14 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, Calcula-
tions of stores in the crown magazines in Finland 1739–1741.
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Porvoo, Helsinki and Hamina, where altogether 86,000 lispund of 
dried bread was ready and stored. Provision regulation (Sw. fält 
stat) stipulated that one soldier was entitled to have 2.25 lispund 
(19.1  kg) bread in a month. According to this regulation, the 
gathered amount of bread was enough to feed 10,000 soldiers for 
roughly four months.15
Thus, the supply situation looked bleak just four months before 
the declaration of war. Thousands of soldiers already commanded 
 15 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, Prop-
osition for a month’s provision to infantry regiment according to 
regulation (fält stat) of 1740.
Table 6.1: Rye, barley, flour, and bread in storage and field magazines in 
April 1741.








Hamina 83 10 576 8,167
Lappeenranta 13 1,889 — 92
Hämeenlinna 464 158 5,484 —
Turku 4,060 70 — —
Savonlinna 135 — — —
Helsinki — — — 22,616
Porvoo — — — 55,470
Total 4,755 2,127 6,060 86,345
1 barrel = 146,5 litres; 1 lispund = 8.5 kg
a Some of the flour was informed in barrels. These have been converted 
to weight measurements (1 barrel = 12 lispund). On conversion ratio, 
see Hatakka 2019a, 306.
b When a barrel of grain was baked into bread, one could usually get 
11 lispund dried bread, although the exact amount varied. Hatakka 
2019a, 307.
Sources: Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, 
Calculations of stores in the crown magazines in Finland 1739–1741; 
Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply 
Commission 14.4.1741 (No. 304). Table by the author.
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in Finland needed a continuous supply of food throughout the 
summer of 1741. More bread was needed but it was not an easy 
task to acquire it in the conditions that were prevalent in early 
modern Finland.
Possibilities of Grinding Grain and  
Baking Bread in Finland
The large-scale manufacturing of bread was always a challenging 
and laborious undertaking in the early modern period. Most of 
the available mills were small and inefficient, and thus their capac-
ity was limited. Armies had often difficulties finding enough mills 
for military needs from the area where they operated. For this 
reason, G. Perjés has argued that, under normal circumstances, 
an army could get a satisfactory amount of flour only if it had 
been manufactured beforehand and stored in magazines. Other 
options to obtain flour were either to establish mills in the vicinity 
of the magazines or to form magazines in places with high- 
capacity mills.
The baking of bread was equally challenging task. For the 
requirements of a large army, baking was only possible if there 
were enough ovens available. It took hundreds of bricks to build 
one oven and the total material requirements could rise to tens of 
thousands of bricks. Once the bricks and other building materials 
were ready, they had to be transported to the construction sites. 
Finally, the bakeries also had to be built.16
These challenges concerning grinding and baking were not 
only similar in Finland but also more pronounced than in many 
other places. Mills needed water, wind, animals or men as a 
power source. Watermills were the most efficient ones, but they 
could only be built in suitable places along rivers. The problem in 
Finland, however, was that most of the rivers were small, and the 
majority of the mills could only operate during spring or autumn. 
During summers most of the rivers did not have enough water, 
 16 Perjés 1970, pp. 7–10.
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and during winters rivers were frozen. Only a few mills could 
operate throughout the year.
Finnish mills were also rather simple and outdated. They rarely 
had more than one or two pairs of millstones, and these stones 
were without furrows. Furrows, which helped the grinding of 
grains, were already common in Sweden but not in Finland, where 
they were not regarded as vital as in the western part of the realm. 
In Finland, grain was practically always dried in a building called 
riihi, and this made it much easier to grind than moist grain. 
Even older types of millstones could handle dried grain relatively 
well. For example, the mills of Vanhakaupunki near the town of 
Helsinki and Forsby in Pernaja could grind 30 barrels (4,400  l) 
of dried rye but only 6 barrels (880 l) of undried grain per day.17
The inefficiency of Finnish mills was not the only problem that 
affected grinding. Most of the mills were scattered across the 
countryside and located in places where they were impractical to 
use for military purposes. Land transport was particularly bur-
densome because of long distances, bad or non-existent roads, 
and scarcity of horses and carriages. The best mills were therefore 
the ones that were accessible by waterways. In theory, this was an 
advantage in Finland, the land of a thousand lakes, but in practice 
most of the large lakes could not be utilised for the transportation 
that supplying of armies required.
Wars were mainly fought in southern Finland because it was the 
most populated part of the land. However, the Finnish lake dis-
trict is situated inland, geographically separated from the south-
ern coastal area by the Salpausselkä ridges (see Figure 6.1). In 
addition, the southern rivers were not only small but full of rap-
ids, which largely prevented any meaningful transport of goods. 
Along the coast there were only a few mills accessible by ships, 
and because they were in private ownership and locally impor-
tant, the crown could not use them freely. For these reasons, mili-
tary provisioning was dependent on many small mills in a wide 
 17 Hatakka 2019a, pp. 178–179; Hatakka 2019b, pp. 21–23. Regarding 
the difficulties of grinding moist grain, see also Kaplan 1984, p. 50.
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coastal area reaching all the way from Turku to Hamina.18 Utilis-
ing these mills required a lot of ships and workforce. Because these 
were difficult to obtain during the war in 1741, the crown had to 
settle for using only the mills closest to the magazines.19
Baking was easier to manage than grinding because bakeries 
did not require specific places to operate, unlike mills. Baking, 
however, demanded different kinds of resources: ovens and pro-
ficient bakers. At the beginning of the war the crown bakery of 
Hamina had only six small ovens, three of which were reserved 
for the needs of the garrison. The remaining three ovens could 
only handle 60–70 barrels (8,800 l–10,300 l) of flour per month. 
This amount of flour produced around 700 lispund (6,000 kg) of 
dried bread. According to the provision regulation of 1740, this 
bread would have been enough for the rations of 300 soldiers for a 
month. Clearly, an army could not rely on the production capac-
ity of the small bakery of Hamina.20 To supplement the capacity 
of this bakery, the crown had to utilise the baking obligation of 
burghers and peasants.
In many parts of Europe, bread for armies was baked in towns 
because they had proficient bakers and better means to bake bread 
than in the countryside. Also, the Swedish Realm had a long tra-
dition of utilising the civilian population in baking. For example, 
during the Great Northern War, the bakers of Stockholm and 
Tallinn manufactured large amounts of bread for the Swed-
ish army.21 However, in Finland, baking in towns was inevitably 
small-scale because the towns were so modest. The population of 
Helsinki was only 1,500 in the middle of the 18th century. The 
 18 Hatakka 2019a, pp. 175–180, 207–208.
 19 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 1 October 
1741 (No. 389).
 20 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission, 19 May 
1741 (No. 310). Conversion ratio (flour to bread) is presented in 
Hatakka 2019a, p. 307.
 21 Korkiakangas 1974, pp. 176–182.
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number of burghers was 100–150 and there was only one baker. 
Still, even with such a small population, Helsinki was one of the 
larger towns in Finland. Burghers confronted many difficulties 
when they tried to fill their baking quotas. Some of them did not 
have the means to transport grain to mills; others did not have 
ovens suitable for baking. In addition, most of the ovens were so 
small that they could only produce a small amount of bread.22
For the above-mentioned reasons, most of the bread had to be 
baked in the countryside. In a land with a low population density, 
this practice was expensive for the crown and cumbersome for the 
peasants, who had to transport grain, flour and bread long dis-
tances between magazines, mills and their homes. Because of the 
sparse population, many of the peasants lived far away from 
the towns and the magazines, and thus decentralised baking 
required a wide area.23 The officials of the crown had to overcome 
these problems concerning grinding and baking if they wanted to 
succeed in provisioning an army.
Attempts to Build Bakeries in Finland
The lack of mills and bakeries in Finland was not immediately 
evident for the officials who had been assigned to take care of the 
war preparations. In March 1741, a commission was established 
in Stockholm to manage war expenditures and to ensure that mili-
tary forces in Finland got enough supplies.24 This Supply Com-
mission (Sw. Utrdeningskommissionen) also supervised, together 
 22 Hatakka 2019a, 50, pp. 170–171. On the number of burghers in 
Helsinki, see Granqvist 2016, p. 257.
 23 Hatakka 2019a, pp. 171–174. 
 24 Winton 2018, p. 236. Winton has translated Utredningskommis-
sionen to procurement commission, which describes the Commis-
sion’s main task well: acquiring supplies for the army. However, in the 
context of this study the term Supply Commission is better because, 
in addition to procurement, the Commission was also involved 
with other matters concerning military supply, which included, for 
example, building bakeries.
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with the commander-in-chief, the work of the War Commissariat, 
which governed the supply organisation locally in Finland. If nec-
essary, the Supply Commission had power to command the War 
Commissariat to take action.25
The War Commissariat was led by Commissary General 
(Sw. generalkrigskommissarie) Fabian Wrede. When he was 
appointed to this position in April 1741, the Supply Commission 
asked his thoughts about the situation of mills and bakeries in 
Finland. At that time, Wrede was still residing in Stockholm, and he 
could only give vague answers. He told the Commission that there 
were around 20 pairs of millstones on the coast of the province of 
Uusimaa. However, he did not know how many of them could be 
used for grinding. Wrede also presumed that there were crown bak-
eries available, but he could not give any further information about 
them.26 This was the level of the knowledge of the supply situation 
in Stockholm in spring 1741 when the war preparations began.
Soon it became clear that there were not enough mills or baker-
ies for the army. The lack of bakeries in particular was a severe 
problem that was hard to solve during the coming summer 
and autumn.
Although the war began at the end of July 1741, the commander-
in-chief, General Charles Emil Lewenhaupt, arrived in Finland 
as late as September. While he was in Stockholm, the supreme 
command was entrusted to General Henrik Magnus von Bud-
denbrock.27 Von Buddenbrock was also the Supply Commission’s 
main contact in Finland before Wrede arrived from Sweden and 
got his instructions.
In May, von Buddenbrock informed Stockholm that, in addition 
to Hamina, the best places to establish bakeries were Helsinki, 
 25 See, for example, Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, 
Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Com-
mission, 12 April 1741 (No. 302), and 7 September 1741 (No. 377).
 26 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 12 April 1741 
(No. 302).
 27 Cederberg 1942, pp. 297–299.
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Turku and Porvoo. However, nothing had yet been done to begin 
building these bakeries because there were neither bricks nor 
other building materials available. Only the construction work of 
the bakery of Hämeenlinna had been started, but the same lack 
of bricks had prevented finishing it. Furthermore, this bakery was 
less useful for the war efforts since it was located deep inland, on 
the other side of the Salpausselkä ridges, and all supplies from 
there had to be transported by road. All other proposed places 
were accessible by ships.28
The Supply Commission was eager to get the planned baker-
ies built as soon as possible and tried to pressure the War Com-
missariat to finish them, but the obstacles caused by the lack of 
building materials were hard to surpass. Acquiring bricks and 
lime were the first problems that were tackled. Wrede wrote to the 
Supply Commission that enough bricks could be acquired only if 
they were brought from Sweden. Hence, the Commission tried to 
help the Commissariat by arranging for both bricks and lime to be 
brought from Stockholm to Finland.
The War Commissariat also tried to obtain bricks locally from 
Finland, but it was not an easy task. The best situation was in 
Hämeenlinna, where von Buddenbrock had himself founded 
a brickworks to ease the construction work. According to him, 
it was the only way to finish the bakery during the autumn. In 
other places, the lack of bricks continued throughout the sum-
mer. Finally, at the end of August, the Commissariat could inform 
Stockholm that it had been able to secure with great effort 100,000 
bricks and 100 läst (245,000 kg) lime.29
 28 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission, 19 May 
1741 (No. 310 and 311) and 26 May 1741 (No. 312).
 29 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 9 June 1741 
(No. 319), 14 July 1741 (No. 347), 21 July 1741 (No. 409), 24 August 
1741 (No. 419), and 27 August 1741 (No. 422), Buddenbrock to 
Supply Commission, 20 August 1741 (No. 366), and 31 August 1741 
(No. 368). 
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Another problem was the shortage of workers for the construc-
tion sites. In an ordinary situation, the crown would have used 
soldiers as workforce. However, after the war was declared in July, 
nearly every soldier had been commanded to the front. Remain-
ing soldiers had their hands full with other duties. For example, in 
Helsinki there were so few soldiers available that even unloading 
the arriving provision ships was difficult. The Supply Commission 
also tried to solve this problem by sending workers from 
Stockholm. In addition, it sent designs for the bakery buildings.30
Despite all these efforts, the bakeries could not be built during 
the autumn 1741. The crucial problem was lack of timber, as 
unbelievable as it may sound in Finland, a land covered mostly 
by pristine forests. The War Commissariat already suspected in 
July that bakeries could not be built during the rest of the year 
because timber could not be acquired before wintertime. When 
autumn came and the war had begun, the peasants were over-
burdened with harvests, autumn sowing and military transport. 
They had no time to fell trees and transport logs to the building 
sites. Moreover, transporting goods overland was much easier in 
Finland during winter, when it was possible to use sleighs, and 
therefore most of the heavy transport in Finland was carried out 
during snowy winter months when ice-covered lakes and rivers 
could be used as winter roads.31
There were also other challenges regarding the availability 
of timber. Wrede tried to explain these in detail to the Supply 
Commission in late August. The bakery buildings needed special 
timber, e.g. for sleepers, that had to be ordered one year in advance. 
 30 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission, 20 
August 1741 (No. 366), Wrede to Supply Commission, 24 August 
1741 (No. 419), 27 August 1741 (No. 422), and 21 September 1741 
(No. 383).
 31 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 14 July 1741 
(No. 347), 24 August 1741 (No. 419), 31 August 1741 (No. 367), 
7 September 1741 (No. 377), and 21 September 1741 (No. 383). For 
the challenges of transports by road, see Hatakka 2019a, pp. 203–208.
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These large timbers could only be transported when the roads 
were fit for sleighing. The bottom boards also had to be ordered in 
advance because none of the nearby sawmills manufactured them. 
Even ordinary timber had to be acquired beforehand since felling 
trees and hewing timber were time-consuming work.32
The Supply Commission was noticeably beginning to lose 
patience with the War Commissariat. It did not believe the excuses 
given and doubted that it was impossible to find suitable timber 
for the bakeries.33 The Commissariat defended itself by putting 
the blame on former officials who had not purchased timber when 
there was still time.34
When it was clear that new bakeries were badly delayed, the 
War Commissariat had no other option than to oblige peasants 
and burghers to bake bread for the crown. The baking was con-
centrated in houses that had suitable ovens for the task. To help 
with the baking efforts, the Commissariat requested that two 
master bakers should be sent to Helsinki and Porvoo. Conse-
quently, the bakery of Hamina remained the only crown bakery in 
Finland during the early part of the Russo-Swedish War, although 
its ovens were considered inapt for large-scale baking. In an effort 
to increase its productivity, two new ovens were built in the old 
bakery building. Their construction began as soon as masons had 
arrived from Stockholm, which happened on 28 September, but 
they were not finished before late October. The existing stores of 
bread had to be preserved as long as possible.35
 32 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 27 August 
1741 (No. 422).
 33 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741 II, 
Minutes, 4 September 1741 (pp. 1084–1087).
 34 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 3 September 
1741 (No. 373).
 35 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 21 July 1741 
(No. 409), 24 August 1741 (No. 419), 3 September 1741 (No. 373), 
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Hence, the deficiency of bread production was one of the main 
reasons why soldiers were given unground grain instead of bread 
whenever feasible. This procedure was problematic because, even 
if soldiers could grind their grain with hand mills, they had still 
difficulties with baking.36
Acquiring Flour and Bread from Sweden
The Supply Commission was worried about production of bread 
even before it became evident that the building of new bakeries 
had failed. In a meeting in August, the members of the Commis-
sion acknowledged that required bread could not be obtained from 
Finland. To overcome the problem, the Commission decided to 
transport flour and bread from Sweden, but there was only limited 
time for this. When the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland 
froze, no ship could arrive in Finnish harbours. During the win-
ter, troops in Finland had to survive without help from outside.
The grinding and baking took place in Stockholm, Norrköping, 
Nyköping and Östanå (mills of Loo). Altogether, the storage mag-
azine of Stockholm delivered 22,800 barrels (3.3 million litres) of 
rye for grinding and baking during the year 1741. Additional grain 
was obtained from the magazines of Norrköping and Nyköping. 
The produced and bought amount of flour and bread is shown 
in Table 6.2.37
Table 6.2 reveals that nearly 190,000 lispund (1.6 million kilo-
grams) of bread was manufactured in Stockholm. Practically all 
the flour acquired from there was used for baking. This achieve-
ment was only possible because of the combined efforts of the 
baker’s guild and the crown bakery of Stockholm. The bakers of 
21 September 1741 (No. 383), 28 September 1741 (No. 386), and 
15 October 1741 (No. 405).
 36 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 24 August 
1741 (No. 419) and 31 August 1741 (No. 371).
 37 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741 II, Minu-
tes, 12 August 1741 (pp. 352–359). See also the sources of Table 6.2.
194 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
the city took rye from the storage magazine, ground it to flour, and 
baked it to bread. When the baking took place in the crown bakery, 
the grinding of grain had to be organised first. The crown gave 
this task to those burghers of Stockholm who owned watermills. 
In addition to production of rye flour, barley was ground to 
hulled barley.38
In Nyköping and Norrköping, contrary to the plan of the 
Supply Commission, no bread was produced in 1741. The rea-
son for this was probably lack of time. Grain was shipped from 
Stockholm to these towns in August and September, which allowed 
little time for both grinding and baking. Even in Stockholm, 
due to the shortage of time, not all bread was ready at the end of 
the year. Nearly 38,000 lispund of the total amount was still to 
be delivered back to the magazine.39 Nevertheless, the amount of 
readily available bread, roughly 150,000 lispund, was so sizeable 
that it would have sufficed for almost seven months for 10,000 
soldiers or for over three months for 20,000 soldiers. This meant 
that there was bread for the army, but the problem was that it was 
 38 Sources of Table 6.2.
 39 Sources of Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Flour and bread acquired from Stockholm, Norrköping, 







Stockholm 207,053 12,540 189,646
Norrköping 40,777 — —
Nyköping 23,428 — —
Östanå (mills of Loo) 10,824a — —
a This is an estimate because there are no accounts from mills of Loo. It is 
based on the knowledge of amount of used grain (902 barrels) and an 
approximate conversion ratio (1 rye barrel = 12 lispund flour).
Sources: Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, 
Accounts from the magazines of Nyköping, Stockholm and Norr-
köping. Table by the author.
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not in the right place. Bread had to be still transported to Finland 
before it was any use for the soldiers.
Transport of Grain, Flour and Bread to Finland
According to General Buddenbrock and the War Commissariat, 
the only locations in Finland where supply transport could be 
received were Helsinki, Porvoo and Hamina. After the supplies 
were unloaded from ships in these towns, they could be trans-
ported overland wherever soldiers needed them. The crown’s 
intention was to avoid as far as possible this transport by road. 
Land transport was not only difficult but also expensive, for peas-
ants were paid eight silver öre for a mile as a transport fee. Hamina 
was, therefore, the best place to unload the supplies during war-
time because it was situated nearest the border. One of the main 
reasons that transport had to be also directed to other towns was 
that there were not enough storerooms in Hamina.40
As favourable as the sea transport was, it also had specific prob-
lems. Ships could be destroyed by storms, and warm weather could 
damage cargos during summer. For example, the crown lost nearly 
two thousand barrels of rye because of a shipwreck in summer 
1741. In time of war there was also a possibility that the enemy 
could intercept transports. In that regard, it was safest to use sea 
routes that passed through the widespread archipelago of south-
ern coast of Finland. However, it was not the easiest route because 
many areas in the archipelago were too shallow for sailing.
When ships arrived in harbours, they had to be unloaded, which 
required numerous longshoremen or soldiers as a labour force. 
This especially related to Hamina, where ships could not come to 
the quay with full cargo. Supplies had to be unloaded from ships 
 40 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission 12 May 
1741 (No. 308), 19 May 1741 (No. 310), 31 August 1741 (No. 370), 
Wrede to Supply Commission, 6 July 1741 (No. 342) and 21 September 
1741 (No. 384).
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to small boats off the coast and only then transported to the town. 
The War Commissariat complained that it had neither boats nor 
workers for this purpose.41
The first ships that brought supplies for the army came from 
Wismar and Stralsund, which were the last major possessions of 
the Swedish Realm in northern Germany. These transports were 
already organised in April, and the ships arrived in Finland from 
May to June, bringing thousands of barrels of rye and barley with 
them. Some supplies were also brought from Karlskrona.42 More 
transports followed in summer, but they intensified only in July, as 
can be seen from Table 6.3. Rye and bread were transported from 
Stockholm, while flour came from Nyköping.
During autumn, shipped supplies constituted increasingly of 
flour and bread, but the amount of grain also stayed high. Rye 
and barley were the most important types of cereals for the needs 
of the army. Rye was baked to dried rye bread, whereas barley 
was mainly intended to be ground to hulled barley. In addition 
to these two cereals, mixed grain (5,097 barrels), hulled barley 
(1,543 barrels) and oats (7,341 barrels) were also transported from 
Sweden to Finland. Oats were primarily needed for horses. Most 
of the rye was destined to Turku, while flour and bread were 
brought to Helsinki, Porvoo and Hamina.43
Table 6.3 reveals that the crown could only import to Finland 
approximately half of the bread that was produced in Sweden in 
 41 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande 
handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission 31 
August 1741 (No. 370), Wrede to Supply Commission, 31 August 
1741 (No. 371), 14 September 1741 (No. 380), and 28 September 
1741 (No. 386). Of the difficulties of sea transport, see also Hatakka 
2019a, pp. 212–215, 230–231.
 42 Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkom-
mande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission 
14 April 1741 (No. 303), 24 April 1741 (No. 305), and 26 May 1741 
(No. 312), Wrede to Supply Commission, 9 June 1741 (No. 317) and 
16 June 1741 (No. 329).
 43 Sources of Table 6.3.
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1741. The reason for this was that there was no time to ship more 
bread before winter and frozen sea made it impossible to continue 
transports. In Table 6.3, lack of time is implied by the fact that last 
ships filled with bread arrived in Finland as late as November. As 
mentioned in the last section, not all the bread baked in Sweden 
was ready at the end of the year. Baking was still going on when 
the last ships sailed to Finland.
If the total amount of transported grain is compared with the 
total amount of transported flour and bread, one can see that grain 
was prevalent. In modern weight measurement, 36,000 barrels of 
grain equals 4,900,000 kg and 161,000 lispund of flour and bread 
equals 1,370,000 kg.44 This indicates that, although Finland had 
serious problems with milling and baking, the officials failed to 
bring enough flour and bread to the army. This was especially true 
in the early part of the war, when grinding and baking had not 
 44 Barrels can be converted to weight measurement, when we know 
that 1 lästi (2,450 kg) is 18 barrels of grain. Hatakka 2019a, p. 306.
Table 6.3: Transport of rye, barley, flour and bread from Stockholm, 
Norrköping and Nyköping to Finland in 1741 (from May to December).








May — 3,593 — —
June 400 1,610 4,046 —
July 7,658 — 4,176 40,123
August 6,809 — — 1,216
September 5,670 509 26,430 17,812
October 5,271 4,231 26,717 16,386
November — 392 — 24,038
Total 25,808 10,335 61,369 99,575
Sources: Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, 
Accounts from the magazines of Nyköping, Stockholm and Norrköping. 
Table by the author.
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yet begun in large scale in Sweden, and when ships were mostly 
loaded with grain.
Conclusions
Sweden began war against Russia under problematic circum-
stances in 1741. The logistical situation was difficult because of 
the poor harvests and the supply needs of thousands of soldiers 
who were stationed in Finland years before the declaration of war. 
Stores of grain, gathered in preceding years, were mostly used by 
the time the hostilities began.
Even if there had been larger stores of grain available, it would 
have been challenging to use them. There were only a few mills situ-
ated in such places where large-scale and efficient grinding of grain 
was possible. Baking was likewise challenging. Hamina was the only 
place with a real bakery, but it was both small and inefficient. There-
fore, if the crown needed a large amount of bread, it had no other 
option than to oblige peasants and burghers to bake it. This was not 
an optimal way to produce bread. Towns in Finland were small, and 
the countryside was sparsely populated. Developing centralised 
baking would have been better choice, but it was not an easy task to 
establish new bakeries because it took time and resources.
The officials of the crown did not realise all these difficulties until 
it was too late. After the declaration of war, the Supply Commis-
sion in Stockholm did everything it could to improve the supply 
situation. When the War Commissariat in Finland complained 
about the difficulties of building bakeries, the Commission 
arranged bricks, lime, workers, and designs for the bakeries. How-
ever, this was not enough because suitable timber was not avail-
able at short notice. The Commission also organised production 
of bread in Sweden as soon as it realised that bakeries in Finland 
would not be ready anytime soon. Although grinding and baking 
was easier in the Swedish part of the realm, it nonetheless took 
time to produce large amounts of bread. At the end of the year, the 
baking operation was still unfinished, and the supply transports to 
Finnish harbours had to be stopped because of the coming win-
ter. The attempts of the Swedish officials to produce bread can be, 
therefore, described as a fight against time.
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Time is an essential factor to be considered in the context of the 
Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743. The Swedes began the war with 
high hopes of gaining advantage by attacking Russia in a moment 
when it was crippled by internal political strife. This required res-
olute and quick action to pressure Russia into concessions and 
ceding areas. But the reality was quite different from what had 
been planned. Instead of attacking, the Swedes tried to figure out 
how to supply the troops required for the offensive. During the 
valuable first months of the war, the officials and the military lead-
ership were occupied with getting building materials for baker-
ies, arranging baking in Sweden, and hurrying with the transports 
before winter isolated Finland. The war was more about efforts of 
supplying troops in time than it was about fighting the Russians.
Although the Supply Commission and the War Commissariat 
were active and did as much as they could, it did not change the 
fact that a period of a few autumn months was a short time to 
correct all the neglect of the previous years. For this reason, the 
failure in war preparations was one of the main reasons why 
the Swedish army was in such a trouble in the early part of the 
war. The politicians and military leadership clearly underesti-
mated all the difficulties that were caused by the sparse population 
and the cold northern climate of Finland.
After the war, in an attempt to strengthen the defence of 
Finland, the Swedish Realm implemented many of the reforms 
General Axel Löwen had already suggested in the early 18th cen-
tury. In the late 1740s and 1750s the crown established new maga-
zines, bakeries and mills on the southern coast of Finland in the 
towns of Helsinki and Loviisa. These towns were also fortified by 
building the sea fortresses of Sveaborg and Svartholma, so that 
they could offer secure bases for both the army and the navy and 
all their supplies. Politicians and officials frequently referred to 
experiences and lessons of the past war when they realised these 
plans and organised the provisioning of the thousands of soldiers 
who built the fortresses.45
 45 Hatakka 2015, pp. 95–110; Hatakka 2019, pp. 42, 71–72, 143, 246–
247, 290.
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In addition to baking, milling and transportation, there were 
also many other supply challenges that the Swedes had to over-
come in the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743. Thus, the question 
remains why the upcoming difficulties were not grasped in time. 
As it stands, further studies are needed to understand the path to 
the supply disaster of the Swedish army during the war.
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CHAPTER 7
Maintenance of Armies and Its Impact  




Gracious Count – these freeholders, liable to taxation, from the 
village of Hyvinkää, in the parish of Loppi, situated in Häme – 
are complaining about their misery and poverty, escalated by the 
proximity of a public road, as the other villages are far, and they 
are heavily burdened by the troops of His Royal Majesty; in addi-
tion, during the latest years, much fields, cattle, corn and other 
property has been taken away from them, to settle their overdue 
payments to the Crown, so that they can’t afford to pay their taxes, 
unless they get some relief. – Thus, they present their petition in 
the hope that you would see and hear their distress and poverty, – 
May God Almighty reward you; and this I confirm with my seal.1
 1 Original in Swedish: ‘– thesse skattskyldige – bönder aff Hyffingeby 
Loppis Sockn J Tauasthuss – Nådige Kreff til at beklaga theres Nödh 
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In 1585, the freeholders of the village of Hyvinkää, situated in 
the southern inland of Finland, were appealing to Count Axel 
Leijonhufvud, governor of the area, to get help in their economic 
distress. As the heaviest burden, they mentioned the proximity of 
the main road between the coastal town of Helsinki and the Häme 
Castle. At the moment that the testimony was written, the Swedish 
Realm was enjoying the fragile truce after a period of warfare with 
Russia (1570–1583), a truce that was constantly tested by guerilla 
warfare and escalated into open war again in 1590–1595.
The tax rolls of the area report of regular visits of troops on their 
way between the coast and the inland castle, as well as of the dire 
situation of the rural population. Moreover, the situation was not 
getting much better over the following decades or centuries. It was 
seldom that the population of inland in southern Finland wit-
nessed any direct military action; nevertheless, the maintenance 
of armies and contributions to the economics of war took their 
toll on rural communities.2
In this chapter, I study how the changes on warfare and mainte-
nance arrangements changed the conditions of rural inhabitants 
in southern Finland between c.1550 and 1750. Based on my long-
term research on some villages and communities, I give a case 
armod och fatigdom som på them ligger, effter tje ähre liggandes 
vppå stora almmänn: wäghen, och andra byar ähr fierenn iffrå them, 
och ähre ther mz swårliga betunga… geno: K: M:tz Krigsfolzh, 
Thesliges ähr och tagit iffrå them j thesse framledne åhr både åker 
båskap spa:mål och alt annat huad ägha kunde för gamble gelder och 
restantier i så at the icke kunna förestå Cronones skatt och rettihgz, 
om the bekommer icke aff edhers nodh noghon hielp – För then skill 
ähr [sin?] ganska ödmiukelige bön til edhers nodh ar J welen werdigas 
see och höra theres nödh och armod, – edher Lönn tagand:s aff then 
alzmectihge gud, till yttermere wisso att så sanningen ähr vnd: mitt 
Signet’ Testimony of the Chapelain of the Nurmijärvi parish, Henrik 
Göransson, Nurmijärvi 1 November 1585 (erroneusly ‘Joosefinpoika’, 
Josefsson, in Tommila I, p. 159). National Archives of Finland, Voudintilit 
[Bailiff ’s Records] KA 4239, f. 69.
 2 Lahtinen 2017, pp. 22–23.
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study of the impact of war on rural life and economics.3 These 
villages were called Hyvinkää or Hyvinkäänkylä and Kytäjärvi, 
situated on the border of the provinces of Uusimaa (Sw. Nyland) 
and Häme (Sw. Tavastland). Since the 1550s, they had been part 
of Nurmijärvi parish in Uusimaa, yet they belonged to the police 
district of Loppi in Häme until the year 1775.
Using tax records and census rolls, archives of the congregation, 
court records and private archives, I aim to make visible the long-
lasting effects of the various preparations for war, the supplies for 
war, and the crises brought by the warfare. First, I present the situ-
ation in the mid-16th century, when the burden of maintaining 
the armies mostly meant paying additional taxes or arranging 
temporary accommodation for troops. Second, I study the effects 
of conscriptions and other obligations typical of the 17th century, 
as well as the consequences of land grants. Finally, I discuss the 
impact and aftermath of the Great Northern War (1700–1721). 
The analysis ends in the mid-18th century and the recovery after 
the so-called Great Wrath (the Russian military occupation of 
Finland, 1713–1721) and Lesser Wrath (the Russo-Swedish War 
and period of occupation, 1741–1743).4
The population of the villages of Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi was 
only some hundred people; there were no churches in the villages, 
and they were administrated by the minister of the Nurmijärvi 
parish and the police district of Loppi. Even though the sampling 
is small, I see a long-term local study as a chance to discuss and 
illustrate the varying impact of warfare on the local level of very 
 3 The material for his article has been partly collected as a part of my 
project on the history of area of the present-day city of Hyvinkää, the 
main outcomes of which were published in Lahtinen 2017. See also 
cases studies published in Lahtinen 2018a and Lahtinen 2018b. Pre-
viously, history of the whole parish of Nurmijärvi has been best cov-
ered in Tommila I; Tommila II; and the history of Kytäjärvi in Lehto 
1989, which, despite lack of consequent annotation, is an important 
guide to many archives and sources. 
 4 About the general lines of history see, for example, Maude 1995 and 
Lavery 2006.
206 Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland
ordinary rural communities. I will pay attention to changes in the 
conditions of local farmers, in the role of nobility, cavalrymen, 
local soldier households, and deserters, as well as the troops pass-
ing through the rural villages. To give local events a broader con-
text, I will also relate my observations to previous Finnish and 
Swedish research on maintenance of armies.5
Arranging and (Mis)managing the  
Defence of the Realm, c.1550–1600
Looking at the 16th- and 17th-century tax rolls and census 
records, one can see evidence of harsh living conditions for rural 
communities in Finland. In addition to the effects of the so-called 
Little Ice Age, the period of cooling climate ranging from the 16th 
to the 19th century, the effective taxation system and the intensi-
fied warfare took their toll. The taxation was controlled more con-
sistently than earlier by the central administration of the crown, 
and the early Vasa period saw intensified warfare, conscriptions, and 
movements of troops.
Situated some 60 kilometres from the new coastal town of 
Helsinki, established in 1550, Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi with their 
surroundings were affected by the development of the town. King 
Gustav had high hopes that the merchants of Helsinki would chal-
lenge the trading power of the mighty city of Tallinn, situated on 
the coast of Old Livonia. In reality, Helsinki did not grow very 
influential trade-wise, although the war on the Livonian side gave it 
some momentum. Moreover, after the 1560s, Tallinn became part of 
the Swedish Realm, a turn that made Helsinki less important com-
mercially. Nevertheless, Helsinki now was an important halting- 
place for troops travelling between the coast and the Häme Castle, 
which had its effect on villages like Hyvinkää.6
 5 About related previous research, see, for example, Österberg 1971; 
Lindegren 1980; Kuvaja 1995; Aalto 2012.
 6 About the early phase of Helsinki, see Aalto 2012.
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In the mid-16th century, most of the farms were run by free-
holders (Sw. skattebonde), who had a perfect right to their landed 
property. The farm was to be inherited by their offspring, as long 
as they were able to pay the yearly taxes. However, as discussed by 
Petri Talvitie in this volume, if a freeholder could not pay taxes for 
several years, the farm was confiscated to the crown. Its farmer 
was now a farmer of the crown (Sw. kronobonde). At least in 
theory, a farmer of the crown could be turned out from the farm 
and the landed property transferred to someone else. In practice, 
however, it was not so common or beneficial to drive old farmers 
away, and many families continued to live in the same estate. Still, 
crown farms could easily be donated to nobility, or enfeoffed for 
a while to someone as compensation for a military contribution, 
for example.7
Looking at the tax rolls from the 1550s to the 1590s, a change for 
the worse can be seen. In the 1550s there were c.50 ‘bows’ or men 
over 15 years old settled in Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi. As a bow was a 
tax measure referring to a man old enough to participate in hunt-
ing as an archer, the total amount of inhabitants in the villages, 
women and children included, might have been around 140. Most 
of the inhabitants were freeholders, although some estates were in 
hands of nobility. The overall impression is that the farmers were 
relatively well-to-do.8
In the later part of the 16th century, the prospects grew darker as 
the Swedish Realm in general and the eastern provinces especially 
were drawn into lengthy and devastating operations and warfare 
against Russia.9 The neighbouring parishes nearer the coast were 
directly affected by attacks from Russian troops.10 For Hyvinkää 
and other villages on the side of the road, passing troops of the 
 7 Tommila II, pp. 30–32; Keskitalo 1964, pp. 88–90; Lahtinen 2017, p. 22.
 8 Estimated after Tommila I, pp. 100–102; Lahtinen 2017, pp. 22–23.
 9 Mäkinen 2002.
 10 About villages burnt by the enemies, see Uudenmaan hopeavero ja 
hopeaveroluettelo v. 1571, pp. CIII–CXXXIII; Kuisma 1990, pp. 82–83.
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king were the most considerable extra burden.11 Even the main-
tenance of bridges caused an extra burden that was resented.12 
There were some efforts to establish a couple of inns on the road 
between Helsinki and the Häme Castle; however, the local farm-
ers were most often those who had to maintain the troops. From 
the 1620s a denser network of inns is known, and at this point an 
inn was also registered in Hyvinkää. It was partly burdened by the 
obligation to serve the travellers, partly benefited because of its 
rights to prepare and sell spirits.13
The long war against Russia coincided with the crop failures 
of the 1580s.14 In the tax records, more and more estates had tax 
arrears or were marked ‘abandoned’ (Sw. öde). These ‘abandoned’ 
estates were not necessarily uninhabited but incapable of paying 
their taxes. In some cases, the neighbours took the task of paying 
the back taxes of the poorest farmers.15 It was in this situation that 
the freeholders of Hyvinkää resorted to Count Axel Leijonhufvud, 
asking for help as cited at the beginning of this chapter. Leijon-
hufvud gave an order that the payments of the villagers should be 
halved. However, the same persons who had been appealing to 
Leijonhufvud were even later mentioned in financial difficulties, 
or totally insolvent, ‘wretched by poverty’.16
 11 Tommila I, pp. 98–99, 157–165.
 12 Keskitalo 1964, p. 141.
 13 ‘Bolemännens och Fierdingmänners vnderholdh i Finlandh, hua-
rth fougderij för sigh, som bleff revocerat effter K M breff pro Anno 
1583…’ KB, Finska handlingar 1427–1700 II (1557–1583). Arw. 
Handl. X p. 199.
 14 Sirkiä 1999, p. 107; Vilkuna 1998, p. 194; KA, Voudintilit 3967, f. 48v. 
onwards.
 15 KB, Finska handlingar 1427–1700 III (1584–1592 [1604]), ‘Register 
aff Hattula häred pro an:o etc. 85, 86 och 87, Matts Simonssons 
restantie.’
 16 ‘är af fattigdom fördriffuen’ KB, Finska handlingar 1427–1700 III 
(1584–1592 [1604]), ‘Register aff Hattula häred pro an:o etc. 85, 86 
och 87, Matts Simonssons restantie’.
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Even though the petitions may have put emphasis on hardships 
to have the hoped-for result, the above-mentioned tax records 
support the impression of impoverishment. In one of the neigh-
bouring villages, Ridasjärvi, the number of ‘bows’ went down 
from 14 in 1539 to only one in 1600, while the number of cattle 
was halved.17 At the end of the 16th century, all the farmers in 
Ridasjärvi and the Arolammi village nearby had given up their 
freeholder position and become crown farmers.18 While Eva 
Österberg has observed only temporary stagnation caused by 
warfare on the south-west Swedish border in the 1560s19, in 
Finland the situation was more severe and one can hardly talk 
about any recovery.
During the same time period, Kytäjärvi farmers also lost their 
freeholder position and were transferred under the nobility. The 
nobility had received established privileges in 1569, and over 
the later part of the 16th century it took control over many new 
farms and estates, reducing the access of the taxable freeholders 
to natural resources. Many farms and villages were enfeoffed to 
become tenants of the nobility. While in Hyvinkää the change was 
slower and only some estates were transferred to the nobility, all 
the farmers of Kytäjärvi disappearred from the tax records by the 
1580s. Two smaller groups of farms were turned to tenants, and 
the third one, Niemi (Fin. for cape), became a manor called Näs 
(Sw. for cape).20 From the late 16th century to the mid-18th 
century, Näs was mostly another distant little estate for its owners, 
the Tott and then the Fleming families, who had their residences 
in more central areas of the realm.21
While the taxation and direct obligation to maintain troops 
were the most keenly felt effects of the intensifying warfare, there 
 17 Keskitalo 1964, pp. 59, 126–129.
 18 KB, Finska handlingar 1427–1700 III (1584–1592 [1604]), ‘Register 
aff Hattula häred pro an:o etc. 85, 86 och 87, Matts Simonssons 
restantie’; Keskitalo 1964, p. 61.
 19 Österberg 1971, pp. 255–269.
 20 Lahtinen 2017, p. 27; Lahtinen 2018b.
 21 Tommila I, p. 414; Tommila II, pp. 83–84.
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were even other consequences. The Russo-Swedish War of 1554–
1557, short though it was, had made King Gustav Vasa aware of 
the problems of supporting the troops. He had thus started new 
projects to arrange the maintenance and finance the warfare more 
effectively in the future. While studying the possibility of estab-
lishing a royal estate in the area, he became very interested in the 
prospects of starting a mine on the rocky hill called Hyvinkään-
vuori (nowadays Hopeavuori, Fin. for ‘Silver Mountain’). As 
Helsinki had newly been established on the coast, the plan was 
certainly to transport the findings of the mine via Helsinki. The 
first mining efforts waned after the mid-1550s, but were revived 
by King Gustavus Adolphus (Sw. Gustav II Adolf) in the 1610s and 
continued until the late 1620s. One of the reasons for Gustavus 
Adophus to restart mining was the need to pay the Älvsborg 
Ransom 1613, as well as to invest in warfare outside the immedi-
ate borders of the realm.22
The Toll of the Expansion of the  
Swedish Realm (1600–1700)
If the 16th century had seen the intensification of taxes and 
demands for temporary maintenance, the 17th century was 
marked with the shock of conscriptions. Although men had even 
been conscripted in the 16th century, the campaigns had been 
irregular.23 Under the lead of Gustavus Adolphus, the Swedish 
Realm entered a period of constant warfare, expansion of the 
Realm and recurrent conscriptions. Adult men were counted and 
classified to groups of 10, a so-called ruotu (Sw. rote). From this 
group of 10 men, one was to face compulsory recruitment to the 
 22 KA, Voudintilit 4432, f. 120r, Hollolan ja Hattulan voutikunnan 
tilikirja 1614; Tommila II, p. 149; Lahtinen 2017, pp. 28–33; an 
unpublished study on mining efforts in the early Vasa period by 
Mirkka Lappalainen.
 23 Tommila I, p. 161.
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war. Of the farmers under nobility, every twentieth man was to 
be conscripted.24
The shock impact on demography was clearly visible in the tax 
rolls and registers of population. In the 1570s, the estimated pop-
ulation in the Nurmijärvi parish had been c.830 inhabitants.25 
When the census registration was made for the first time in 1634 in 
its entirety, there were c.400 inhabitants over age 15. If the number 
of minors is estimated to be c.40% of the total of the population, 
Nurmijärvi now had c.660 inhabitants. This meant a significant 
decline in the parish as a whole. In Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi, the 
estimated population of adults was 42 and 59 respectively; chil-
dren included, the total population of the villages might have 
reached 160 inhabitants, not much more than in the 1550s. In 
several neighbouring villages in the province of Häme, the popu-
lation had all but collapsed.26
By the year 1634, active warfare had been going on for four 
years only, but already almost 70% of the strength of the then-
conscripted troops had been lost to illnesses and epidemics. There 
were many soldiers’ wives and widows distinctly mentioned, and 
the ratio of men and women was distorted. After heavy participa-
tion to the warfare, in the mid-17th century, almost two-thirds of 
the population were women.27 The picture is in many ways similar 
to that reported by other historians, such as Jan Lindegren in his 
study on conscriptions in Bygdeå in 1620–1640.28
In such small communities, every conscription mattered, and 
the casualties were not mere numbers but fathers, spouses, sons 
and brothers, many of whom did not live long enough to see the 
battlefield.29 While the war front was far away from the Northern 
 24 Huhtamies 2000, pp. 5–13.
 25 Tommila I, p. 103.
 26 KA, Population records of Häme and Uusimaa 1634, Voudintilit 
4528, f. 252v; Tommila II, pp. 236–243, Keskitalo 1964, pp. 49, 63; 
Lahtinen 2017, pp. 36–37.
 27 Keskitalo 1964, p. 48; Huhtamies 2000, p. 7.
 28 Lindegren 1980.
 29 Huhtamies 2000, p. 7. In comparison, see also Hietaniemi 2019.
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Uusimaa, its consequences were thus visible in the population, as 
well as in the burden of taxation. Päiviö Tommila has estimated 
that half of the worth of each year’s crop went to taxes that in 
turn were mostly used to finance the warfare.30 The tax burden, 
together with what Jan Lindegren has called ‘the institutionalised 
destruction of some of the forces of production’ – i.e. premature 
deaths of countless human beings – certainly required intensified 
efforts by the remaining workforce in local communities.31
In his analysis, Jan Lindegren observes an increase in produc-
tivity after conscriptions ended, due to the intensified efforts 
and coping methods developed by the remaining population in 
Bygdeå. In this local analysis, similar benefits for Kytäjärvi or 
Hyvinkää cannot be observed.32 Overall, in the villages belonging 
to the Nurmijärvi parish, there were many abandoned farms and 
even whole villages without any inhabitants, even after the most 
intense warfare ended.33 It was no longer a question of fiscally 
‘abandoned’ farms; these were estates that were really left without 
any person who would have had the resources to rebuild them. 
Although the forcible recruitments ended in the 1660s – for a 
while – the population in Kytäjärvi and Hyvinkää does not seem 
to have recovered. It is possible that some farmers and families 
had moved to the southern villages of the Nurmijärvi parish, 
where the soil may have been better.34
While the ordinary freeholders could, at best, ease their situation 
by hiring substitutes for conscriptions or by deserting to forests, 
some wealthier farmers saw a prospect in equipment of a cavalry-
man.35 Cavalry farms (Sw. rusthåll) equipped a cavalryman and his 
horse, and were in return entitled to tax deductions, a benefit that 
enabled some of the wealthy farmers to become even wealthier. 
 30 Tommila II, p. 27.
 31 Lindegren 1980, pp. 256–258.
 32 Lindegren 1980, pp. 256–258.
 33 Tommila II, p. 246.
 34 Tommila I, pp. 242–244; Keskitalo 1964, pp. 46–51; Lahtinen 2017, 
p. 39.
 35 Keskitalo 1964, pp. 145–147; Huhtamies 2000, pp. 7–9.
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However, many freeholders found the cavalry farm position too 
expensive to maintain for a longer period, and several better-off 
cavalry farms of the area belonged to noble persons who were not 
financially ruined by the loss of one cavalryman.36
A new phenomenon, land grants given to Livonian officers, 
became known for the inhabitants in the 1640s, when Queen 
Christina of Sweden donated six abandoned farms to Major Jören 
Berg (1603–1681), a nobleman of Livonian origins.37 In addition 
to these land grants, Berg also bought estates in the neighbour-
hood. His manor Raala (Sw. Råskog, ‘a border forest’) was in the 
neighbourhood of Hyvinkää. Later, in 1646–1647, Berg took over 
four abandoned farms in Hyvinkää and merged them into a cav-
alry farm that was kept by daughter Anna Berg and her husband, 
Captain Roms. Yet, two farms in Hyvinkää, Pietilä and Tapola, 
were turned into auxiliary farms (Sw. augmentshemman), which 
paid their taxes to the cavalry farm.38 Cavalry farms were larger 
than crown farms.39
There was hardly any previous experience of noble neighbours 
really living in the village. Most of other manorial estates nearby 
were taken care by tenants. Jören Berg seems to have caused some-
thing of a shock when he took over his estates. For the benefit of 
all, he spent long periods of time on the battlefield, but when at 
home he was coarse and violent even to his own tenants and serv-
ants.40 The returns on his estates were not good, so his aggression 
may have been partly caused by disappointment caused by failing 
crops. Coming from Livonia, where rural people were serfs bound 
to the soil, Berg most likely had different expectations about how 
he could treat his subordinates. Years on the battlefield may also 
have taught him to resolve problems with violence – which is not 
 36 Of Hausjärvi especially see Keskitalo 1964, pp. 43, 63.
 37 Rein 1929, pp. 14–16. Jören Berg is first mentioned as captain, and as 
a major for the first time in 1657. Keskitalo 1964, p. 63; Eskola 2006, 
p. 79; Eskola 2014, pp. 119, 125–126.
 38 Tommila II, p. 75.
 39 Ahponen 2019, pp. 14–16.
 40 Tommila, II, pp. 71–72.
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to say that violent behaviour was alien to other noble persons of 
the time.41
Be that as it may, Major Berg was constantly at odds with his 
neighbours and he even let plunder part of the harvest of the par-
ish minister, ‘Josephus Canuti, Pastor Nurmoensium’.42 However, 
the long-time minister was not easily scared. He had himself been 
an army chaplain before settling down to the Nurmijärvi par-
ish, where he served from c.1605 until 1648, and he resisted the 
aggression of Berg and initiated many court actions against him.43 
Josephus’s solid resistance against Jören Berg illustrates the 
significant role of the local clergy as a mediator between local 
communities and authorities when in a dire situation.44 
Occasionally, hostile relations between Berg and local farmers 
escalated to violent conflicts. Local villagers took up arms when 
they were to meet Jören Berg for demarcation of boundaries. Berg 
was wounded in some confrontations, and buildings of the Raala 
estate were burned down. The most obvious excesses by Jören Berg 
resulted in sentences at the local court; however, he also managed 
to get his will through in many disputes.45
From the Disastrous Great Northern War  
to the Slow Recovery (1700–1775)
The late 17th century saw several decades of relative peace, and 
also the introduction of the allotment farm system that replaced 
 41 Lahtinen 2017, pp. 47–48.
 42 Tommila II, pp. 70–71; Eskola 2014, pp. 123–124.
 43 RA, Acta Ecclesiastica vol. 88, Nurmijärvi, Josephus Canuti’s several 
letters to the Majesty, complete with the confirmation letter of the lay 
representants of the Nurmijärvi congregation.
 44 Tommila II, pp. 303–304; about the general role of parish ministers 
and local communities, see Pulma 1999, pp. 162–163.
 45 Rein 1929, pp. 17–18; Tommila II, pp. 72–74; Eskola 2014, pp. 122–126. 
On rural resistance in the 16th century, see Lahtinen 2013; Lahtinen 
2018b.
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the old conscriptions. Every ruotu, a group of farms, was now 
obliged to equip and maintain one soldier. During peace, the 
farmers were expected to provide their soldier a piece of land and 
a little dwelling. Their status of an allotted soldier was equivalent 
to that of a crofter.46
In the organisational reformations made in the 1690s, the 
Nurmijärvi parish was divided into 26 ruotus, each one of them 
including three or four farms. In Kytäjärvi and Hyvinkää, the 
farmers were responsible for providing a total of five soldiers for 
the infantry regiment of the province of Uusimaa.47 In addition, the 
local cavalry farms in Hyvinkää were responsible for providing 
one cavalryman each. It is not known how successful the villag-
ers were in the maintenance of their first generation of allotted 
soldiers. The new arrangements took place close to the times of 
the Great Famine of 1695–1697. In some years, the crop failure 
was reported to have been all but total. Approximately one-fifth 
of the local population may have died during the devastating 
time of famine.48
Soon after the Great Famine, the outbreak of hostilities with 
Russia marked the beginning of what is called the Great North-
ern War (1700–1721), including the Great Wrath, the military 
occupation of the area of Finland in 1714–1721. Local allotted 
soldiers were immediately mobilised in 1700. As was often the 
case, there was soon need for reinforcements, so first one addi-
tional soldier per three ruotus was required, and then one sol-
dier from every ruotu. Consequently, at the beginning of the war, 
most adult sons and farmhands had already been sent to war. 
The infantry regiment of Uusimaa was taken to fight the Russian 
troops at the area of historical Livonia. The cavalrymen followed 
the king to Poltava, and, after the fateful battle – if they lived – to 
 46 Tommila II, pp. 222–223.
 47 Tommila II, p. 216.
 48 HyKM, Katri Lehdon lahjoitukset, Loppi winter court sessions 17–18 
February 1696, 22–23 February 1697; Tommila II, pp. 244–246; 
Keskitalo 1964, pp. 50–51.
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captivity in Russia. The weakened Finnish troops retreated to the 
non-occupied area of Sweden; the military expedition to Norway 
became the end of some soldiers that had been taken from 
Kytäjärvi and Hyvinkää.49
It is not easy to identify the allotted soldiers or their families 
in the sources. From the last decades of the 17th century, there 
are surviving church records from the Nurmijärvi parish. In those 
records, however, the demographic development of 10 years is 
presented on one page per farm or village. Often, there are only 
rather unclear omissions and additions, such as undated com-
ments ‘gone to the [battle]field’ (Sw. rest till felt). Nevertheless, 
there are soldiers’ widows mentioned in the documents. As long 
as the allotted soldier was alive, the ruotu was expected to support 
his wife. However, as there were soon several men taken from each 
ruotu, and several of them were married, there were soon quite 
many widows and wives with meagre prospects.50 Once again, 
the effects of war are obvious in the ratio of men and women: 
there were 157 adult women in the congregation records, and only 
96 men.51
Conditions were dire. In addition to the war efforts, a plague 
had killed tens of inhabitants in southern parts of the parish in 
1711. By the next year, almost half of the farms of the Nurmijärvi 
parish had been marked as abandoned.52 On the top of this came 
the military occupation. In the autumn of 1713, Russian troops 
overtook Helsinki, marching towards the Häme Castle.53 When the 
Russian troops invaded southern Finland, Samuel Erici Meche-
lenius (1676–1723), the parish minister, escaped. According 
to his own account of the events, he was forced to flee in totally 
 49 Tommila II, pp. 220–221; Lehto 1989, pp. 53–54.
 50 Lehto 1989, p. 53.
 51 Tommila II, p. 7.
 52 Records of the dead and buried of the Nurmijärvi Congregation in 
1711, Nurmijärvi Congregation.
 53 Keskitalo 1964, p. 178.
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unexpected circumstances with his wife and children, through the 
forests and across the sea.54
The records are incomplete during the war years that followed. 
During the most chaotic years of 1714–1717, much of the prop-
erty of the Nurmijärvi congregation was robbed. Many inhabit-
ants of the parish escaped to less known forest dwellings or even 
farther away, to unknown residences, to return again around 
the year 1720.55 For some, however, it was enough to move from 
the restless Hyvinkää to Kytäjärvi, and to return after the war was 
over. During the military occupation, the closest support for the 
local communities was offered by the assistant clergyman, Thomas 
Kelsinius, assisted by a local tenant of Näs Manor of Kytäjärvi: 
Olaus Wallius, previously a student of the Royal Academy 
of Turku.56
It is illustrative that in comparison, most of the more remote 
farms of Kytäjärvi survived the military occupation in the hands 
of the same families, while the farms in Hyvinkää, situated road-
side, were abandoned except for the Nikkilä farm, which kept the 
inn for travellers. From the year 1714 onwards, the road between 
the coast and the inland was in the use of the Russian troops, and 
now it was their maintenance that mattered.57 The stagecoach 
service was heavy – again explaining why the roadside villages 
suffered most.58 In addition, natural resources were taken for the 
fleet. When the assessor, statistician Ulrik Rudenschöld, travelled 
through the area some decades later, he noted that the biggest local 
 54 RA, Acta Ecclesiastica vol. 88, Nurmijärvi, Samuel Mechelinius’ own 
account on the events, Stockholm 22.1.1718.
 55 Tommila II, pp. 6–10.
 56 Protocols of Deanery inspection, 4 May 1718, 7 March 1718, 
Nurmijärvi Congregation; Tommila II, pp. 8, 303–310, 315; Lehto 
1989, p. 46; Yrjö Kotivuori, Ylioppilasmatrikkeli 1640–1852: Olof 
Wallius. Database 2005 https://ylioppilasmatrikkeli.helsinki.fi/henkilo 
.php?id=2937.
 57 Keskitalo 1964, p. 178.
 58 Keskitalo 1964, pp. 180–181.
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trees had been hewn for masts during the Russian occupation.59 
There are also some surviving solid stone formations called 
‘Russian ovens’ (Fin. ryssänuunit) that may have been used 
by Russian troops during the occupation.60
The Russian fiscal records are not available; however, it is known 
that the local administration was to certain extent replaced with 
commissaries – doing tasks that normally would have been taken 
care of by a local priest, for example – and starosti, ordinary free-
holders who were to collect the taxes. As has been pointed out by 
Christer Kuvaja, the flight of civil servants meant that the Russian 
administration did not get much local help or expertise in arrang-
ing the military government (1715–1717) or later civil administra-
tion (1717–1721).61 The taxes were not heavy as such, but as many 
of the inhabitants had escaped and their farms were desolated; the 
solvency was not good. There were some economic prospects as 
well, however: from the 1718 onwards, there are custom entries 
that record the selling of beer and spirits from the villages to Rus-
sian troops stationed in Helsinki.62
Finally, in 1721, the Peace Treaty of Uusikaupunki (Sw. Nystad) 
was agreed on and signed. While the treaty ultimately meant the 
end of military occupation, there were still questions that had 
to be settled. The retreated regiments had to be relocated back to 
the Finnish soil, and there were prisoners of war who could be 
expected to return to their homes or regiments. The living condi-
tions remained harsh and nourishment had to be sought in emer-
gency food. In January 1731, the allotted soldier Hans Weikman 
 59 Ruuth 1899, p. 165.
 60 Sikopesänmäki, ID 106010003, as reported at Kyppi (Cultural 
Environment Service Window) of Museovirasto (Finnish Heritage 
Agency), see https://www.kyppi.fi/to.aspx?id=112.106010003; cf. 
Suhonen 2007.
 61 Kuvaja 1999, pp. 336–337.
 62 In December 1719, Matts Andersson from Hyvinkää reported 
30 pottles (Fin. kannu, Sw. kanna) of beer, totalling some 80 litres, 
to Helsinki. KA, Läänintilit 7066, Turun kenraalikuvernementin tilit 
1719 f. 493v; Tommila II, pp. 191–192.
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from Kytäjärvi went to the forest to collect pine bark for bread, 
got lost in the whirling snow, fell into water, and was consequently 
frozen to death under a tree. One farmer from his ruotu, Henrik 
Haratta, paid for the ringing of the bells in his burial.63
Because the strength of the returning regiments was low, thou-
sands of Swedish soldiers were added to the troops that were sent 
to Finland, and many of them remained and were assimilated to 
the Finnish population as crofters and occasional craftsmen.64 
These soldiers were involved in restoring the Kytäjä manor that 
had already been subject to property disputes and fallen into 
decay in the hands of tenants in the late 17th century.65
In the year 1740, the estate of Kytäjä was bought by noble Capi-
tain Gustav Wulfcrona (1693–1754), originally a merchant’s son 
from Stockholm, who had started his officer career at an early 
age.66 After Wulfcrona had bought the Kytäjä manor, he brought 
the first crofters to the village – Swedish soldiers who had been 
previously serving in his company in Häme. The position of these 
soldiers reflects the above-mentioned similarities in the status of 
allotted soldiers and crofters. Captain Wulfcrona may have hoped 
to have Swedish-speaking crofters to ease possible communica-
tion problems. The former soldiers also had skills in handicrafts 
and they seem to have gradually assimilated into the community; 
however, the marriages between soldiers’ sons and daughters in 
the first generation may implicate that the assimilation to the local 
families was not straightforward.67
 63 Records of the dead and buried of the Nurmijärvi Congregation, 
Hans Weikman’s death 9 January 1731, buried 7 February 1731; 
Payment for the church bells after Hans Weikman is recorded in 
February 1731, on the second last page of the Account Books 1724–
1730 of Nurmijärvi congregation. 
 64 Vuorimies 2015, pp. 53–70.
 65 Tommila II, p. 85; Lehto 1989, pp. 45–47, 84.
 66 Records of the dead and buried of the Nurmijärvi congregation, 
Capitain Wulfcrona’s death after 10 January and burial 31 January 
1754.
 67 Vuorimies 2015, pp. 177, 213, 221–222, 246.
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It has been pointed out by Heikki Vuorimies that, in many ways, 
the Swedish allotted soldiers who settled in the area of Häme – in 
this case, on the very southern border of Häme – could be seen as 
a welcomed workforce that helped in restoration and recovery.68 
However, not every soldier settling down was in a good shape 
or contributed to the prosperity of the community. The soldiers 
were remarkably often present in court cases, accused of excessive 
drinking, fighting and promiscuity.
Soldiers fined for illicit intercourse reoccur in the account books 
of the Nurmijärvi congregation.69 In Kytäjärvi, one of the trou-
blesome figures of the post-war period was Johan Piquett (Picett, 
Pikett, Pickett, Biquelt), allotted soldier of Sipilä and three other 
farms; he featured in many court cases in the 1720s and 1730s and 
was referred to as an ungodly person by the court records.70 He 
fathered an illegitimate daughter with a servant girl in 1728 and 
there were doubts about bigamy, as Piquett seemed to have a bride 
in Sweden as well. A death sentence was passed; however, the 
death took its toll in another form, as Piquett eventually drowned 
in Kytäjärvi in 1736.71
Despite some conflicts of interests, however, the most difficult 
times were now in the past. Although the Russo-Swedish War 
(1741–1743) meant yet another mobilisation against Russia, as 
well as a short period of military occupation known as the Lesser 
Wrath, the losses were not big or long-lasting.72 When it came 
 68 Vuorimies 2015.
 69 See, for example, Account books of Nurmijärvi congregation, 
May–June 1730.
 70 KA II 39, Loppi winter court session 1730, p. 30; Tommila II, 
pp. 221–222.
 71 Records of the baptized children of Nurmijärvi congregation, 
11.2.1728; Records of the dead and buried of Nurmijärvi congrega-
tion, 27 August 1736. Ruotu farmer Erik Eriksson of Sipilä paid the 
ringing of the burial bells; see Account books of Nurmijärvi con-
gregation, September 1736; Lehto 1989, pp. 179–181. About similar 
suspicions of bigamy in near villages, see Lehto 1989, pp. 187, 189.
 72 Tommila II, pp. 10–11.
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to the residents of Kytäjärvi and Hyvinkää, possibly the biggest 
damage was done to the aforementioned Captain Wulfcrona, and, 
more precisely, to his reputation. Wulfcrona participated to the 
disastrous battle in Lappeenranta in 1741 and was later rumoured 
to have deserted in a cowardly manner. To defend himself and his 
honour, he started a lawsuit and several petitions that only led to 
a posthumous compensation in 1755.73
Although the actual military campaigns were not very lengthy 
after the peace treaty in 1721, military readiness was still present 
in the form of the allotment system that was only dissolved in 
1809. The allotted soldiers participated in the building and main-
tenance of Fortress Sveaborg on the islands off Helsinki shore. 
Via limestone supplies, Kytäjärvi inhabitants also contributed to 
the building of the new fortress structures in the Häme Castle.74 
The allotted soldiers even went to the Pomeranian War, fought in 
1757–1762, and came home with a plant, potato, that would later 
on help to support their communities. It has been observed that 
the cultivation of potatoes emerged most prominently on fields 
that were allotted to veterans of the Pomeranian War, although 
the plant was, at first, considered more of a luxury than a primary 
source of nutrition.75
 73 HyKM, Hyvinkään historiatoimikunnan arkisto, Carl Henrik Wrangel 
to the court-martial prosecutor Mannerfeldt, 22 May 1742; Records 
of the Court of Appeal, 19 December 1752, Gustav Wulfcrona’s ‘hum-
ble pro memoria’ 4 February 1747 and 27 January 1753, The Royal 
Order 21 February 1755, as copies from the Kytäjä Manor Archives 
(copies of originals).
 74 Ruuth 1899, p. 139; Kalkkikallio, ID 1000028558, as reported 
at Kyppi (Cultural Environment Service Window) of Museo-
virasto (Finnish Heritage Agency), see https://www.kyppi.fi/to 
.aspx?id=112.1000028558; Koskinen 2007, pp. 294–305; A field 
excursion to the limestone quarries of Ridasjärvi and Kytäjä with 
Seppo Söderholm and the archaeologist Tarja Knuutinen, 29 August 
2016.
 75 Tommila II, pp. 126–127, 221–223.
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Conclusion
Above, I have presented and discussed the local long-term effects 
of the Swedish warfare and the obligation to maintain armies. 
While the studied area is very limited, the local experiences 
mostly follow the big patterns of the warfare effects. Of the period 
of c.1550–1750, only some three to five years involved the pres-
ence of the enemy troops in the studied area; however, the toll 
of war as well as the military readiness are present at almost any 
given moment, in the loss of the male workforce, in the grow-
ing percentage of insolvency, in the lists of soldier widows, in the 
dwellings of allotted soldiers.
At first, in the 16th century, there is the growing tax burden 
and the obligation to maintain the troops of the crown. The great 
shock, in the form of conscriptions, can be seen in the 1630s, along 
the lines with new noble landowners disturbing the local power 
balance. While there was a period of recovery during the late 17th 
century, the disastrous climate conditions, crop failures and war-
fare had devastating effects on local communities in the turn of 
the 18th century. Recovery was often slow, or just did not happen.
Being situated on the roadside posed a threat to a village in trou-
bled times. It is also evident from the point of view of the court 
records that the return to peace was far from being a peaceful pro-
cess: the returning soldiers were often prosecuted for restless life 
that disturbed the villagers. On the other hand, however, there 
was also assimilation of soldiers originally coming from the area 
of the present-day Sweden, and the effects or army maintenance 
had more subtle consequences on an individual level.
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Army Maintenance Shaping  




The military town was a sub-species of European urban system 
fathered by the military revolution. Towns had, of course, been 
affected by the military since time immemorial, but, until the 
birth of premodern warfare, the peacetime interaction between 
 1 The article is based on my doctoral thesis Helsingin porvaristo Via-
porin rakennuskaudella (The Helsinki Burgher Community during the 
Construction of Fortress Sveaborg), published in 2016 by University 
of Helsinki. All the statistical information about the composition of 
Helsinki burgher community presented here is taken from the thesis. 
However, the concept of ‘military town bourgeoisie’, which is here 
used to analyse the material, is new and introduced to the theme in 
this article.
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the military and urban civilian populations was limited. The medi-
eval castle functioned as much as a storage depot and an office 
building as it did as a military stronghold, and only had a handful 
of soldiers in permanent military service. Furthermore, the castle 
was separated from the town by gates, moats, ramparts and other 
physical barriers, and thus formed a separate entity.
When the European powers began to recruit standing armies, 
and warfare was revolutionised by the advancement of artillery, 
the medieval castle became obsolete and the military town was 
born. In such a town, the civilian settlement and the military 
stronghold coalesced, and the large numbers of permanent troops 
lived in constant interaction with the civilians. In the Vaubanian 
fortress town, perfected by French military engineer Marquise de 
Vauban (1633–1707) and held as the ideal all around the conti-
nent, the whole town was turned into a fortress by surrounding 
it with bastions. This kind of fusion of military base and civil-
ian town eased the maintenance of armed forces: the townspeo-
ple could be obliged to lodge soldiers in their homes, which freed 
the army from expensive barrack-building, and the local burgh-
ers could sell their services to the army and food and drink to 
the soldiers.2
In the Swedish Realm, the military towns were a late phenom-
enon, as the predominantly rural kingdom manned its army first 
by conscriptions and then by the allotment farm system. How-
ever, little by little, militarised urban settlements started to appear. 
Gothenburg, founded in 1621 to be a commercial and military 
stronghold against the Danes, was designed and built as a forti-
fied garrison town.3 Karlskrona, founded 60 years later, was first 
of all a base for the Swedish navy and only secondly a town, and 
the main function of its burghers was to cater to the maintenance 
needs of the navy.4
 2 See e.g. Parker 1988, pp. 10–24; Artéus 1988, pp. 25–26.
 3 Andersson 1996, passim.
 4 Bromé 1930, pp. 69–88.
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The biggest and most expensive military town project in the early 
modern Swedish Realm began in 1747, when King Frederick I 
(Sw. Fredrik I) approved the plan to fortify the islands off the small 
Finnish town of Helsinki. The realm had lost its easternmost parts 
to Russia in two consecutive wars (the Great Northern War of 
1700–1721 and the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743) and had to 
rebuild its eastern defence from scratch. The fortress of Helsinki 
– later named Sveaborg – was to be a large garrison and naval 
base functioning as the place d’armes, or the central fortress, of 
the whole of Finland. The gigantic project was funded mostly by 
financial subsides from France, who pursued to curtail the grow-
ing power of Russia by bankrolling its enemies.
The construction of Fortress Sveaborg ended in 1791, after 
the French Revolution had cut off the vital French subsidies. The 
original plans had been so massive in scale that the fortress was 
left partly unfinished despite being under construction for over 
40 years – apart from a few pauses, the longest in 1757–1763 due 
to the Seven Years War. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 19th 
century, Sveaborg was bar none the biggest military base in the 
Swedish Realm, with its standing troops – infantry, artillery, and 
army navy – and large civilian population adding up to some 
5,000 persons.5
In this chapter, I analyse the development of early modern ‘mili-
tary town bourgeoisie’, with Fortress Sveaborg as example. I trace 
the development of the Helsinki burgher community from 1747, the 
foundation year of the fortress construction, to 1808, when 
the Finnish War ended Sveaborg’s history as a Swedish fortress, 
arguing that the co-existence with Fortress Sveaborg and its 
maintenance needs profoundly shaped the burgher community of 
 5 The history of Fortress Sveaborg has recently been researched by 
the Academy of Finland-funded project ‘Connections, Associa-
tions, Innovations: The Case of Sea Fortress Sveaborg, its Founding, 
Socio-Economic Impact and Innovative Role ca, 1730–1808’ (2010–
2013), in which the author also took part. The publications of the 
project are extensively referenced in this chapter. For the population 
statistics of Sveaborg, see Hatakka 2012, pp. 103–120.
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Helsinki. This shaping was not conscious, nor was it forced from 
outside. Instead, the natural law of supply and demand was at 
work. The fortress had specific needs, and the burghers had the 
opportunity to make money by answering to those needs. Slowly, 
unconsciously and often through trial and error, the burgher com-
munity started to form a shape that was ideal for the maintenance 
of the fortress.
The 18th century was an era of modest but intent urbanisation 
in the Swedish Realm: the urban population roughly doubled, with 
the percentage of town dwellers out of the national population 
rising from 4% to 7–8%.6 At the same time, the great legislative 
reforms and the rough-handed national economic policy, espe-
cially during the so-called Swedish Age of Liberty (1719–1772), 
reshaped the political and economic structure of urban commu-
nities. This resulted in certain broad national trends in the evo-
lution of urban communities: the handcrafters were growing in 
numbers, the merchants increased their wealth and exclusiveness, 
and the petty-burghers lost their economic ground.7
All these variables were also present in Helsinki, but the effect 
of Fortress Sveaborg shaped them into something new. In some 
cases, the development of the Helsinki burgher community fol-
lowed the general national trend; in others, it outdid it; and, in yet 
others, it completely subverted it. The key factor was whether the 
general trend was useful for the army maintenance. If it was, it was 
enhanced – if it was not, it was reversed.
The Difficult First Steps
When the construction work began in the spring of 1748, the 
army came to Helsinki with a firm intention to utilise the local 
civil society in its maintenance, as per the European models. The 
local burghers could, it was thought, deliver the brick, stone, tim-
ber, lime and other construction materials, as well as sell food and 
 6 Turpeinen 1977, passim.
 7 Granqvist 2016, passim.
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drink to the construction workers and soldiers. This would ease 
the logistical burden considerably, as the army would not have to 
engage in primary production. All it needed was money – money 
to buy materials from the burghers, and money to pay the wages 
and allowances so that workers and soldiers could purchase their 
own food.
This, however, was a miscalculation. Helsinki was a provin-
cial hamlet with 1,500 inhabitants and some 80 burghers, barely 
recovered from the Russian occupation during the Russo-Swedish 
War of 1741–1743, and unable to cater to the needs of the soldiers 
and construction workers, whose number was at its highest some 
5,000 men during the busiest years of the 1750s.8
During the summer of 1748, the right to retail beer, spirits and 
victuals at the construction site was leased out to two local mer-
chants, brothers Georg Wilhelm Clayhills and Thomas Anton 
Clayhills. This arrangement did not last long, as officers soon 
started to complain that there was no food on sale in Sveaborg. 
The Clayhills brothers, brought before the town council for ques-
tioning, had to admit that they were unable to purchase enough 
victuals for the thousands of fortress builders.
The problem was not a lack of connections, as the brothers had 
probably the best business network in town: they belonged into 
an influential family that owned the biggest merchant house in 
Tallinn, Thomas Clayhills & Son, were sawmill owners and timber 
exporters, and operated on the credit markets of Amsterdam. 
Feeding Sveaborg was simply too gigantic and too sudden a task 
for any local merchant to handle.
The lack of bread proved to be another problem, as Helsinki 
had no professional bakers – the small-town people baked their 
own bread. The army demanded that the town council recruit mas-
ter bakers, so that the soldiers could buy bread with their allow-
ance, but the mayor and the councilmen flatly refused. They argued 
that the fortress construction was a ‘temporary phenomenon’ that 
should not affect the composition of the burgher community. 
 8 Granqvist 2016, pp. 40, 61; Nikula 2011, passim.
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For the town council, the case was a matter of principle and self- 
rule: the burgher community did not take new members on the 
command of the army; it took them when it wanted.
After the contract with the Clayhills brothers was dissolved, the 
local crown warehouses began to hand out victuals to the soldiers, 
reducing the prize from their allowances. To solve the bread 
shortage, the crown built a bakery in Helsinki, and soldiers begin 
to receive bread as part of their allowance. Purchasing and trans-
porting victuals to the warehouses, and buying and milling grain 
for the bakery, demanded the time and contribution of numer-
ous military and civilian officials. Thus, the army had to do 
just what it had hoped to avoid: invest a significant amount of 
money, resources and working hours into making the food supply 
system work.9
The town council’s unwillingness to cooperate caused prob-
lems also for the burgher community. When some master bak-
ers eventually settled in Helsinki, lured in by the growing urban 
population, they had difficulties in earning their living, since the 
townspeople continued eating self-baked bread and the soldiers 
got their bread from the crown bakery. Master baker Carl Gustav 
Krook, who relocated from Norrtälje to Helsinki in 1751, left the 
town six years later in a state of bankruptcy.10 Johan Philipsson, 
who took Krook’s place as the only baker in town, lasted about 
the same time. In 1766, a marginal note in a tax roll stated that 
Philipsson had ‘disappeared from the town’.11
These two cases illustrate the two types of problems the army 
encountered. In some cases, the burgher community was willing 
to cooperate, but was unable to do so due to the lack of resources. 
In other cases, it went into self-defence against a perceived threat 
 9 In his doctoral thesis, Sampsa Hatakka reconstructed the victual 
supply system of Fortress Sveaborg during the first construction 
years (1748–1756). See Hatakka 2019.
 10 HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:63, Helsinki Town Council protocol 17 
and 19 December 1757; Granqvist 2016, p. 234.
 11 Granqvist 2016, p. 236.
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to its political and economic autonomy. The law guaranteed the 
burghers the sole right to govern their own town and to do busi-
ness inside its borders, and these rights were held sacred.
The purchase of construction material faced similar problems, as 
the quantities of stone, brick, timber and lime the fortress needed 
were larger than the local burghers could deliver. During the first 
construction years, the army had to resort to large-scale primary 
production. The soldiers were used for logging the timber, and the 
only brickworks in town was rented from its owner and expen-
sively rebuilt to manufacture enough bricks. The situation eased 
after the first years, and the army was able to give up its own pro-
duction bit by bit and outsource the purchases. When the lease 
period of the brickworks ended in 1753, the army decided not to 
extend the contract – despite all the money spent – and started 
to buy bricks purely from private entrepreneurs.12
All these entrepreneurs were not local burghers, however. In the 
old tradition of military entrepreneurship, several high officers of 
the army who had inherited financial capital and business sense 
had begun to sell materials and services to the fortress. Captain 
Carl Tersmeden, chief of the army dockyard in Sveaborg, is the 
most representative and most well-known case. After purchasing 
the Alberga manor near Sveaborg, he cut down its forests to sell 
timber and firewood – getting complaints from the local farmers, 
who accused him of desolating the whole area – and built a brick-
works to its premises to manufacture and sell bricks. He also owned 
several vessels that transported soldiers and cargo to and from 
Sveaborg.13 In the 1750s, a larger amount of the materials and 
 12 In her doctoral thesis, Sofia Gustafsson reconstructed the construc-
tion material supply system of Fortress Sveaborg during the first con-
struction years (1748–1756). See Gustafsson 2015. See also Nikula 
2011, pp. 115–117, 146–147.
 13 Carl Tersmeden’s private diary, kept from the 1730s to the 1780s 
and containing over 10,000 handwritten pages, is one of the most 
unique surviving sources of 18th-century Swedish history. Unfor-
tunately, it has been published only as a greatly abbreviated version, 
which omits, among other things, nearly all entries considering his 
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services that the fortress needed was bought from Tersmeden and 
his officer colleagues than from the burghers of Helsinki.14
The main reason for the small share of the local burghers were 
their small resources. When the army made subcontracting deals 
with them, be it for delivering victuals for the crown warehouses, 
grain for the bakery or construction material for the fortress 
building site, it had to pay partly or totally in advance. A typical 
example was the contract the crown made with merchant Jacob 
Johan Tesche in October 1752. Tesche promised to deliver 3,000 
barrels of grain for 19,000 silver dalers – a gigantic transaction by 
the standards of the Helsinki merchant community. Of this sum, 
9,500 dalers were to be paid immediately, the other 9,500 when 
Tesche had purchased – but not necessarily yet delivered – half 
of the grain. In other words, he made the purchase solely on the 
crown’s money, without investing a daler of his own.15
In 18th-century England, France or Germany, big merchants 
sold material to the army on long-term credit and thus were 
important financiers of the crown. In small Helsinki, the situation 
was the reverse – the merchants did not have enough capital to 
make the purchases unless the crown paid them in advance. This 
was a problem especially in the 1750s, as several burghers took 
advance payments for larger deliveries than they could manage, 
and the crown eventually had to collect its money back from their 
bankrupt estates.16
This was, among many others, the fate of the Clayhills broth-
ers, the top merchants of their generation. After their unsuc-
cessful attempt to keep the fortress construction site in food and 
drink, they made several large deals for delivering construction 
material. At first, they were the biggest local under-contractors, 
but it soon came clear that they had bitten off more than they 
could chew. In 1754, at the demand of the army, the town court of 
business ventures. Tersmeden’s role as under-contractor of Fortress 
Sveaborg is discussed in Granqvist & Gustafsson 2013, which uses 
the original manuscript of his diary as source material.
 14 Gustafsson 2015, passim; Nikula 2011, pp. 115–117, 146–147.
 15 About the Tesche case, see Hatakka 2019, pp. 132–133.
 16 See Gustafsson 2015, passim; Hatakka 2019.
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Helsinki declared Georg Wilhelm Clayhills bankrupt and con-
fiscated his property to pay off his massive debts to the crown. 
Thomas Anton Clayhills avoided bankruptcy but spent the rest of 
his life as a small-time businessman.17
The Structure of the Burgher Community
The problems and conflicts that coloured the first fortress con-
struction years were the result of high hopes colliding with harsh 
reality. The royal decision that turned Helsinki into the largest 
construction site in the Swedish Realm almost overnight caught 
the burghers off guard and unprepared. However, the burghers 
were able to adapt to the situation. Doing small business with the 
fortress gave them money, the money allowed them to invest, and 
the investments allowed them to do bigger business with the for-
tress. Step by step, the military town bourgeoisie began to emerge. 
To further analyse this development, we must take a closer look 
on the growth of both the general urban population and different 
burgher groups.
When the builders of Sveaborg came to town, Helsinki had 
some 1,500 inhabitants. Sixty years later, at the beginning of the 
19th century, the town of Helsinki and the fortress Sveaborg had a 
combined population of almost 9,000 persons, one-third of whom 
were soldiers and the rest civilians. The fortress was officially a 
closed military base, but in practice it had grown together with 
the town, as large number of the fortress’s garrison was lodg-
ing in the town and large number of civilian townspeople lived 
and worked on the fortress islands. Therefore, the ‘twin town’ of 
Helsinki–Sveaborg can be counted as one of the largest urban cen-
tres in the Swedish Realm.18
During the same period, the number of burghers in Helsinki 
grew from c. 70 to a little over 200. This growth, however, did 
 17 Aalto, Gustafsson & Granqvist 2020, p. 266.
 18 Excluding the capital, Stockholm, and its more than 60,000 res-
idents, the biggest urban centres in the Swedish Realm, such as 
Gothenburg, Karlskrona, and Turku, were in the range of 9,000–
13,000 inhabitants. 
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not affect everybody in the same way, as different groups evolved 
along different patterns.
Out of the four groups in Figure 8.1, the sea captains are not dis-
cussed in this chapter. They were newcomers in burgher society, 
as only the Seaman Act of 1748 had required captains of merchant 
ships to acquire burgher rights. Almost all of them were employ-
ees of the shipowner-merchants and not independent business-





































































Handcrafters Merchants Petty-Burghers Sea-Captains
Figure 8.1: The Structure of the Helsinki Burgher Community 1748–
1808.19
Source: Granqvist 2016. Figure by the author.
 19 See e.g. Granqvist 2016, pp. 86–89.
 20 The figure is based on a database, into which I have compiled cur-
ricular information about the burghers of Helsinki from numer-
ous sources (the most important being the Helsinki Town Council 
protocols and accounts, and the annual poll tax and concession 
tax rolls), and which is published, together with a complete list 
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The number of master handcrafters in Swedish and Finnish 
towns roughly doubled during the 18th century, as the general 
growth of urban population meant growing clientele. In Helsinki, 
the handcrafters roughly tripled their numbers during latter half 
of the 18th century, from c. 30 in 1748 to c. 100 in 1808. The main 
explaining factor was the pull of urban growth, with the above-
average growth in the number of master handcrafters being the 
result of the above-average urban growth.
The local craftsmen complained early on that the military 
population did not benefit them. The soldiers, who got their 
clothes, accommodation and other necessities from the army, 
were only interested in buying food and drink, and thus carried 
all their allowance to taverns and grocery shops.21 The fortress 
construction site did not use the local handcrafters as subcon-
tractors either. The army used soldiers for the menial work 
and employed trained army craftsmen for the more specialised 
tasks. Furthermore, a large number of enlisted soldiers were 
former apprentices and thus mastered different handcraft skills. 
Only a minority of master’s apprentices had the opportunity to 
became masters themselves, and, for apprentices without career 
of sources, as an annex to my doctoral thesis; see Granqvist 2016, 
pp. 227–256. In the database, I identified a total of seven different 
internal groups in the Helsinki burgher community: 1) handcraft-
ers, 2) merchants, 3) sea captains, 4) petty-burghers, 5) grocers, 
6) restaurateurs and 7) butchers. In this chapter, I have classified 
everyone who was not a handcrafter, merchant or sea captain as pet-
ty-burgher. Although the grocers, restaurateurs and butchers were 
distinguishable in the community as separate professional groups, 
they were small in number and their economic and social standing 
was identical to petty-burghers; therefore, to simplify the analy-
sis, I have counted the practitioners of these professions as petty- 
burghers in this chapter.
 21 HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:52, Helsinki Town Council protocol 
30 November 1748.
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prospects, enlisting to the army was a popular way of making 
a living.22
In the few cases where the army did use a civilian craftsman as 
subcontractor, it needed a special skill that none of its own sol-
diers could master and that was needed so rarely that hiring a full-
time craftsman was not practical. It ordered windowpanes from 
the local glassblower, kettles and canteens from the local copper-
smith, and stove tiles from the local potter. All these were make-
shift solutions that were abandoned at the first opportunity; after 
a soldier who mastered the art of glasswork was found, the army 
stopped using the services of the town glassblower.23
This is not to say the construction of Sveaborg did not affect the 
handcrafters at all, but rather to argue that the effect was indirect. 
The fortress lured more civilians to the town, which meant grow-
ing clientele to the masters. The high officers of the fortress, many 
of them wealthy cosmopolitans with refine tastes, also supported 
a small group of masters making luxury products – a goldsmith, a 
clockmaker, a pastry maker, a bookseller, a couple of fine tailors, 
eventually even a portrait painter. But the maintenance needs of 
the army, be them the soldiers’ need for food and drink or the 
fortress’s need for subcontractors, did not affect the craftsmen 
class as whole and shape its structure in the same way it affected 
and shaped the merchantry and petty-bourgeoisie. Therefore, the 
craftsmen of Helsinki are not discussed further in this chapter.
The Enclosing Merchantry
In the Swedish Realm, the 18th century was a golden age for mer-
chants. For the most part of the epoch, the official economic phi-
losophy of the Swedish crown was strict mercantilism. To make 
the country more self-sufficient, the crown discouraged import 
 22 The soldier handicraft in Nordic military towns is a well-researched 
phenomenon; see e.g. Ramstad 1996. For soldier handcraft in late 
18th-century Helsinki, see Granqvist 2019.
 23 Aalto, Gustafsson & Granqvist 2020, p. 164.
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with bans and tariffs and supported domestic production by 
lavishly handing over economic privileges and subsidies. This 
benefited the Swedish and Finnish merchants, who were able to 
engage in new branches of trade and commerce with governmen-
tal backing, or monopolise lucrative businesses with the govern-
ment’s blessing.24
At the same time, the legislation concerning municipal elections 
was revised and the traditional per capita voting was replaced 
by proportional elections, where each burgher’s tax rate dictated 
his number of votes. This led to a situation where the merchants, 
when unanimous, were able to pick the mayor, the councilmen 
and the local member of parliament without consulting the rest 
of the burgher community. This allowed them to both run their 
towns according to their own interests and take part in formulat-
ing the national policies, as the Estate of Burghers at the Swedish 
Parliament openly campaigned for the benefit of big business.25
In the Law Code of 1734, the merchants of the Swedish Realm were 
for the first time required to get formally organised by founding 
merchant societies. These societies became a tool for them to con-
trol their growing wealth and position. The Swedish and Finnish 
merchantry, which had during the previous centuries continu-
ously got foreign reinforcements especially in the form of German 
and Baltic-German businessmen, started to turn inwards in the 
18th century. The societies had an exclusive recruiting policy, and 
they openly favoured the sons and trustees of the old members. 
Total self-sufficiency was impossible with such small recruiting 
pools, but the effects were nevertheless prominent. The number of 
new merchants not related to the old plummeted during the 18th 
century, as did the number of burgher rights awarded to foreign 
businessmen.26
Helsinki rode on the high tide of this phenomenon. In 1748, 
Helsinki was an economically menial small town with 1,500 
 24 Ranta & Åström 1980, pp. 255–265; Heckscher 1985, pp. 217–219.
 25 Mäntylä 1977, pp. 11–17, 34–66; Mäntylä 1981, pp. 27–64.
 26 Karonen 2004, pp. 37–39.
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inhabitants and 25 merchants. In 1808, the twin town of Helsinki–
Sveaborg was a blooming centre of trade and commerce with 
9,000 inhabitants – and 25 merchants. The local merchant society 
had kept its numbers down despite the urban population growing 
sixfold and all business activities multiplying.27
The balance sheets of the Fortification Department reveal how 
the local merchants gradually took over the subcontracting deals. 
In the 1750s, only 40% of construction material was bought from 
the merchants of Helsinki. In addition to the purchases made 
from Carl Tersmeden and other army officers, the army bought 
material from other parts of the Swedish Realm. In the 1760s 
the share bought from local merchants had risen to 60%, with the 
share of officers and out-of-town businessmen dropping in pro-
portion. In the 1770s, 80% was bought from local merchants, the 
remaining 20% containing mostly lime and limestone shipped 
from Gotland, the leading lime-production centre of the Baltic 
Sea area. The officers had practically disappeared from the bal-
ance sheets, as the old generation had died or moved elsewhere, 
and the burghers now left no room for new ones.28
With the capital made by doing business with the fortress, the 
merchants were able to expand their trade and spread their net-
works wider. Helsinki had always exported timber, first in the 
form of raw timber and later in the form of sawn timber, but it 
had earlier been shipped abroad by Dutch intermediators, as the 
lack of capital had prevented Helsinkians to build large merchant 
ships. During the 1750s and 1760s, the local merchants built a 
fleet of ocean-worthy frigates and began to export their timber 
to the Mediterranean themselves. They were also able to invest 
in pre-industrialisation: in addition to the brickworks mentioned 
 27 Granqvist 2016, pp. 48–50.
 28 The numbers considering the 1750s are taken from Sofia Gustafsson’s 
doctoral thesis (Gustafsson 2015, passim). The numbers consider-
ing the 1760s and 1770s are based on the Fortification Department’s 
balance sheets from the years 1766 and 1774: KrA, Fortifikations 
kassaräkenskaper GI F2: Finland, Sveaborg.
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earlier, Helsinki got a sailcloth factory, a porcelain factory, a glass-
works and several large breweries during the construction years 
of Sveaborg.
As Helsinki grew bigger and wealthier, there was no shortage of 
people seeking to become a merchant there. The local merchant 
society, however, had multiple means to block their way. It exam-
ined all applicants, and, if they were not members of the inner 
circle, usually found crucial flaws in their commercial expertise. 
The town council had, in theory, the power to hand out merchant 
rights against the society’s will, but, since the merchants’ favourites 
usually prevailed in councilmen elections, it rarely did so. Some 
rejected filed a complaint to the National Board of Trade and won 
their cases, but the majority did not challenge the decision of the 
merchant society and town council.29
The exclusiveness also benefited the army. In the 1750s, its 
local subcontractors had been poor and untrustworthy. They 
had demanded payment in advance, and often failed to deliver, 
so that the crown had to litigate with their bankrupt estates to 
get its money back. The growing exclusiveness of the local mer-
chant society eased this problem. The wealthier the merchants of 
Helsinki became and the wider their commercial network spread, 
the less they needed advance payments, and the more reliably they 
delivered on time. The situation had created a self-supporting spi-
ral: the more business the merchants did with the fortress, the 
more capital they had to expand their other commercial ventures, 
and, consequently, the better under-contractors they were for 
the fortress.
This development allowed some of the merchants of Helsinki 
to grow into business tycoons of national class. The most illustri-
ous example is Johan Sederholm, who began his career in the late 
1740s by selling material to the fortress construction, cemented 
his position as the richest man in Helsinki in the 1760s, and 
kept it until his death in 1805. At the top of his game, Sederholm 
 29 See Granqvist 2016, pp. 80–86 for more detailed description of the 
practice of taking new merchants in Helsinki.
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dominated all branches of local big business: shipbuilding, seafar-
ing, sawmills, industry and subcontracting for the fortress. After 
the fall of the Clayhills brothers in the mid-1750s, he was the big-
gest under-contractor of Sveaborg as long as the construction 
works continued.
As his career advanced, the Swedish crown granted Sederholm 
numerous special favours. The most important of them was the 
privilege to buy tax-exempt manors (Sw. säteri), the ownership 
of which was by law reserved to the members of nobility. This 
allowed him to become the largest landowner in the region. 
Sederholm had, stated the letter of privilege, served the crown so 
well that he was entitled to rewards. This was a diplomatic way of 
saying that the crown owed uncomfortably large sums of money 
to Sederholm after he had sold construction material to Sveaborg 
on credit. Granting him complimentary favours did not cost the 
crown anything but diminished the risk that he would demand his 
money back.30
The letter of privilege perfectly illustrates the profound change 
in the merchantry of Helsinki. In the 1750s, Jacob Johan Tesche, 
one of the top merchants of the previous generation, had been 
able to sell grain to the fortress only with the help of 100% advance 
payments. In the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, Johan Seder-
holm and his colleagues had turned into important financiers of 
the army, as per as their British, French or Prussian counterparts.
The Thriving Petty-Bourgeoisie
Petty-burghers, or the ‘third class’ as they were commonly called, 
were the poorest and most heterogenous burgher group. They were 
small businessmen of all sorts – peddlers, vendors, grocers, fishmon-
gers, butchers, innkeepers, drivers, barge skippers. They formed 
the grassroots level of the burgher community, modest financially 
but vital for the daily life of the town.
 30 Mäntylä & Mäkelä-Alitalo 1997, passim; Granqvist 2016, pp. 263–264.
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In the 18th-century Swedish Realm, the petty-burghers were a 
species headed towards extinction. As the wealth and might of 
the merchants grew, they used both their grip over the local poli-
cymaking and their influence over the national policymaking to 
narrow the living space of the lesser burghers. Using privileges 
and subsidies as their tools, they were able to take over tradition-
ally petty-bourgeoisie branches of business and drive smaller 
businessmen out of the market. In the local town councils, they 
lobbied for tighter criteria for accepting new petty-burghers, and 
even pushed whole trades and professions out of the burgher soci-
ety, as fewer voters in local elections meant more political power 
to them.
In some towns, the petty-burghers as a class completely disap-
peared during the 18th century. In others, they stayed alive, but 
in smaller numbers and with smaller influence.31 The only sig-
nificant exceptions seem to be the military towns. A large soldier 
population craved just for the kind of grassroots services – most 
notably, food and drink – the petty-burghers were specialised in.
Helsinki is a textbook example of this phenomenon. When the 
construction of Sveaborg began in 1748, the town had a dozen 
petty-burghers. Their number grew more or less steadily until the 
end of the 1790s, when it was 70 persons at most. The permanent 
ending of fortress construction works caused the number to drop, 
but just before the Finnish War there were still 50 petty-burghers in 
Helsinki. During a period when the class of lesser burghers 
diminished or disappeared from most towns, their numbers in 
Helsinki quadrupled.
The most singular branch of the petty-bourgeoisie business was 
producing and selling alcohol. Military towns were boozer towns 
everywhere in Europe, and Helsinki was no exception. The annual 
licence fees all innkeepers paid to the town council provide a 
fruitful source material to examine this phenomenon. When the 
 31 See e.g. Halila 1953, pp. 58–59; Mäntylä 1971, pp. 306–307, 364–368, 
400–410; Nikula 1971, p. 287; Petersson 1972, p. 87; Keskinen 2012, 
pp. 52–53; Granqvist 2016, passim.
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construction of Sveaborg started, the number of licence payers 
jumped almost overnight from 13 to 75. It decreased during the 
Seven Years War, but started to grow steadily after it, peaking at 
over 80 at the end of the 1780s. After the fortress construction 
ended in 1791, the number of taverns stabilised at around 30.32
The structure of the alcohol trade is revealed in a town council 
report made in 1784. The 61 persons who paid the licence that 
year included 39 petty-burghers or their widows, five sea captains 
or their widows, three merchants or their widows, one master 
handcrafter, and five non-burghers keeping tavern with special 
permission (a broker, a bookkeeper, a fisherman, and two wid-
ows of civil servants).33 In that year, there were 58 petty-burghers 
in Helsinki. These figures show two things: the class of petty- 
burghers dominated the alcohol business, and the alcohol busi-
ness dominated the class of petty-burghers. Two-thirds of them 
lived on full-time or part-time innkeeping.
Out of all the forms of bourgeoisie enterprise vital for the army 
maintenance, the production and selling of alcohol was the only 
one that functioned satisfyingly from the first day onwards. Lack 
of beer and spirits was never a problem in Sveaborg. A small and 
short-lived crown brewery, co-managed by the ever-industrious 
Captain Carl Tersmeden, operated in the fortress from 1753 to 
1756; however, it was not founded to fill a shortage of alcohol but 
rather to improve the quality of it.34 Carl Fredrik Zandt, the army 
doctor of the construction site, complained that some of the alco-
hol the burghers sold was of such poor quality that it made the 
soldiers sick.35
Thanks to the blooming alcohol business that supported 
the petty-burghers, Helsinki was one of the few towns where the 
 32 Granqvist 2016, p. 114.
 33 ‘Förteckning Öfwer Wissa Ämbeten i Helsingfors Stad för Åhr 1784.’ 
HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:90, Helsinki Town Council protocol 
12 January 1784.
 34 Granqvist 2012, passim.
 35 HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:57, Helsinki Town Council protocol 
27 January 1752.
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lower strata of the burgher community unionised. The craftsmen 
had had their guilds since the Middle Ages, and the Law Code 
of 1734 required the merchants to found merchant societies, but 
neither the tradition nor the law required petty-burghers to do 
so. The only two known Finnish towns where this happened were 
Helsinki and its smaller neighbour, Loviisa, the site of the con-
struction of frontier fortress Svartholma.36
The unionisation happened in two steps. First, the grocers 
detached themselves from the rest of the ‘third class’ and started to 
appear in front of the town council as the Helsinki Grocer Society 
in 1774. Exactly a decade later, in 1784, the remaining petty-
burghers officially founded the Helsinki Lesser Burgher Society.37
Although these new societies closely mimicked the procedures 
of the merchant society, inspecting persons who pleaded for 
burgher rights as grocer or petty-burgher and giving statements to 
the town council, they did not have real opportunities to acquire 
similar clout or prestige than the merchants’ union. In a burgher 
community, wealth and commercial success equalled political 
weight, and Johan Sederholm alone paid more taxes than the 
whole petty-bourgeoisie combined. The town council routinely 
overruled their statements and took new grocers or lesser burghers 
in Helsinki against their will.38
Nevertheless, the societies proved to be useful tools for the 
lesser burghers. As they engaged in a war with merchants over 
the right to manufacture and sell alcohol, it was practical that they 
had a formal organisation that could prepare statements and hone 
strategies, and an official spokesman who could represent them in 
front of the town council. This war raged on for many decades and 
ultimately proved the power of the petty-burghers.
 36 Mäntylä 1977, p. 74.
 37 For the first recorded mentions of Grocer Society and Lesser Bur-
gher Society, see Helsinki Town Council protocols 25 August 1774 
(HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:80) and 18 October 1784 (HKA Mais-
traatin arkisto Ca:90). 
 38 Granqvist 2016, pp. 90–98.
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The Struggle over Alcohol
The rules of alcohol business favoured the petty-burgher. His tav-
ern was a family business in the full sense of the word: it typically 
operated in his home, with his wife and children serving the drinks 
in the front room, and the stills and brewing barrels bubbling in 
the back room. When the clock in the church tower struck nine 
and the legal serving time ended, the tavern transformed into a 
private home and the burgher family made their beds in the room 
that had just a moment earlier been full of merry drinkers. This 
kind of tavern had no higher profit expectations than to bring 
food to the table for the burgher and his family.39
If a wealthy merchant wanted to participate in the business, he 
had the opportunity to manufacture alcohol more efficiently than 
the petty-burgher. According to an investigation conducted by the 
town council in the 1750s, only a handful of the biggest merchants 
had ‘immured pans’ (inmurade pannor) – in other words, built-
in distillation complexes instead of the freestanding stills.40 But 
what the merchant won in manufacturing, he lost in the retail. He 
had to buy or rent a suitable locale for a tavern – opening a noisy 
boozer in his own house, next to his family home and business 
office, was out of the question – and hire external workforce to 
mind the pans and serve the drinks. Thus, the operational costs 
easily ate up the minuscule profits.
Since the rules favoured the petty-burghers, the merchants of 
Helsinki made two ambitious attempts to rewrite those rules. In 
the 1750s, a dozen of the leading merchants founded the Helsinki 
Brewing Company and built a stone brewery in the outskirts of 
the town. At the Diet of 1755–1756, the members of the com-
pany applied to the estates. They reported that they had ‘with high 
expense constructed a stone brewery to serve the garrison and the 
 39 Of the structure of early modern alcohol retail business in Finnish 
towns, see e.g. Savolainen 2017, pp. 138–149.
 40 HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:60, Helsinki Town Council protocol 
28 September 1754.
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construction workforce both here in town and in Sveaborg’ and 
asked for a local monopoly for alcohol manufacturing in return.41
The plea was perfectly in line with the mercantilist, monopoly-
favouring economic policy of the realm, and the Brewing Com-
pany was granted the privilege in 1756. But, when it tried to 
execute its monopoly, problems arose. Swedish Realm joined the 
Seven Years War in 1757, and the construction of Sveaborg was 
halted, as the soldiers were needed in the Prussian battlefields. 
This temporarily killed the alcohol business in Helsinki, the num-
ber of licence-paying taverns dropping from 72 to nine in a few 
years. Furthermore, the petty-burghers launched an official com-
plaint and made it clear that they were ready to fight hard and long 
to keep what remained of the business in their own hands.42
The merchants backed down. They announced that, regarding the 
circumstances, they were ready to allow the alcohol business to con-
tinue as usual ‘for the time being’. The issue was never revisited.43
Another attempt was made in 1787, when King Gustav III 
reformed the national alcohol policy. The right to manufacture 
alcohol was leased out to private entrepreneurs in each town and 
parish. In Helsinki, the Brewing Company and the Lesser Burgher 
Society competed harshly. The former wanted to concentrate all 
manufacturing of alcohol into the brewery, while the latter wanted 
to rent the manufacturing rights collectively in the name of all 
local petty-burghers.
The town council delegated the decision to the Town Elders. They 
were a representative body of members from different burgher 
groups, whose advice and opinion were asked in important political 
 41 ‘… med nog dryg kåstnad nu låtit upbygga et brygghus af sten, till at 
therigenom fournera garnizon och arbets manskapet både i staden och 
på Sveaborg …’ The pleas of the Town of Helsinki to the Diet of 1755, 
§ 3. Published in Nordmann 1908, p. 149.
 42 The complaint itself has not survived, but it is been referenced 
to in Helsinki Town Council protocol of 27 March 1759 (HKA, 
Maistraatin arkisto Ca:65).
 43 HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:66, Helsinki Town Council protocol 
13 February 1760.
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and economic matters – an ‘upper house’ of sorts. The lesser 
burghers were under-represented in the Elders, but the craftsmen 
and also couple of the poorer merchants took their side and chose 
the proposition of the Lesser Burgher Society. The Brewing Com-
pany was the project of the richest and mightiest merchants, and 
the majority of burghers preferred the old system.44
Even though a well-functioning alcohol market was vital for the 
military maintenance, the army took no official stance in these 
fights. This was probably a wise choice, as the burghers tradition-
ally had a knee-jerk negative reaction every time the army tried 
to involve into their business matters. However, it can be read 
between the lines that the army preferred the existing and time-
honoured system over the new one the merchants tried to build. 
Notably, it was unwilling to cooperate with the Brewing Company 
in any way when it tried to create its monopoly in the 1750s. The 
company wanted to build its own taverns in Sveaborg – creating 
thus a total manufacture–retail monopoly over alcohol – but a 
representor of the army denied them the right, arguing that there 
were already enough taverns in the fortress.45
The Entrepreneurs of Newtown
The local geography posed its own problems to the burghers sell-
ing their services to the army. Fortress Sveaborg was on islands, a 
quarter Swedish mile (2.5 kilometres) from the town harbour. For 
the merchants selling construction material, this was no obstacle, 
as large cargos were easier to transport by sea than on dry land, 
and the construction work took place in summertime, when the 
sea was open. For the supply of food and drink, the situation was 
more complex. As the soldiers were unable to freely visit the town 
and use its commercial services due to the water between, the gro-
cers and innkeepers had to operate on the fortress islands.
 44 HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:93, Helsinki Town Council protocol 8 
and 9 November 1787.
 45 HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Cb:40, Captain Jacob Gerdes to Helsinki 
Town Council 26 July 1756.
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In the first construction summer 1748, as stated earlier, the 
army subleased the right to sell food and drink at the construction 
site to the Clayhills brothers. After it became clear the brothers 
were unable to fill the contract, the town council declared in the 
October of the same year that all burghers had the right to operate 
commercially in the fortress. In only a few years, a whole shanty 
town referred to commonly as ‘Newtown’ (Sw. Nystad), full of 
groceries, haberdasheries, taverns and restaurants, rose to the for-
tress islands to offer its services to the soldiers.46
In the first years, Newtown caused heated exchanges of words 
and letters between the officials of the fortress and the town. The 
formers were annoyed that the burghers had settled in the for-
tress area without the army’s consent and operated there without 
supervision or authorisation. However, they grudgingly tolerated 
the situation since the system worked. By the mid-1750s only the 
temporary workforce was still sustained through the crown ware-
houses, the soldiers of the permanent garrison troops already buy-
ing all their food and drink from Newtown.47 As the manpower 
of the garrison increased and the number of seasonal workers 
dropped after the 1750s, Newtown became the main method of 
feeding the soldiers of Sveaborg.
The final peace treaty in the matter was composed in 1763, when 
the officers and the burghers made a detailed agreement concern-
ing the business conditions in Sveaborg. The burghers promised 
officially to see that Newtown had enough grocers, butchers, 
innkeepers and restaurateurs to meet the needs of the army. Fur-
thermore, every burgher needed the double authorisation of the 
Helsinki Town Council and the commandant of Sveaborg in order 
to operate in the fortress. This finely balanced resolution satisfied 
the army’s need for larger control over Newtown without threat-
ening the burghers’ economic autonomy.48
For several decades, Newtown functioned as intended, hous-
ing enough merchants and petty-burghers to keep the soldiers 
 46 Granqvist 2015, pp. 79–81.
 47 Hatakka 2019.
 48 HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:69, Helsinki Town Council protocol 
8 April 1763.
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in fresh meat, groceries and alcoholic beverages, and a relative 
peace reigned in the relationship between the town and the army. 
But, after the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790, problems arose. 
As the generation of burghers that had got their authorisation in 
the 1760s died and retired, very few of their younger colleagues 
were ready to become their successors. As a result, the mayor and 
the councilmen began to receive complaints from the fortress 
commandant about the lack of commercial services.
The burghers’ lack of interest in living and operating in Sveaborg 
rose from two things. The construction work was reduced in 1778 
and altogether abandoned in 1791, meaning that the Newtown 
burghers lost the clientele of seasonal workers. Furthermore, the 
town of Helsinki had grown and provided more business oppor-
tunities for the burghers, making the keeping of a shop or a tavern 
in Newtown much less attractive in the 1790s than it had been in 
the 1750s.49
The town council had a problem to solve. It was the keeper of the 
concord between the army and the burghers that was archived in 
the 1763 agreement. In that agreement, the burghers had commit-
ted to provide all the necessary commercial services in Sveaborg. 
Breaking the contract would have caused a serious riff to the local 
civil–military relationship. As a makeshift solution, the council 
started to bend rules and give burgher rights to members of the 
military who were willing to do business and keep taverns and 
shops in Sveaborg. Sergeant Carl Teckenberg of the army navy 
was appointed grocer in 1790, and baker Johan Österberg from 
the army bakery became merchant in 1792.
The appointment of two men perhaps does not seem a large issue, 
but the burghers of Helsinki did not think so. By taking in outsid-
ers of the burgher community without any sort of formal quali-
fications, the town council crossed a line previously uncrossed. 
Both the merchant society and the grocer society flared up and 
protested with the strongest terms possible. The council, however, 
was unflappable in its decision. It stated that ‘the Commandants 
 49 Granqvist 2016, pp. 183–186.
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of Sveaborg have repeatedly complained over the fact that the local 
burghers do not sell in the fortress enough food, drink and other 
necessities for the daily benefit of His Royal Majesty’s officials and 
garrison soldiers as well as the other inhabitants of the fortress’, 
and therefore, the appointments of Teckenberg and Österberg 
were a necessity.50
The petty-bourgeoisie, on the other hand, saw no problem in 
collaborating with these two upstarts. By 1787, the Lesser Burgher 
Society had already subleased the right to manufacture and sell 
alcohol in Sveaborg to a company headed by Teckenberg and 
Österberg. The company built a large brewery in Sveaborg and ran 
the alcohol market of the fortress up until the breakout of Finnish 
War in 1808. After spending half a century fighting with the mer-
chants over the control of alcohol market, the lesser burghers 
rather cooperated with total outsiders than with the richest mem-
bers of their own community.
Grocer Carl Teckenberg filed bankruptcy in the turn of the 
century, but Johan Österberg grew to be the merchant-king of 
Sveaborg. He ran a haberdashery and grocery shop, a bakery and 
a tavern in Newtown and was the chief owner and operator of 
the fortress brewery. He sold gunpowder to the army, acting as 
official military purveyor, and had joint business with several high 
officers of the fortress, including the commandant of Sveaborg 
himself, General Nils Mannerskants. In the last years before 
his death in 1803 he was the second-richest merchant in all of 
Helsinki–Sveaborg, surpassed in the tax rolls only by the old 
Johan Sederholm.
Many of Österberg’s actions veered on the illegal and generated 
complaints to the town council. To be able to continue his bakery 
 50 ‘… och Klagomål, tid efter annan af wederbörande Befallningshafvare 
å Sweaborg blifwit theröf:r anförde, at Borgerskapet här i Staden ura-
chlåtit hålla på fästningen til försälgning, förfrisknings och mat-wahror, 
samt flera förnödenheter, som Kungl. Mai:ts thärwarande Ämbetsman 
och Garnizons Milice samt fästningens öfriga Innewånare dageligen 
betarfwa …’ HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:96, Helsinki Town Council 
protocol 12 April 1790.
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business even after becoming merchant – practising handcraft, 
including baking, was illegal for merchants – Johan Österberg 
used his younger brother Zacharias as front man. On paper, 
Zacharias Österberg was the owner and operator of Newtown 
bakery, even though he did not even live in Helsinki. The other 
local bakers tried on several occasions to shut down Österberg’s 
bakery, but the town council protected him and systematically 
dismissed all complaints, even though it was well aware of the 
illegality of the situation.51
For the town council, Johan Österberg was too big to fail. At his 
peak, the ‘King of Newtown’ almost singlehandedly kept Sveaborg 
in groceries, bread, beer and booze. Both his indispensability for 
the fortress maintenance and his close connections with its high-
est officers made him untouchable, and the mayor and the coun-
cilmen considered it wiser to turn a blind eye to his endeavours.52
Conclusions
The latter half of the 18th century saw the birth of a new Nordic 
military town, as the little town of Helsinki evolved into the 
blooming fortress town of Helsinki–Sveaborg. At the same time, 
the local burgher community evolved into a military town bour-
geoisie – one fully equipped to serve all the major maintenance 
needs of the army.
 51 Österberg’s actions did not propel complaints to Helsinki Town 
Council only. Around the year 1800, an anonymous and undated 
letter sent to King Gustav IV Adolf described Sveaborg as a nest 
of corruption and pinpointed Johan Österberg as the most glaring 
example. According to the letter, Österberg’s private vessels were 
repaired at the army navy dockyard at the crown’s expense. When 
the king had visited Sveaborg, Österberg’s barge, which was at the 
time under repairs, had been hidden by the dockyard workers 
in order to avoid awkward questions. The letter is referenced in 
Odelberg 1954, pp. 304–305.
 52 Granqvist 2015, pp. 83–86; Granqvist 2016, pp. 187–189.
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The start was rocky. In the 1750s, the actions and interest of the 
army collided frequently with those of the burghers. The army 
had come to the town with the intention of adopting the European 
models of military maintenance, only to discover that their func-
tionality in Helsinki was questionable at best. The local burgher 
community was not the resourceful and obedient pool of helpers 
the army had hoped for. In many cases, they were too poor and 
too few to take care of the army’s needs; in others, they bluntly 
refused to cooperate for fear of losing their autonomy.
Half a century of co-existence shaped both parties. On the 
one hand, the burgher community grew larger and wealthier, 
and thus was better equipped to fill the maintenance needs. The 
members of the exclusive Helsinki Merchant Society became 
more resourceful subcontractors, and the biggest of them even 
started to act as army financiers, European style. The local petty-
bourgeoisie, in turn, grew and prospered, because the grassroots 
services they offered – most importantly, alcohol – were vital for 
the military community.
On the other hand, the army became more resilient and ready 
to accept ad hoc solutions for the maintenance problems, even 
though those broke official rules and established conventions. The 
most important of these was the spontaneous growth of Newtown 
in the fortress islands. After a period of protest on the army’s part, 
commandants of Sveaborg became official patrons of Newtown 
and its burghers. Illegal as it might have been, the solution worked, 
as Newtown solved the problem of soldiers’ food and drink, and 
acceptance was wisdom.
Also, the readiness of the town council to meet the army half-
way improved. In the 1750s the councilmen reacted with almost 
knee-jerk opposition when the army suggested appointing more 
burghers in the town. In 1763, it was already willing to share its 
authority over Newtown with the commandant of the fortress. 
Finally, in the early 1790s, the council was ready to go so far as to 
appoint army employees as burghers in order to keep up the good 
relations, despite fiery protests from its own community. Defen-
sive approach had mellowed into pragmatism.
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By the beginning of the 19th century, the burgher community 
of Helsinki had acquired a shape ideal for army maintenance. It 
included a closed circle of wealthy merchants who acted as financ-
ers and subcontractors, a large group of petty-burghers who took 
care of the grassroots services, and a handful of men specialised 
in catering to the needs of the fortress islands. What orders and 
ultimatums from the army had not managed to do, the simple law 
of supply and demand had.
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CHAPTER 9 
Billeted Soldiers and Local Civilians  
in 1750s Helsinki
Sofia Gustafsson
The year 1748 saw the beginning of one of the biggest construction 
projects that took place in the early modern Swedish Realm – the 
building of the sea fortress Sveaborg (later renamed Suomenlinna 
in Finnish) outside Helsinki. The Russo-Swedish War of 1741–
1743 had once more pushed the eastern border westwards and the 
old defence line was lost. A new central fortress along the south-
ern coast of Finland had to be constructed. After much debate, the 
plan to fortify Helsinki and the island outside the town was finally 
approved by the Diet in 1747.
During the following years, all Finnish soldiers and several 
Swedish regiments were sent to Helsinki for the construction 
works, alongside plenty of craftsmen and experts. The small 
town of Helsinki, with around 1,300 inhabitants in 1747, grew 
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rapidly.1 The military population soon outnumbered the local 
civilians. According to the original plan, the fortress should have 
been ready within five years, but it was never fully completed 
despite the construction works lasting for nearly 60 years. How-
ever, the most intense phase of the construction works was over 
by 1756, when most of the islands were in defendable condition.
The fortress construction brought two different kinds of soldiers 
to Helsinki: allotted regiments commanded for construction work, 
and enlisted regiments commanded for garrison duties. Most of 
the former stayed in the town only temporarily, since the con-
struction works mainly took place between May and September, 
whereas the latter settled permanently in Sveaborg. All the 
soldiers had to be accommodated somewhere, but, as building 
barracks was a slow process, the crown had to resort in large scale 
to the billeting system.
The lack of military infrastructure had already, during the 
medieval period, created a system where the locals had to accom-
modate and transport both military and civil staff on behalf of 
the state. Burghers had already been obliged to billet soldiers in 
their homes in the 16th century, when the system was used, for 
example, in Stockholm and Helsinki.2 The accommodation and 
transportation duties often resulted in complaints from the local 
inhabitants, and on several occasions the state sought to regulate 
the system.3
The allotment system, where soldiers of provincial regiments 
were provided with a piece of land, was introduced in the Swedish 
Realm from the late 17th century onwards. The system turned 
soldiers to crofters taking care of their own subsistence, making 
it possible for the state to sustain a standing army in peacetime. 
However, this system did not remove the problem of how to sus-
tain the enlisted garrison troops in urban areas, and the state 
 1 Turpeinen 1977, p. 125.
 2 Gidlöf 1976, p. 721; Jansson 1991, p. 209; Aalto 2012, pp. 89–94, 135–
144, 214–216, 220–224.
 3 Holm 2009, pp. 66–69. 
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continued to use the billeting system in towns if garrisons were 
not available. Especially for temporary needs, the billeting system 
was cheaper, faster and more flexible.
In the 17th century, when the Swedish Realm was as its 
biggest, the garrison cities were mainly in the Baltic states and far 
in the east, but after the Great Northern War (1700–1721) gar-
risons reappeared in Finnish towns. In the 1720s, billeting was 
used in the towns of Hamina and Lappeenranta, which were 
fortified to defend the new eastern border.4 After these two 
towns had been lost in the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, new 
fortresses were built in Helsinki and Loviisa, and along came 
also the billeting system.5
The billeting question was hotly debated at the Diet in the 1760s. 
The burghers wanted the option to pay for accommodation in cash, 
while the nobility still wanted it to be the right to a living space. 
In 1766, when a new regulation was finally passed, the burghers 
got the right to perform their duty in money, while other house-
owners in the cities also became obliged to participate. However, 
houseowners belonging to the nobility or the clergy remained 
exempted from the accommodation duty.6
The question of accommodating soldiers was by no means just 
a Swedish problem. All over Europe, early modern states were 
dealing with the same issue: how to sustain permanent armies 
without making costly investments in infrastructure. A very sim-
ilar system was in force for example in 17th- and 18th-century 
Denmark, where soldiers were billeted among the civilians.7 And, 
in France and the Netherlands, billeting soldiers was the last resort 
if garrisons were not available.8
 4 Ahonen 1991, pp. 34–42.
 5 Lappalainen 1993, pp. 11–12.
 6 Gidlöf 1976, p. 723.
 7 Bjerg 1994, p. 51.
 8 Guignet 2006, pp. 10–11; Kappelhof 2006, pp. 295; Lamarre 2006, 
pp. 309–310; Vermeesch 2006, pp. 277–280. 
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The billeting of soldiers in the Swedish Realm has been studied, 
for the main part, as it relates to its biggest cities, Stockholm and 
Gothenburg, which were most deeply and chronically affected by it. 
In his article about the Svea Life Guards in Stockholm, Leif Gidlöf 
(1976) focuses not only on the accommodation but also on the 
soldiers’ economic activities. Pär Frohnert (1985) has also written 
about the soldiers’ accommodation in Stockholm, mainly about the 
debate in the 1760s. The enlisted soldiers’ involvement in crafts and 
their work in manufacturing in western Sweden have been studied 
by Thomas Magnusson (2005), and Gothenburg has also been stud-
ied by Bertil Andersson (1997). Also, the soldiers’ wives’ economic 
activities have been studied, e.g. by AnnaSara Hammar (2017) and 
Marie Lennersand (2017). In Finland, the 18th-century garrison 
cities have been studied by, e.g., Voitto Ahonen (1991), Ulla-Riitta 
Kauppi (1993) and Jussi T. Lappalainen (1993). For Helsinki, the 
soldiers’ craft works have been studied by Juha-Matti Granqvist 
(2018) and the soldiers’ criminality by Petri Talvitie (2014).
In the 1750s, Helsinki was turned into a huge military camp. 
The billeting also lasted for years, not week or months, and caused 
long-lasting tension between the military and the local civil 
authorities. How did the accommodation of the soldiers and other 
military staff take place? How did the billeting system work in a 
small town under these extreme circumstances? What were the 
relations between the army staff and the civilians? How and in 
which ways did they interact economically and socially?
The main sources used for this study are Helsinki Town Council 
protocols and court records from the local treasurer’s court, the 
inferior town court that dealt with minor offences but also con-
ducted a first examination of more serious crimes. I have also used 
different church records from both civil and military congrega-
tions in southern Finland, mainly in the form of the genealogists’ 
database for church records called Historiakirjat (HisKi).
The Billeting System in Helsinki in the 1750s
Officially, the burghers’ obligation to billet soldiers applied only to 
the enlisted regiments doing garrison duty, and not to the allotted 
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regiments used as construction workforce. However, there was 
a large grey area. Enlisted regiments were occasionally sent for 
construction works, and the burghers had to negotiate with the 
army about their lodging arrangements.9 Another question was 
whether the civilian craftsmen and experts working for the army 
were entitled to accommodation or not.
The first troops to be billeted in Helsinki arrived already before 
the fortress construction started. The enlisted Finnish Artillery 
Battalion, which had retreated to Stockholm during the Russo-
Swedish War of 1741–1743, began returning to Finland after the 
war with reinforcements. The first artillerist arrived at Helsinki 
in 1744, and, by the time the construction of Sveaborg began in 
1748, the town had four artillery companies.10
At the beginning of the 1750s, enlisted infantry troops from 
Sweden commanded for garrison duty in the fortress came 
to town. In 1751 approximately 450 men from the Lantings-
hausen Regiment and approximately 450 men from the 
Hamilton Regiment arrived, which meant half of both these 
regiments. In 1753, more units from these two regiments 
arrived.11 For a short period, eight companies from also a third 
enlisted regiment, the Crown Prince’s Regiment, stayed in 
 9 Jansson 1991, p. 210.
 10 Hedberg 1964, pp. 29–31. 
 11 Hirn 1970, p. 13; Screen 2010, pp. 14–15. The regiments were usually 
named after their commander and, when the commander changed, 
the regiment’s name was changed too. One and the same regiments 
was known as Lantingshausen’s Regiment 1749–1752, Cronhielm’s 
Regiment 1752–1762, Björnberg’s Regiment 1762–1772, von Saltza’s 
Regiment 1773, Skytte’s Regiment 1773–1777, Fleming’s Regiment 
1777–1788, Stackelberg’s Regiment 1788–1801 and finally Jägerhorn’s 
Regiment 1801–1808 (Hirn 1970, p. 30). In 1759, Hamilton’s Reg-
iment turned into Liljesvärd’s Regiment, in 1761 to von Liewen’s 
Regiment, in 1762 to Prince Fredrik Adolf ’s Regiment, in 1771 to 
Manteuffel’s Regiment and finally in 1772 to the Queen Dowager’s 
Life Regiment (Screen 2010, pp. 13–17).
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Helsinki.12 However, they left in summer 1753 for garrison duty 
in Loviisa instead.13
It is impossible to determine exactly how many soldiers the 
burghers had to accommodate in their homes and for how long, 
as the town council protocols mention exact numbers only occa-
sionally. One of these occasions happened in May 1751, when the 
first Swedish enlisted troops started to arrive in Helsinki. Accord-
ing to the town council, in total one general, one colonel, two 
lieutenant colonels, one major, one artillery scribe, 11 captains, 
32 lieutenants and ensigns, 35 NCOs and 522 common soldiers 
were billeted in Helsinki at the moment. The general, the colonel, 
four captains and 10 other officers belonged to the Swedish regi-
ments; a lieutenant colonel, one captain and three other officers 
belonged to the fortification; and four lower officers belonged to 
Finnish infantry regiments. All the other 24 officers were artiller-
ists, as were all the common soldiers.14 The numbers only include 
the soldiers, and nothing was said about their families.
The cost of the accommodation was estimated to be nearly 
40,000 copper dalers. However, this estimate was based on the 
sums the burghers would have had to pay in cash to the officers in 
the event they did not accommodate them in their homes. Thus, 
it had nothing to do with the burghers’ real costs for the accom-
modation, or with their losses for the alternative use of their 
living spaces.15
Fortunately, not all the soldiers in garrison duty had to be bil-
leted by the burghers. When the artillerists had started to arrive 
in 1744, the burghers and the crown had constructed together the 
so-called Gyllenborg’s Barrack, named after the local governor, 
with room for 200 soldiers.16 In 1748, constructions works for 
 12 KA, Läänintilit, Uudenmaan ja Hämeen läänin tilejä, Henkikirjat 
1751–1756, Helsingin kaupungin henkikirjat 1751–1756.
 13 Roos 1960, p. 13.
 14 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:55, Helsingin maistraatin talousasi-
oiden pöytäkirja 25.5.1751; Hornborg 1950, p. 297.
 15 Hornborg 1950, p. 297.
 16 Hedberg 1964, p. 72.
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another two large barracks to the outskirts of the town was initi-
ated, and yet another smaller barrack was built in 1766. Accord-
ing to Jonas Hedberg’s calculations, these four barracks were able 
to house 1,300 soldiers.17 As the construction works of Fortress 
Sveaborg proceeded, more and more living quarters for officers 
and soldiers were also completed on the fortress islands.
At least Cronhielm’s Regiment (formerly known as Lantings-
hausen’s Regiment) was mainly lodging in barracks, either in 
the town or on the fortress islands.18 Likely the same applied to 
Hamilton’s Regiment, since the town council protocols are mainly 
talking about artillerists. As the construction of Sveaborg pro-
ceeded, the townspeople eventually got rid of even some of the 
artillery companies, for in 1754 at least two companies had already 
moved out to the fortress islands. But still, in June 1755, Coun-
cilman Nils Larsson Burtz complained that the soldiers’ families 
were still living in Helsinki.19
The workforce on the construction site mainly consisted of sol-
diers from allotted regiments. The first of them arrived in town in 
autumn 1747 and winter 1748. In the beginning, the workforce 
was quite small, since only preparational work could be made in 
wintertime, and the real construction season only started in May. 
The first regiments to arrive also came from neighbouring areas, 
and the soldiers could walk home during leaves. During the fol-
lowing years, the numbers of soldiers increased rapidly, involving 
regiments from more and more remote areas. However, the local 
burghers were not obliged to accommodate any other than the 
garrison troops if it could be avoided, and they were very persis-
tent in interpreting their billeting duty as narrowly as possible. In 
only two known occasions, the governor of Uusimaa and Häme 
Province, Gustaf Samuel Gyllenborg, requested the burghers to 
accommodate allotted soldiers.
 17 Hedberg 1964, p. 73.
 18 Hirn 1970, p. 160.
 19 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:61, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 
26.9.1755.
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In March 1755, the governor asked for quarters for 280 soldiers 
from the Häme Regiment on their way to Sveaborg. Since there 
was not immediately available living space for them on the fortress, 
the governor asked the burghers to accommodate the soldiers for 
two weeks. The local authorities claimed that it was impossible to 
accommodate more than 180 soldiers, since the weather was far 
too cold so early in spring and soldiers therefore could not sleep 
in outhouses.20 But the town council still agreed to the governor’s 
request, likely because it simply was impossible to transport the 
soldiers to the fortress, as the ice was too thin for walking and too 
strong for boating.
In May during the same year, a new request arrived about lodge-
ments for the same regiment for two or three weeks. This time the 
town council did not consider the burghers able to accommodate 
the soldiers comfortably, since they were already burdened with the 
artillerists. The councilmen asked for an exemption from the accommo-
dation and hoped that the soldiers could be transported elsewhere 
to be accommodated in barracks and tents.21 Unfortunately the 
protocols provide no answer to whether their request was granted 
or not.
The remark about accommodating soldiers in outhouses tells 
that the burghers’ persistence was not only a matter of princi-
ple. Since parts of the artillery already were accommodated in 
the homes of the townspeople, their houses were quite crowded. 
Colonel Augustin Ehrensvärd, head of the Finnish fortification 
works, commented in as early as 1748 that soldiers had to be 
accommodated in saunas, sheds and other outhouses, and it was 
nearly impossible to provide even one more soldier with a roof 
over his head, let alone getting him any bedclothes.22
 20 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:61, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 
27.3.1755.
 21 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:61, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 
25.5.1755.
 22 Ericsson 1937–1939, p. 146.
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Even disregarding the lack of space, it was not in the army’s 
interest to accommodate allotted soldiers in the town. The 
fortress construction site was on the islands outside the town, and 
the preparational works such as logging timber took place out-
side town. This meant plenty of time wasted on marches and boat 
rides, as soldiers were transported to and from their workplaces.23 
Time and transport possibilities being scarce, the most reasonable 
thing was to accommodate the soldiers as close to their working 
post as possible. In 1748, before the work on the fortress walls had 
even started, Augustin Ehrensvärd had already initiated the work 
on building makeshift wooden barracks both on the islands and on 
the mainland. It is also likely that the army used tent accommo-
dation in summertime.24 Unfortunately, the locals still had to 
accommodate some of the officers from the allotted regiments, 
a heavy burden since they were entitled to more space than the 
common soldiers.25
The accommodation duty was definitely a considerable social 
and economic problem, but the burghers’ complaints should still 
be taken with a grain of salt, as other hidden motivations were 
often in play. In 1753, the crown transferred the town of Helsinki 
to a higher category on the taxation scale, which meant that the 
burghers’ tax burden increased. The local taxation board protested 
wildly, and among other arguments referred to the townsmen’s 
heavy burden of accommodation. In a letter to the king in 1755 
the burghers complained of the difficult accommodation, claim-
ing it cost them several thousand silver dalers every year. The aim 
of the complaint was to obtain concessions and considerable tax 
reliefs for Helsinki.
From 1749 onwards, the National Population Statistics Bureau 
(Sw. Tabellverket) obliged priests to compile yearly population sta-
tistics from their congregations. The statistics from 1750s Helsinki 
are not a complete series, but some years have been preserved. 
 23 Ericsson 1937–1939, p. 147.
 24 Nikula 2010, p. 110; Ericsson 1937–1939, p. 147.
 25 Hornborg 1950, p. 298.
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They provide insight in the size of the civil population in Helsinki 
(the number also includes children) and, more importantly, the 
number of households. The latter is not complete, since poor 
and precarious households were excluded. However, the poorest 
households were also excluded from the billeting of soldiers since 
the accommodation was distributed according to the tax records.
The military population is much more difficult to calculate since 
no similar statistics have been preserved. It also must be remem-
bered that only part of the soldiers lived in the town, with the 
rest lodging out on the fortress islands or in the neighbouring 
parishes. However, with so many regiments in town, the military 
population likely outnumbered the civil population by far. If we 
divide the number of billeted soldiers from 1751 by the number 
of households at the same year, we get 2.37 billeted soldiers per 
household. With the arrival of more enlisted regiments from 
Sweden later the same year, this number might have risen sub-
stantially. And these numbers include only the soldiers itself, not 
the servants of the officers, nor the wives and children that might 
have following the soldiers.
The burghers were not the only ones burdened with accom-
modation, although certainly the ones who complained about it 
the most loudly. Peasants on the surrounding countryside were 
burdened at least as much. Many soldiers from allotted regiments 
worked in the neighbouring parishes, cutting timber or chopping 
wood for the brickworks and lime burning. The lime quarry was 
Table 9.1: Civil population and civil households in Helsinki 1750–1757.





a Excluding poor and precarious households exempt from taxes.
Source: KA, Helsingin ruotsalais-suomalainen seurakunta, II Dc: 
1 Väkilukutaulukot, Väkilukutaulukot 1750–1801. Table by the author.
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also situated outside town, but barracks were swiftly constructed 
there. But, for the mobile forest works, taking place on different 
places every year, barracks could not be constructed. These sol-
diers could in summertime be accommodated in tents, but during 
the winter months they had to be accommodated in the homes 
of the local peasants.
During the first years, the workforce was composed of Finn-
ish allotted soldiers, who could be sent home for the winter. But, 
when allotted regiments from central Sweden were sent to con-
struction works in 1751–1754, it became necessary to arrange 
winter quarters for them in the countryside around Helsinki.26 
The winter accommodation started in October or November and 
lasted until April or May; for sick soldiers it could even last over the 
summer. The sources often state just that the soldiers were lodging 
in ‘the countryside’, without mentioning the parishes. However, 
we know that soldiers were accommodated in peasant homes at 
least in the parishes of Espoo, Sipoo, Porvoo, Kirkkonummi and 
Helsinge. At least at the beginning of the 1750s, enlisted soldiers 
on garrison duty were also sometimes accommodated in winter-
time in the countryside.27
 26 Hornborg 1950, p. 208. KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 18, 
Kassakontrarulla vid fortifikationskassan i Helsingfors 1752; KrA, 
Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 3, Månadskontroller över fortifika-
tionsarbetsmanskapet i Helsingfors 1751; KrA, Helsingfors fästnings-
arkiv, vol. 4, Månadskontroller över fortifikationsarbetsmanskapet i 
Helsingfors 1752; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 19, Kassakont-
rarulla vid fortifikationskassan i Helsingfors 1753; KrA, Helsingfors 
fästningsarkiv, vol. 4, Månadskontroller över fortifikationsarbets-
manskapet i Helsingfors 1752; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 
5, Månadskontroller över fortifikationsarbetsmanskapet i Helsingfors 
1753; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 20, Kassakontrarulla vid 
fortifikationskassan i Helsingfors 1754; KrA, Helsingfors fästnings-
arkiv, vol. 5, Månadskontroller över fortifikationsarbetsmanskapet i 
Helsingfors 1753; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 6, Månadskon-
troller över fortifikationsarbetsmanskapet i Helsingfors 1754. 
 27 Hirn 1970, p. 158; Screen 2010, p. 15.
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The burden of accommodating soldiers gradually diminished in 
the later part of the 1750s. In September 1757, Governor Gustaf 
Samuel Gyllenborg promised that the billeting in Helsinki would 
stop as soon as all soldiers could be lodged in barracks. This pro-
vided to be a slow process, and it is uncertain when the last soldiers 
really moved out from the local burghers’ homes. Nevertheless, 
during the following decades, the crown used large-scale billeting 
of soldiers in Helsinki only temporarily for shorter periods, e.g. 
when troops returned after the Pomeranian War (1757–1762) and 
after a fire in the Siltavuori barracks in 1771.28 However, the prob-
lem re-emerged in the 1790s during and after the Russo-Swedish 
War of 1788–1790.29
The Practices for Billeting Soldiers
The burghers could provide accommodation for the soldiers either 
in living space or in cash. Each burgher received an officer or 
some soldiers as houseguests and had to provide them lodgings.30 
The alternative was to pay them an agreed sum of money, which 
they then used to rent lodgings on their own and thus became 
normal tenants in the townsmen’s houses. The burghers could not 
choose which method to use, as the army had the right to decide 
whether the accommodation could be paid in cash or not.31 But, 
if it was impossible to accommodate officers properly, the army 
likely accepted the cash.
According to the accommodation prescript of 1720, as it was 
interpreted in Helsinki, a general or a colonel was entitled to one 
large and one smaller room, a kitchen, a cellar, a room for his 
servants, a stable for four horses, one good and two poorer beds. 
For lieutenant colonels and majors, the requirements were one big 
and one smaller room, a kitchen, one good bed and one poorer 
 28 Hornborg 1950, p. 301.
 29 Hornborg 1950, pp. 408–410.
 30 Frohnert 1985, p. 21.
 31 Magnusson 2005, p. 198.
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bed, lodgements for the servants, and a stable for two horses. Cap-
tains were entitled to one room, one good bed and one poorer 
bed, and lodgings for one male servant; lieutenants and ensigns 
got the same, albeit with a smaller room than the captains. NCOs 
had to be content with a bed lodging with their hosts. All these 
gentlemen were also entitled to receive firewood and light. For 
simple soldiers, a bed and heat with the host was enough.32
However, it is highly unlikely that these requirements were always 
met in the crowded town. Several complaints from the 1750s 
show that it was not always easy for the soldiers to get the kind of 
lodgings they were entitled to. As the chronic lack of space was 
common knowledge, most of the complaints regarded other 
things than the number of rooms. Officers complained often that 
they did not receive enough light or firewood, while the common 
soldiers lacked bedclothes.33 There were also problems fulfill-
ing the standards during the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790, 
and the town council had to allow several officers to be accom-
modated in the same room, even though they should have been 
entitled to a room of their own.34
In the 1750s, organising the billeting system was the responsi-
bility of Councilman Carl Hasselgren. He likely got help from the 
municipal officials, but it was still a tremendous task for one man to 
handle. During the war of 1788–1790 the town council opted for a 
different solution. In autumn 1789, the council appointed an offi-
cial Billeting Board, consisting of four merchants, five craftsmen, 
five petty-burghers, and one representative for the artillery. Later 
it was also joined by two representatives for homeowners in the 
town without burghers’ rights.35
 32 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:55, Helsingin maistraatin talousasi-
oiden pöytäkirja 25.5.1751.
 33 See for example Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirjat 9.6.1750, 25.6.1750 
and 15.9.1750, Ca:53, HSA.
 34 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:95, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 
16.11.1789.
 35 Hornborg 1950, pp. 455–456.
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The accommodation was distributed among the burghers in 
proportion to their taxation. The more tax a burgher paid, the 
more soldiers he had to take in. The taxation was not progressive 
in a strict meaning of the word, but every year a local taxation 
board decided how to distribute the town’s tax burden between 
the locals. They had good knowledge of everyone’s capability of 
paying and tried to adjust the shares fairly. However, to decide 
what was fair was not always easy. Merchant Anders Lindberg 
complained in 1753 to Governor Gyllenborg that he had been 
burdened with too heavy an accommodation requirement, but 
the town council quickly replied that the billeting had been done 
in proportion to the general taxation. It was not wise to complain. 
In Lindberg’s case, the town council eventually discovered that he 
should have been receiving one soldier more.36
Until 1766 only the burghers were obliged by law to billet sol-
diers, but after that all houseowners in garrison towns had to par-
ticipate.37 However, the statutes of 1720 had already given the 
town council a loophole, as in extraordinary situations, when there 
were more soldiers than usual to billet, it could ask all houseown-
ers in the town to participate.38 It is possible that the local authori-
ties in Helsinki used this option, although it is often difficult to 
say if soldiers were billeted to a household or simply lived there as 
paying lodgers. For example, in March 1750, Ensign Kyhl handed 
in a bill to the town for accommodating officers in his house. This 
seems to indicate that the ensign was not obliged to billet soldiers, 
but, on the other hand, having to accommodate two high-ranking 
officers for months was huge task, and it is possible that Kyhl was 
paid compensation.39
 36 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:59, Helsingin maistraatin talousasi-
oiden pöytäkirja 27.10.1753.
 37 Magnusson 2005, p. 169.
 38 Utdrag utur alle ifrån den 7. Decemb. 1718 utkomne Publique 
Handlingar, Placater, Förordningar, Resolutioner och Publicationer 
… 1742, p. 255.
 39 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:53, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 
3.3.1750.
Billeted Soldiers and Local Civilians in 1750s Helsinki  273
The local authorities were fully aware of the fact that it was 
impossible to distribute accommodation completely evenly and 
fairly. Some burghers simply did not have enough space in their 
homes for the accommodation that they, according to the taxes 
they paid, should have been obliged to arrange. Other burghers 
had to help out more than they should have because they hap-
pened to live in larger houses.40
The town council protocol of 1 August 1753 notes that Com-
mander of the Artillery Fredrik Ehrensvärd will be moving from 
the fortress to the town. He was billeted to Councilman Carl 
Telleqvist. However, Councilman Jakob Johan Tesche, who was at 
the time not burdened with any accommodation at all, was ordered 
to pay Telleqvist a compensation of 15 copper dalers. Accommo-
dating such a high-ranking officer was a big expense, and it was 
thought not to be fair for Telleqvist to cover all on his own.41 A 
monetary payment was a more practical solution than to force a 
high-ranking officer to move around all the time just to distribute 
the burden evenly between his hosts.
The town council protocols show that the billeting system was 
not popular among the locals, and that many burghers tried dif-
ferent tricks to escape their duties. An honest way to do so was to 
rent rooms from somebody else’s house for the soldiers, or to per-
suade relatives with more space to take them in. No one stated that 
the burgher had to accommodate the soldiers in his own house; he 
just had to arrange the accommodation at his own expense.42 Pas-
sive resistance was also popular. In October 1750, Jöran Wervelin 
was accused in town court of not repairing his house, which was 
seen as an attempt to avoid billeting duties.43 Wervelin was not a 
 40 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:55, Helsingin maistraatin talousasi-
oiden pöytäkirja 25.5.1751.
 41 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:59, Helsingin maistraatin talousasi-
oiden pöytäkirja 1.8.1753.
 42 See e.g. HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:53, Helsingin maistraatin 
pöytäkirja 15.1.1750 and 30.6.1750.
 43 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:53, Helsingin maistraatin talousasi-
oiden pöytäkirja 19.10.1750.
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burgher but a low-ranking civil servant, which indicates that the 
town council had to include also non-burgher townspeople to 
the billeting system.
Sometimes the reluctance to billet an officer could take a quite 
humoristic turn, as Colonel Cronhielm experienced upon his 
arrival in Helsinki. As the commander of a garrison regiment, he 
should have been entitled to accommodation in town. However, 
in August 1753, Cronhielm complained to the town council that 
he had not been received quarters. The council refused to accom-
modate the commander, with the explanation that he was also the 
acting commandant of the Sveaborg fortress. No commandant 
had ever been billeted in Helsinki, and therefore it was necessary 
to first ask for instructions from the authorities in Stockholm. 
Cronhielm replied that in such a case he was obliged to use his 
powers as commandant and find himself quarters where it best 
suited him.44
The army was aware how reluctantly the townspeople accom-
modated soldiers, and in 1750 they came up with a system that 
granted a bonus for all who fulfilled their billeting duties with-
out complaints. Lieutenant Ribbing from the Artillery suggested 
that the accommodated soldiers should be relocated between the 
burghers, so that good hosts would get the good-natured and mod-
est soldiers, while burghers failing to follow the rules would get the 
troublemakers. The town council had no objections to this plan, as 
long as no one would get more soldiers than before to accommo-
date.45 It is doubtful if this plan was ever implemented, but maybe 
just the threat was enough to scare disobedient burghers.
The billeting system did not apply only to soldiers but also to 
some civilians working for the army. At least master smith Anders 
Wikström, employed by the Fortification, demanded accommo-
dation in 1753 and seems to have got his will, although the town 
 44 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:59, Helsingin maistraatin talousasi-
oiden pöytäkirja 18.8.1753.
 45 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:53, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 
4.6.1750.
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council protocol does not give details about the arrangement.46 
But not all craftsmen were entitled to accommodation in the 
burghers’ houses, as the fortress accounts note several cases where 
craftsmen were reimbursed for paid rents.47
The duty to accommodate officers and soldiers also included 
their wives and children. Even if the soldiers were temporarily 
commanded elsewhere, the families had the right to stay. Leave 
for private reasons did not automatically deprive the soldier of his 
right to accommodation, and he still had the right to quarters for 
himself and his family.48 This right could also extend to after the 
soldier himself had moved into an army barrack. After the artil-
lery regiment moved from the town to the fortress islands in 1754, 
many families stayed behind in town and in June 1755 Council-
man Nils Larsson Burtz complained that the soldiers’ families 
were still living in Helsinki.49
For the common soldiers’ wives, it might have been more con-
venient to stay in town. Most of them had to work and gain an 
income, since the enlisted soldiers’ salary was far too low to sustain 
the family. The town might have offered more economic oppor-
tunities for the women, who usually earned money by washing, 
sewing, nursing and cooking. Many of them also sold food and 
beverages, either in small stands or circulating on the streets.50
Both the allotted and the enlisted soldiers in the Swedish Realm 
were often married – not only the officers but also the common 
soldiers. The enlisted soldiers’ wives often followed their husbands 
to the deployment, while the allotted soldiers’ wives usually stayed 
 46 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:59, Helsingin maistraatin talousasi-
oiden pöytäkirja 27.10.1753.
 47 KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 18, Kassakontrarulla vid forti-
fikationskassan i Helsingfors 1752, KrA.
 48 Magnusson 2005, p. 200.
 49 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:61, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 
26.9.1755.
 50 Lennersand et al. 2017, pp. 187–192; Lennersand 2017, pp. 165–169; 
Hammar 2017, pp. 145–146. About the situation in Europe see for 
example Hearl-Eamon 2008.
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at home, taking care of the croft. However, this was not always the 
case, as occasionally wives of allotted soldiers could also follow 
their husbands to Helsinki, and sometimes they also visited their 
husbands or fiancés during deployments.51
The facts that civilians could also be accommodated, and that 
soldiers could live on rent if they received accommodation in 
cash, blurs the limits of the billeting system. All these factors make 
it difficult to say if individual soldiers staying with the civilians 
were billeted or just tenants. But in both cases the results were the 
same: the soldiers lived close to the civilians and formed social 
and economic relations with them. They were not staying in closed 
barrack areas out on the fortress island but constantly interacting 
with the local society.
Social Interaction between Soldiers and Locals
Helsinki was crowded and it was difficult and expensive to find 
somewhere to live. Many houses, buildings and even rooms were 
shared by different social groups, and military staff and civilians 
mingled extensively. All local households probably encountered 
the army staff, voluntarily or involuntarily, as it would have been 
extremely difficult to avoid the soldiers and their families, and these 
encounters resulted in different kinds of social or economic rela-
tions. This mixture of different population groups in their shared 
living space is difficult to detect in the sources, but sometimes 
court records can reveal details of the different ways of living.
It would be interesting to know exactly which soldier stayed 
with which burgher, but no lists have been preserved, and there 
are not many descriptions in the town council protocols about 
the actual living arrangements in the crowded town. Complaints 
were common, but expensive paper was not wasted on details. 
However, some exceptions can be found. In a murder case from 
1761, the living arrangements of the accused soldier Martin 
Gutatis were described in detail. Gutatis was an enlisted soldier, 
 51 Gustafsson 2018, p. 186.
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currently on leave, which was nothing unusual for enlisted sol-
diers. He had been lodging with Anna Catharina Björklund, the 
wife of an artillery employee. Anna Catharina Björklund, in her 
turn, was a tenant of Walborg Henriksdotter Hallberg; she was 
a married woman, but there is no mention of her husband. All 
three had been living in one and the same room, until Walborg 
Henriksdotter had evicted the others because it was too crowded. 
Walborg Henriksdotter also ran a tavern, but it is not mentioned if 
she ran her business in the same room or somewhere else.52
A later court case from 1789 features a detailed description 
of the local living arrangements during the Russo-Swedish War of 
1788–1790. The situation during the war closely resembled the 
1750s, as soldiers in too large numbers had again to be accom-
modated in the burghers’ homes in Helsinki. In November 1789, 
merchant Carl Etholén complained about the improper behaviour 
of two captains and the damage they had caused to his house, and 
at the same time also complained about the number of soldiers he 
had to accommodate.
Before the two captains arrived, Etholén had already been 
assigned to billet two other officers with their servants, as well 
as three NCOs. His house was not big. On the ground floor was 
his shop, a room for his bookkeeper and apprentices, and a small 
chamber he used himself. The upper floor consisted of a drawing 
room – impossible to keep warm in wintertime – and two small 
chambers occupied by his wife, children, sister-in-law and female 
servants. Since his family already filled up the house, Etholén had 
rented a room from his uncle’s widow’s house for the two officers. 
The officer’s servants and the three NCOs lived in Etholén’s serv-
ant’s quarters in his outhouse.
Despite this, the two captains had been billeted to his upper floor 
and they were determined to get in there. While the family had 
been away to a wedding, the captains had broken the door and 
carried their belongings in. Later at night, while the household 
was sound asleep, they arrived themselves, forcing the Etholén 
 52 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 4.6.1761.
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family to escape from their own home to their neighbours. The 
town council agreed that Etholén could not possibly accommo-
date any more officers, and that the captains would have to stay in 
the vicarage until other quarters could be found. The captains also 
had to pay Etholén for the damage they had caused to his doors.53
The use of court records as sources easily gives the impression 
that the relations between the soldier and the civilians were bad. 
However, usually the soldiers did not cause this much destruc-
tion. Cases where civilians sued soldiers for threats, violence, or 
damages to property are quite rare in Helsinki in the 1750s.54 In 
1753, innkeeper Gustaf Wetter accused Lieutenant Stjernvall and 
NCO Schiönström for arriving to his house in the middle of the 
night, shouting, yelling, and kicking his door when they required 
accommodation. The material damages were insignificant, and 
the burgher was mainly upset about the disturbance of his sleep.55
In 1757 another case of intruding officers can be found, where 
two NCOs were accused of having forced a lock and broken a 
door to get in merchant Aron Peron’s shop. This case, however, did 
not relate to billeting, but to another common problem, namely 
debts. Merchant Peron owed the soldiers money, but he was 
unfortunately bankrupt and could not pay. Therefore, the NCOs 
were planning to take goods from his shop instead of payment. 
However, they changed their mind after entering and did not 
take anything.56
The only known case from Helsinki where soldiers systemati-
cally and constantly pestered a local civilian is from 1755, when 
the poor brickwork owner Anders Ernst Mosberg claimed that 
soldiers were defaming him, singing nasty songs about him, 
shouting at him, threatening him, and throwing stones at his 
house. The court never really got to the bottom of this story, but 
 53 HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:95 Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 
23.11.1789.
 54 Talvitie 2014.
 55 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 3.4.1753.
 56 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 19.3.1757.
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Mosberg also accused his neighbour, merchant Erik Grönberg, 
for having something to do with all this.57 Mosberg had also been 
litigating against his former business partner, Johan Lillgren, in 
court for years. Lillgren ran a tavern in Mosberg’s neighbourhood, 
where the soldiers usually were sitting drinking, which might 
have been a coincidence or not. Mosberg died in December 1755, 
which probably explains why the case was never resolved and just 
disappeared suddenly from the court records. In Mosberg’s case 
the soldier’s animosity might very well have been fuelled by local 
civilians and originated in old conflicts between neighbours.
The court records reveal that civilians ended up in court for 
attacking soldiers more often than the other way around. Between 
1752 and 1755, the town court handled seven cases were soldiers 
or their wives accused civilians for manhandling them and only 
three cases were civilians accused soldiers.58 The local butcher 
Gudmund Mether often got himself into trouble, sometimes also 
with the army staff. In May 1756 he was accused of beating sol-
dier’s wife Anna Maria Sjöberg. She and her husband had been 
billeted to Mether’s house together with their children. When one 
of the children had cried, the mother had tried to silence him 
with threats of corporal punishment. Mether had tried to calm 
her down, but she had slandered the butcher, who had retorted by 
hitting her.59
Different behavioural and cultural codes could sometimes lead 
to conflicts, and women could get violent too. In 1754, carrier’s 
wife Annika Carlsdotter Palin was accused of slandering and 
beating NCO Jacob Drossel’s lover, Madame Holthausen, who 
had been baking bread at Palin’s home.60 Men could also fall 
victim to local civilians’ anger, as did the enlisted soldier Jacob 
 57 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 3.10; 10.10; 
14.10; 17.10; 21.10; 25.10; 31.10. and 5.11.1755.
 58 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 1752–1755.
 59 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 11.5 and 
12.5.1756.
 60 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 22.4 and 
5.5.1755.
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Östman, who in 1755 accused a local custom inspector and his 
wife of attacking him both verbally and physically.61
Considering the size of the military population, including 
women and children, the few court cases of violence represent a 
minuscule part of the encounters between the army and the civil 
population. It can of course be argued that the soldiers’ possible 
attacks upon civilians might not have been dealt with in in the 
town court but instead in courts martial. The complex court sys-
tem in Helsinki has been thoroughly described by Petri Talvitie 
(2014) in his study of soldiers’ criminality.62 However, Talvitie’s 
research does not indicate that the soldiers were violent, as he 
found only two fights between soldiers and civilians in the mili-
tary court records. There are also very few cases where soldiers 
attacked each other, and in the 1750s not a single homicide involv-
ing the military population has been found. Talvitie’s conclusion 
is that the townspeople were more inclined to violence than the 
military staff.63
The court records also reveal that trade and other economic 
interaction went on to a large extent between the civil and mili-
tary populations. In the period 1752–1755, nearly 36% of all civil 
court cases where army staff or their families acted as plaintiffs 
or accused concerned debts or other economic transactions.64 
The soldiers could act as both debtors and creditors, buyers 
and sellers, or employers and employees. For example, in 1754, sol-
dier Henrik Nymalm demanded payment for a cow from butcher 
Gabriel Wikström,65 while soldier Johan Hortenius was arguing 
with carrier Palin about the sale of a horse.66 The court records 
also show that the soldiers did all sorts of works for the locals, 
who sometimes refused to pay up. For example, in 1755, enlisted 
 61 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 9.5.1755.
 62 Talvitie 2014, pp. 49–52.
 63 Talvitie 2014, pp. 56–57. 
 64 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 1752–1755.
 65 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 14.6.1754.
 66 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 2.5.1754, 
14.6.1754 and 2.8.1754.
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soldier Anders Selling complained that he had not received his 
salary from one of the highest-ranking civil servants in town, Pro-
vincial Treasurer Anders Hellenius, who had employed the soldier 
to paint his house red.67
A common type of court case where the soldiers were men-
tioned, but usually not accused, was trials of single mothers 
who had given birth out of wedlock. In the years 1752–1755, the 
records of the Helsinki town court contain 30 trials regarding pre-
marital sexual relations involving soldiers. Pre-marital sex, or sex 
between any persons not being married, was a criminal offence 
and punishable by 18th-century Swedish law. The courts of 
Helsinki, however, quite often seem to have taken these trials 
quite lightly, as the processes were formulaic and the penalties 
not too harsh.
The Helsinki town court did not deal with the fathers, only with 
the mothers, since they did not have jurisdiction over the sol-
diers. In some cases, the fathers were also claimed to be ‘unknown 
soldiers’. This might have been true in some cases, but blaming 
deceased or departed soldiers and sailors was also a way to pro-
tect local married men. In one case this became evident: in 1752, 
maidservant Anna Jacobsdotter claimed that her former master, 
merchant Fredrik Myhrberg, had paid soldier Christopher Bruce 
to accept the paternity of her child, although the real father was 
the merchant himself.68
It would be easy to assume that soldiers who had sexual rela-
tions with local women left them in trouble after an unwanted 
pregnancy. However, by contrast with the situation in many other 
European countries, the Swedish army actively encouraged sol-
diers to marry, so they often did marry their local sweethearts.69 
 67 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 29.8.1755 
and 5.9.1755.
 68 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 17.11.1752.
 69 About Swedish soldiers’ marriages in general and also their marriages 
with local women, see e.g. Lennersand et al. 2017, pp. 188–191.
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Marrying a local woman provided the soldiers not only with eco-
nomic support but also with local social networks.70
Many soldiers were already married upon arrival, but between 
the arrival of Hamilton’s Regiment to Helsinki in 1751 and the end 
of 1757 there were 36 soldiers from the regiment getting married 
according to the regiment’s church records. In only eight cases 
are there indications of the bride’s origin. Three of them were 
mentioned to have been from Helsinki, and one from Fortress 
Sveaborg. In addition, two brides came from countryside parishes 
near Helsinki, Kirkkonummi and Inkoo. However, in three more 
cases a profession and an employer are mentioned, showing that 
these women had prior to their marriage been working as serv-
ants in town. In one case the father of the bride is mentioned, 
showing that also this woman was of local origin.71
However, not all soldiers’ marriages were registered in the 
regimental church records. Many soldiers married women from 
neighbouring civil parishes, and their marriages were inscribed 
in the civil parish records.72 One unusual case went to court in 
Helsinki in 1754: enlisted soldier Johan Lilliegren accused his 
former fiancée, maidservant Johanna Eliedotter, of breaking her 
promise to marry him without any reason. Men could also be 
abandoned by their sweethearts, but they rarely decided to bring 
the matter to court.73
Soldiers from allotted Swedish regiments also married local 
women during their deployment in Finland. At least three sol-
diers from the Calmar Regiment got married in Inkoo and 
Siuntio, rural parishes near Helsinki, in 1753–1754. It is likely 
they had been billeted over the winter among the local farmsteads 
there. Also, one soldier from Närke Regiment married in Vihti in 
1753. In addition to common soldiers, officers, NCOs and other 
 70 Lennersand 2017, pp. 160–169.
 71 HisKi, Sotilasseurakunnat, Hamiltonin rykmentti, vihityt 1751–1757.
 72 HisKi, Uusimaa, vihityt 1751–1757.
 73 KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 14.6, 3.9.1754 
and 23.9.1754.
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military staff from enlisted regiments also sometimes married 
local women.74
Another way of mapping the relations between civilians and sol-
diers is looking at the godparents of children born in the Helsinki 
town congregation in 1750–1757.75 The results are inconclusive, as 
godparents often lack titles, and women are often called just ‘wife’. 
However, common soldiers very rarely appeared as godfathers 
for common townsmen’s children in the 1750s. For the higher 
social groups, the situation is different: wealthy merchants, high-
ranking civil servants and other members of the local elite could 
sometimes include high-ranking officers and important army 
staff among the godparents for their children. In some cases, it is 
clear that the father of the child had ample business transactions 
with the army. For example, the local pharmacist Johan Magnus 
Tingelund often sold medicaments, colours and ink to the army, 
and it is hardly surprising that many of his children had mili-
tary staff among their godparents. Also, many of the local mer-
chants that were big suppliers of materiel to the army, e.g. Johan 
Sederholm, strengthened his bonds with the army by including 
officers among his children’s godparents.
In the 1750s, many locals might still have regarded the soldiers 
as temporary visitors in their hometown, and thus felt no need to 
form long-lasting social bonds and commitment to the army. But, 
as the garrison regiments during the following decades became 
permanent residents in town, the military and civil society started 
to merge to a larger extent, especially among the social elites. In 
the late 18th century, marriages between soldiers and civil women 
became much more common, many daughters of wealthy mer-
chants started to marry officers, and their sons might even marry 
daughters of officers. Not only was this phenomenon due to 
closer and more long-lasting relations between military staff and 
 74 HisKi, Uusimaa, vihityt 1751–1757.
 75 KA, Helsingin ruotsalais-suomalainen seurakunta, I C:2 Syntyneiden 
ja kastettujen luettelot 1750–1764.
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civilians but it also reflects a profound social transformation in 
Sweden, where a new middle class started to emerge.
Conclusions
The burden of billeting soldiers among local inhabitants peaked 
in Helsinki in the early and mid-1750s owing to the construc-
tion works of the sea fortress Sveaborg and the arrival of garri-
son regiments. The accommodation of thousands and thousands 
of soldiers for months or years was a tremendous task. The town 
council tried to distribute the billeted soldiers fairly among the 
burghers, but that was an impossible task. Complaints were inevi-
table, but the tensions and complaints rarely resulted in violent 
rows, although they sometimes did end up in the local court.
Helsinki appears strangely calm and the local inhabitants obvi-
ously quite easily adapted to the military invasion of their living 
spaces. The reason for the Helsinkians’ quite relaxed approach 
under these extreme circumstances might be found in the town’s 
history. The early modern Swedish Realm was a highly militarised 
society, and Helsinki, owing to its strategic situation and excellent 
harbour, had always had importance for the military. The inhabit-
ants had likely got used to having soldiers around, and after two 
Russian occupations during the previous 50 years they might also 
have felt more secure with so many Swedish soldiers in town. 
Many of the local inhabitants were refugees from areas that had 
been conquered by Russia in the Great Northern War or in the 
Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743.
The court records also show frequent economic interaction 
between the army staff and civilians. Many civilians did their best 
to gain profit from the soldiers. Helsinki had suffered economi-
cally from the wars and occupations during the first half of the 
18th century, and the fortress and the soldiers offered a waste 
range of economic opportunities, both for merchants selling con-
struction materials and petty-burghers and poor widows (and 
rich merchants) selling beer and spirit. For most local inhabit-
ants there was the possibility to profit economically from the army 
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in one way or the other – the more soldiers, the more clients.76 
Local historian Henrik Forsius warned that in 1757 the town was 
already getting economically dependent on the soldiers, and that 
too many locals were engaged in the lucrative tavern business and 
neglected their own livelihoods.77 Many locals thus had a strong 
economic incitement to stay on friendly terms with the army.
Peaceful social interaction is always much more difficult to 
detect than quarrels, since only problems and fights end up in the 
court records. However, the church records offer proof of sexual 
relations and marriages between soldiers and civil women. How-
ever, only the absolute socio-economic elite in Helsinki included 
high-ranking officers among their children’s godparents in the 
1750s. At that time, the soldiers might still have been perceived 
as temporary guests, and the locals were not so keen in forming 
life-long relations with them, as they were mainly interested in 
short-term business relations. Maybe the local civilians’ calm and 
collected approach to the army’s invasion of their homes could 
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The general objective of this anthology has been to discuss the 
role of non-state actors in the military supply systems in the early 
modern Swedish Realm. This includes entrepreneurial officers in 
the army, burghers in the towns, and peasants in the countryside. 
Officers are here included with non-state actors alongside burgh-
ers and peasants because during the 16th and 17th centuries they 
more closely resembled private entrepreneurs than public serv-
ants. The two main questions are: in what ways did the Swedish 
government engage civilians in supply operations, and what kind 
of special supply challenges did the northern, vast and sparsely 
populated realm have compared to other European powers?
This is not the first book to argue that civilians had an impor-
tant role to play in military supply systems. However, most of the 
studies on military history in Sweden and Finland have focused 
on wartime operations, especially on the challenges the armies 
encountered when trying to acquire the victuals or the horse 
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fodder they needed from the local population. Moreover, plenty of 
attention has been paid to conscriptions and recruitments, which 
were arguably the biggest military burdens for civil society. The 
purpose of this collection is to complement the overall picture by 
bringing to the discussion new actors, such as small-town burgh-
ers, and by also including peacetime operations to the analysis. 
In this way, the book seeks to enhance our understanding of the 
total costs and benefits of the militarisation of the early modern 
Swedish Realm.
According to Charles Tilly’s well-known theory, early modern 
governments had three ways to mobilise private resources: coer-
cion, markets or a combination of the two. As regards coercion, 
Tilly refers principally to taxation and conscriptions, but coercive 
methods were also used in actual supply operations. As shown in 
the chapters of this anthology, the Swedish crown utilised all three 
of these models, with varying effects and results.
The production of saltpetre is a good example of coercion. The 
saltpetre factories were owned by the state, but the acquisition 
of raw materials (dung, ash, firewood, straw etc.) was based on 
forced deliveries. As Mirkka Lappalainen writes in her chapter, 
the crown forced peasants to give up an important part of their 
life-saving manure to feed the endless demands of warfare. The 
oppressive nature of the system made it susceptible to insubordi-
nation, disobedience and loitering. The same conclusion applies 
to the billeting of soldiers, as the burghers did not house garrison 
soldiers because it was profitable but because it was their duty. 
According to Sofia Gustafsson, the billeting obligation was a con-
stant source of complaints and tensions in Helsinki during the 
1750s, when local burghers had to share their houses with hun-
dreds of soldiers from all over the country.
Inland, the peasants were forced to maintain bridges and roads 
for the use of the troops of the crown, as well as to provide them 
and their horses with shelter and nutrition, as Anu Lahtinen dis-
cusses in her chapter. For some of the peasants, the troop move-
ments also offered opportunities to make small profits by selling 
spirits to the soldiers, but the overall burden grew constantly at 
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the turn of the 17th century, increasing tax arrears. The crown 
also resorted to coercion-based resource mobilisation during the 
Great Northern War, when it tried to press the peasants to buy 
crown farms against their own intention, and in the early phases 
of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, when peasants and 
burghers had to bake bread for the army because there were not 
enough crown bakeries in Finland.
At first sight, the use of coercion might create an image of a 
strong state, capable of forcing its subjects to serve their ruler’s 
military ambitions. To some extent, this conception might be 
true, but there was another side to this coin. The Swedish crown 
resorted to forcing not just because of its superior administrative 
capabilities but because it did not have any other option. Towns 
were small in Finland, resources were limited, and the infrastruc-
ture was underdeveloped. It is revealing that during the Russo-
Swedish War of 1741–1743 the crown had to buy bread from the 
baker’s guild of Stockholm, as the bakers in Finland did not have 
enough ovens. Likewise, there was almost no one to sell bricks 
and lime in Finland, when the crown began to construct bakeries 
during the early phases of the campaign, and consequently the 
construction materials had to transported from Stockholm.
Both the proponents and opponents of the military revolu-
tion theory have presented the Swedish Realm as a model case of 
an effective bureaucratic state – the former treating it as a European 
norm, the latter as a European anomaly. However, as several chap-
ters in this anthology suggest, its effectiveness had its limits. The 
administration excelled in its core tasks like collecting taxes for 
the king or rounding up men for the wars but was often in trouble 
in front of more complex or unexpected missions when there was 
a lack of reliable information.
This is not to say, however, that supply markets were non-existent. 
Quite the contrary. The chapters of this book suggest that, in 
certain situations, markets had an important albeit relatively 
unexplored role in wartime and peacetime operations. The mer-
chants were often more flexible than the public administration in 
organising the supply, and also better connected to the European 
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finance markets. During the Great Northern War (1700–1721), 
the burghers of Nyen provided the army with victuals and other 
necessities, and in the spring of 1713 the supply of the army and 
navy units in Finland was practically privatised to one person, 
Johan Henrik Frisius. A single merchant – and a refugee from his 
destroyed hometown, for that matter – had better credit standing 
on international markets than the Swedish crown itself.
The Ingrian War (1609–1617) is another interesting example. 
According to Jaakko Björklund, the Swedish crown would prob-
ably have lost the campaign without the private credit offered by 
several high-ranking officers. The commanders used their per-
sonal connections and resources to pay soldiers’ salaries and to 
buy victuals and clothes for them, and they acted as necessary 
intermediaries by raising funds from the private sector to the 
ruler they served at any given time.
Some cases even indicate that Swedish decision makers, at times, 
relied too much on the possibility of utilising markets and civilian 
actors in supply. The construction period of sea fortress Sveaborg is 
a prime example of this. When the construction began in 1748, the 
army came to Helsinki with the intention of outsourcing both 
the maintenance of the construction site and the accommodation 
of the workers and soldiers to the local burghers. However, the 
burghers were too few in numbers and too afraid of the loss of their 
autonomy to take full advantage of all the possibilities, and the 
army had to resort to its own production. The soldier billeting 
system faced similar problems, as the burghers were unable to 
lodge the soldiers along the official accommodation prescripts 
and the crown had to both bend the regulations and resort to 
barrack-building.
Overall, David Parrott is probably right when arguing that the 
officers, burghers and other civilians engaged in supply operations 
extended the central government’s administrative power, and for 
that reason the outsourcing was an efficient means of mobilising 
military resources. However, the use of markets was possible only 
if there were profits to be made. Otherwise, the cooperation began 
to resemble coercion.
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The case of Nyen is illustrative in that respect. As Kasper Kepsu 
writes in his chapter, the crown had difficulties getting credit from 
wealthy merchants in Swedish cities during the Great Northern War 
because normal trade yielded a much greater profit than the 
government was able to offer. The situation was different in 
Finland, near the operational area. The small-town burghers were 
willing to do business with the army and navy, because they did 
not have better alternatives. Military operations disrupted nor-
mal trade, and consequently it was better for the merchants to use 
their connections to provision the troops than to fall into poverty.
As regards the 17th-century officers, also they were motivated 
by prospective profits. The high-ranking officers were willing to 
finance the Ingrian War from their own pockets because they 
were confident that their king would reward them sometime in 
the future – if not in money, then in land grants or high positions 
in the crown administration. Had the king not done so, he would 
have risked the loyalty of his officers. Moreover, military cam-
paigns offered always other sources of revenues than just earned 
income such as supply trade or looting. Officers who allowed their 
units to disintegrate would lose these revenues.
According to Jaakko Björklund, the Swedish crown was highly 
dependent on the services of foreign aristocrats during the Ingrian 
War. Some of them joined the war to gain experience in com-
mand, and they were not willing to use their own funding to wage 
the war. However, there were also military migrants who wanted 
to make a career in the Swedish army, and they were more eager 
to invest their own resources. These cases affirm Jan Glete’s argu-
ment that private actors preferred to cooperate with strong rulers 
capable of actually ruling their territories, although Glete did not 
develop his theory to analyse military enterprising. He was more 
interested in foreign trade and state–merchant relationships.
The Swedish kings preferred to acquire the maintenance for 
their army from civilians, either by coercion or cooperation, 
but the preconditions of their northern realm set serious limits 
on their attempts to act like their counterparts in Western and 
Central Europe. Although the privatised maintenance was in many 
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cases surprisingly effective, the crown could never fully count on 
it. The Ingrian War of 1610–1617 and the Russo-Swedish War of 
1741–1743 offer a fruitful parallel: in the former, private entrepre-
neurs turned the war into a military victory, whereas in the latter 
the lack of private entrepreneurs turned the war into a military 
disaster. This uncertainty forced the Swedish Realm to maintain 
a strong governmental machine. The stronger the state, the better 
chances it had of using private resources in military supply.
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Early Modern Finland
 During the early modern centuries, gunpowder and artillery revolution-ized warfare, and armies grew rapidly. To sustain their new military machines, the European rulers turned increasingly to their civilian 
subjects, making all levels of civil society serve the needs of the military.
This volume examines civil-military interaction in the multinational 
Swedish Realm in 1550–1800, with a focus on its eastern part, present-day 
Finland, which was an important supply region and battlefield bordered by 
Russia. Sweden was one of the frontrunners of the Military Revolution in 
the 16th and 17th centuries. The crown was eager to adapt European models, 
but its attempts to outsource military supply to civilians in a realm lacking 
people, capital, and resources were not always successful.
This book aims at explaining how the army utilized civilians – burghers, 
peasants, entrepreneurs – to provision itself, and how the civil population 
managed to benefit from the cooperation. The chapters of the book 
illustrate the different ways in which Finnish civilians took part in supplying 
war efforts, e.g. how the army made deals with businessmen to finance its 
military campaigns and how town and country people were obliged to lodge 
and feed soldiers.
The European armies’ dependence on civilian maintenance has received 
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in Early Modern Finland brings a Nordic perspective to the debate.
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